Meddling in the Ballot Box : The Causes and Effects of Partisan Electoral Interventions

This book examines why partisan electoral interventions occur as well as their effects on the election results in countries in which the great powers intervened. A new dataset shows that the U.S. and the USSR/Russia have intervened in one out of every nine elections between 1946 and 2000 in other countries in order to help or hinder one of the candidates or parties; the Russian intervention in the 2016 U.S. elections is just the latest example. Nevertheless, electoral interventions receive scant scholarly attention. This book develops a new theoretical model to answer both questions. It argues that electoral interventions are usually “inside jobs,” occurring only if a significant domestic actor within the target wants it. Likewise, electoral interventions won’t happen unless the intervening country fears its interests are endangered by another significant party or candidate with very different and inflexible preferences. As for the effects it argues that such meddling usually gives a significant boost to the preferred side, with overt interventions being more effective than covert ones in this regard. However, unlike in later elections, electoral interventions in founding elections usually harm the aided side. A multi-method framework is used in order to study these questions, including in-depth archival research into six cases in which the U.S. seriously considered intervening, the statistical analysis of the aforementioned dataset (PEIG), and a micro-level analysis of election surveys from three intervention cases. It also includes a preliminary analysis of the Russian intervention in the 2016 U.S. elections and the cyber-future of such meddling in general. "This book examines why partisan electoral interventions occur as well as their effects on the election results in countries in which the great powers intervened. A new dataset shows that the U.S. and the USSR/Russia have intervened in one out of every nine elections between 1946 and 2000 in other countries in order to help or hinder one of the candidates or parties. The Russian intervention in the 2016 U.S. elections is just the latest example. Nevertheless, electoral interventions receive scant scholarly attention. This manuscript develops a new theoretical model in order to answer both questions. It argues that electoral interventions are usually an "inside job," occurring only if a significant domestic actor within the target wants it. Likewise, electoral interventions won't happen unless the intervening country fears its interests are endangered by another significant party or candidate with very different and inflexible preferences. As for the effects, it argues that such meddling usually gives a significant boost to the preferred side with overt interventions being more effective than covert ones in this regard. However, unlike in later elections, electoral interventions in founding elections usually harm the aided side. A multi-method framework is used in order to study these questions, including in-depth archival research into six cases in which the U.S. seriously considered intervening in this manner, the statistical analysis of the above-noted dataset (PEIG), and a micro-level analysis of election surveys from three intervention cases. It also includes a preliminary analysis of the Russian intervention in the 2016 U.S. elections and the cyber-future of such meddling in general"-- Provided by publisher Why do world powers sometimes try to determine who wins an election in another country? What effects does such meddling have on the targeted elections results? Great powers have attempted for centuries to intervene in elections occurring in other states through various covert and overt methods, with the American intervention in the 2013 Kenyan elections and the Russian intervention in the 2016 US elections being just two recent examples. Indeed, the Americans and the Soviets/Russians intervened in one out of every nine national-level executive elections between 1946 and 2000. Meddling in the Ballot Box is the first book to provide a comprehensive analysis of foreign meddling in elections from the dawn of the modern era to the 2016 Russian intervention in the US election. Dov Levin shows that partisan electoral interventions are usually an "inside job" occurring only if a significant domestic actor within the target wants it. Likewise, a great power will not intervene unless it fears that its interests are endangered by an opposing party or candidate with very different preferences. He also finds that partisan electoral interventions frequently have significant effects on the results--sufficient in many situations to determine the winner. Such interference also tends to be more effective when it is conducted overtly. However, it is usually ineffective, if not counterproductive, when done in a founding election. A revelatory account that explains why major powers have meddled so frequently across the entire postwar era, Meddling in the Ballot Box also provides us with a framework for assessing the cyber-future of interference. Meddling in the Ballot Box is the first book to focus exclusively on partisan electoral interventions. In these situations, such as Russia's intervention in the 2016 US elections, foreign powers try to determine election results in another country. Dov Levin examines why such interventions occur and what their effects are. Using historical case studies and an original statistical analysis, he identifies the conditions for meddling. A local actor agrees tocollude with the intervener, and the great power feels threatened by another actor with divergent preferences. Furthermore, electoral interventions frequently affect election results and in many situations determine the winner 'Meddling in the Ballot Box' examines why partisan electoral interventions occur as well as their effects on the election results in countries in which the great powers intervened