Method, Model and Matter

This collection of essays deals with three clusters of problems in the philo­ sophy of science: scientific method, conceptual models, and ontological underpinnings. The disjointedness of topics is more apparent than real, since the whole book is concerned with the scientific knowledge of fact. Now, the aim of factual knowledge is the conceptual grasping of being, and this understanding is provided by theories of whatever there may be. If the theories are testable and specific, such as a theory of a particular chemical reaction, then they are often called 'theoretical models' and clas­ sed as scientific. If the theories are extremely general, like a theory of syn­ thesis and dissociation without any reference to a particular kind of stuff, then they may be called 'metaphysical' - as well as 'scientific' if they are consonant with science. Between these two extremes there is a whole gamut of kinds of factual theories. Thus the entire spectrum should be dominated by the scientific method, quite irrespective of the subject matter. This is the leitmotiv of the present book. The introductory chapter, on method in the philosophy of science, tackles the question 'Why don't scientists listen to their philosophers?'. Front Matter....Pages I-VII Introduction....Pages 1-23 Front Matter....Pages 25-25 Testability Today....Pages 27-43 Is Biology Methodologically Unique?....Pages 44-66 The Axiomatic Method in Physics....Pages 67-87 Front Matter....Pages 89-89 Concepts of Model....Pages 91-113 Analogy, Simulation, Representation....Pages 114-130 Mathematical Modeling in Social Science....Pages 131-142 Front Matter....Pages 143-143 Is Scientific Metaphysics Possible?....Pages 145-159 The Metaphysics, Epistemology and Methodology of Levels....Pages 160-168 How do Realism, Materialism and Dialectics fare in Contemporary Science?....Pages 169-185 Back Matter....Pages 186-196