Measurement in Psychology: A Critical History of a Methodological Concept (Ideas in Context, Series Number 53)

This book traces how such a seemingly immutable idea as measurement proved so debatable when it collided with the subject matter of psychology. This book addresses philosophical and social influences (such as scientism, practicalism, and Pythagoreanism) reshaping the concept of measurement and identifies a fundamental problem at the core of this reshaping: the issue of whether psychological attributes really are quantitative. The author argues that the idea of measurement now endorsed within psychology actually subverts attempts to establish a genuinely quantitative science, and he urges a new direction. This volume relates views on measurement by thinkers such as HГ¶lder, Russell, Campbell, and Nagel to earlier views, like those of Euclid and Oresme. Within the history of psychology, it considers contributions by Fechner, Cattell, Thorndike, Stevens and Suppes, among others. It also contains a nontechnical exposition of conjoint measurement theory and recent foundational work by leading measurement theorist R. Duncan Luce. This thought-provoking book will be particularly valued by researchers in the fields of psychological history and philosophy of science. Cover......Page 1 Half-title......Page 3 Series-title......Page 5 Title......Page 7 Copyright......Page 8 Dedication......Page 9 Contents......Page 11 Preface......Page 13 Acknowledgments......Page 17 CHAPTER 1 Numerical data and the meaning of measurement......Page 19 TWO EXAMPLES OF PSYCHOLOGICAL MEASUREMENT......Page 23 Psychophysics......Page 24 Intellectual abilities......Page 27 QUANTITATIVE RELATIONSHIPS AND THE CONCEPT OF MEASUREMENT......Page 30 The definition of measurement in psychology......Page 33 CHAPTER 2 Quantitative psychology’s intellectual inheritance......Page 42 THE CLASSICAL CONCEPT OF MEASUREMENT......Page 43 THE MEASURABILITY THESIS......Page 51 THE QUANTITY OBJECTION......Page 58 APORIA AND NEXUS......Page 62 CHAPTER 3 Quantity, number and measurement in science......Page 64 THE THEORY OF CONTINUOUS QUANTITY......Page 65 THE THEORY OF (MEASUREMENT) NUMBERS......Page 77 THE THEORY OF QUANTIFICATION......Page 85 STEVENS’ DEFINITION AND THE LOGIC OF QUANTIFICATION......Page 94 CHAPTER 4 Early psychology and the quantity objection......Page 96 FECHNER’S MODEL FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL MEASUREMENT......Page 97 APPLYING FECHNER’S MODUS OPERANDI......Page 108 CHAPTER 5 Making the representational theory of measurement......Page 127 RUSSELL’S TRANSFORMATION OF THE CONCEPT OF MEASUREMENT......Page 128 The problem of the relativity of continuous quantity......Page 129 The problem of the indivisibility of magnitudes......Page 132 Russell’s new theory of measurement......Page 134 CAMPBELL’S THEORY OF FUNDAMENTAL AND DERIVED MEASUREMENT......Page 139 Campbell’s concept of number......Page 141 Campbell’s concept of physical additivity......Page 143 Derived measurement......Page 146 NAGEL’S POSITIVISTIC REPRESENTATIONALISM......Page 149 FROM RATIOS TO REPRESENTATIONS......Page 155 CHAPTER 6 The status of psychophysical measurement......Page 158 THE FERGUSON COMMITTEE......Page 161 THE RESPONSE TO THE FINAL REPORT......Page 173 CHAPTER 7 A definition made to measure......Page 180 STEVENS’ THOROUGHGOING REPRESENTATIONALISM......Page 182 STEVENS’ OPERATIONISM......Page 187 STEVENS’ CONCEPT OF NUMBER......Page 195 STEVENS’ ‘REVOLUTION’......Page 203 CHAPTER 8 Quantitative psychology and the revolution in measurement theory......Page 209 THE REVOLUTION THAT HAPPENED......Page 211 ELUDING THE REVOLUTION......Page 229 IN FINE......Page 234 Glossary......Page 238 References......Page 242 Index......Page 261 This book traces how such a seemingly immutable idea as measurement proved so malleable when it collided with the subject matter of psychology. It locates philosophical and social influences (such as scientism, practicalism and Pythagoreanism) reshaping the concept and, at the core of this reshaping, identifies a fundamental problem: the issue of whether psychological attributes really are quantitative. It argues that the idea of measurement now endorsed within psychology actually subverts attempts to establish a genuinely quantitative science and it urges a new direction. It relates views on measurement by thinkers such as Holder, Russell, Campbell and Nagel to earlier views, like those of Euclid and Oresme. Within the history of psychology, it considers contributions by Fechner, Cattell, Thorndike, Stevens and Suppes, among others. It also contains a non-technical exposition of conjoint measurement theory and recent foundational work by leading measurement theorist R. Duncan Luce. This book traces how such a seemingly immutable idea as measurement proved so debatable when it collided with the subject matter of psychology. This book addresses philosophical and social influences (such as scientism, practicalism, and Pythagoreanism) reshaping the concept of measurement and identifies a fundamental problem at the core of this reshaping: the issue of whether psychological attributes really are quantitative. The author argues that the idea of measurement now endorsed within psychology actually subverts attempts to establish a genuinely quantitative science, and he urges a new direction. This volume relates views on measurement by thinkers such as Holder, Russell. Campbell and Nagel to earlier views, like those of Euclid and Oresme. Joel Michell. Includes Bibliographical References (p. [224]-242) And Index.