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Methodological and metaphilosophical disputes in the contemporary philosophy of law are very vivid. Basic issues remain controversial. The purpose of the book is to confront approaches of Anglo-Saxon and continental philosophy of law to the following topics: the purpose of legal philosophy, the role of disagreement in legal philosophy, methodology of legal philosophy (conceptual analysis) and normativity of law. We see those areas of legal metaphilosophy as drawing recently more and more attention in the literature. The authors of particular chapters are internationally recognised scholars rooted in various traditions: Anglo-Saxon (Gerald Postema, Dennis Patterson, Kenneth Ehrenberg, Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco); Southern-European (Riccardo Guastini, Manuel Atienza); Nordic (Torben Spaak); German (Ralf Poscher); and Central-European (Jan Woleński, Tomasz Gizbert-Studnicki, Adam Dyrda). They represent different approaches and different backgrounds. The purpose of the volume is to contribute to the cross-cultural discussions of fundamental issues of philosophy of law. Contents The Philosophy of Legal Philosophy: An Introduction Part I: Status of Legal Philosophy 1. Jurisprudence, the Sociable Science I. Vera Philosophia II. Policing the Borders of Jurisprudence III. Philosophical Jurisprudence IV. Clio's Contribution: Why History? V. Sociable Philosophical Jurisprudence VI. Vera Philosophia Again References 2. The Two Faces of Analytic Legal Philosophy I. Introducing Analytic Legal Philosophy II. ToolKit of Analytic Legal Philosophy III. Law, Jurisprudence and Legal Philosophy IV. Analytic Legal Philosophy as a Conceptual Workshop V. An Exercise in Conceptual Construction VI. Analytic Legal Philosophy as Meta-Jurisprudential Analysis VII. An Exercise in Meta-Jurisprudence References 3. Can We Please Stop Doing This? By the Way, Postema was Right I. Introduction II. Joseph Raz III. Robert Alexy IV. Ronald Dworkin V. Gerald Postema References Part II: Legal Philosophy and Metaphysics 4. Naturalism and Legal Philosophy References 5. The Canberra Plan and the Nature of Law I. Introduction II. Legal Positivism III. Serious Metaphysics and Conceptual Analysis IV. Modest Conceptual Analysis V. Jackson's Moral Functionalism I: The Idea VI. Jackson's Moral Functionalism II: Identifying the Descriptive Properties VII. Jackson's Moral Functionalism III: Sense, Reference, and Realiser and Role Properties VIII. Michael Smith on the Network Model IX. Lewis on Defining Theoretical Terms X. Idea of a Platitude XI. The Permutation Problem XII. Response-Dependent Theories: A Difficulty XIII. The Concept of Law XIV. Mature Legal Thinking XV. Conclusion References 6. The Social Sources Thesis, Metaphysics and Metaphilosophy I. Introduction: Social Sources Thesis II. Reductionist Account III. Supervenience Account IV. Grounding Account V. Metaphilosophical Conclusions References 7. Ontology and Reason Giving in Law I. Hume's Guillotine II. Getting to a Legal 'Ought' III. Need for a Metaphysical Answer IV. An Artefact V. An Institution References Part III: Particular Problems of Legal Philosophy 8. The Philosophy of Law as a 'Regional' Philosophy I. How Philosophy Can be Regional: The Case of Legal Philosophy II. But Can Legal Philosophy be Doubly Regional? The Case of Latin World Legal Philosophy References 9. Re-examining Deep Conventions: Practical Reason and Forward-Looking Agency I. Introduction II. Intentional Action is Primarily Forward-Looking III. A Criticism of Deep Conventions: Deep Conventions are Always Forward-Looking and Therefore Presuppose Practical Reason IV. An Alternative Diagnosis V. Conclusion: Forward-Looking and Primary Reasons for Actions References Part IV: Theoretical Disagreement in Legal Philosophy 10. Why We Argue About the Law: An Agonistic Account of Legal Disagreement I. The Argument from Disagreement II. Taking Stock III. An Agonistic Account IV. Resume References 11. The Epistemology of Theoretical Disagreement I. Introduction II. Legal Disagreements: Empirical and Theoretical III. Easy (Empirical) Cases of Disagreements IV. Practical Resolvability of Easy Cases (Fork on the Road Example) V. What is the 'Philosophical' Evidence? VI. Why are Our Philosophical Defects Justified? VII. Is it Also Reasonable to Suspend Belief? VIII. Back to Theoretical Disagreements IX. Two Positivisms: Better and the Best X. Tell Me Lies, Tell Me Lies, Sweet Little Lies XI. Epilogue: Can We Trust Legal Philosophers? References Index Présentation de l'éditeur : "Methodological and metaphilosophical disputes in the contemporary philosophy of law are very vivid. Basic issues remain controversial. The purpose of the book is to confront approaches of Anglo-Saxon and continental philosophy of law to the following topics: the purpose of legal philosophy, the role of disagreement in legal philosophy, methodology of legal philosophy (conceptual analysis) and normativity of law. We see those areas of legal metaphilosophy as drawing recently more and more attention in the literature. The authors of particular chapters are internationally recognised scholars rooted in various traditions: Anglo-Saxon (Gerald Postema, Dennis Patterson, Kenneth Ehrenberg, Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco); Southern-European (Riccardo Guastini, Manuel Atienza); Nordic (Torben Spaak); German (Ralf Poscher); and Central-European (Jan Wolenski, Tomasz Gizbert-Studnicki, Adam Dyrda). They represent different approaches and different backgrounds. The purpose of the volume is to contribute to the cross-cultural discussions of fundamental issues of philosophy of law."