Means, Ends, and Persons : The Meaning and Psychological Dimensions of Kant's Humanity Formula

"No one wants to be treated merely as a means-"used," in a sense. But just what is this repugnant treatment? Audi's point of departure is Kant's famous principle that we must treat persons as ends in themselves and never merely as means. Treatment of these kinds is conduct, a complex three-dimensional notion whose central elements are action, its motivation, and the manner of its performance. He shows how the notions of treating persons as ends and, by contrast, merely as means, can be anchored outside Kant and clarified in ways that enhance their usefulness both in ethical theory and in practical ethics, where they have much intuitive force. Audi constructs an account of treatment of persons-of what it is, how it differs from mere interpersonal action, and what ethical standards govern it. In accounting for such treatment, the book develops a wider conception of ethics than is commonly implicit in utilitarian, deontological, or virtue theories. These results contribute to ethical theory, but in its discussion of diverse narrative examples of moral and immoral conduct, the book also contributes to normative ethics. Audi's theory of conduct takes account of motivational elements that are not traits of character and of behavioral elements that are not manifestations of virtue or vice. Here it goes beyond the leading virtue approaches. The theory also advances rule ethics by framing wider conception of moral behavior-roughly, of acting morally. The results advance both normative ethics and ethical theory. For moral philosophy, the book frames conceptions, articulates distinctions, and formulates principles; and for practical ethics, it provides a multitude of cases that illustrate both the scope of moral responsibility and the normative standards for living up to it" -- From the publisher Contents 8 Preface 12 Acknowledgments 16 Introduction 20 Part I The Ethics Of Protecting Persons 30 1 The Instrumental Treatment of Persons 32 I. Means and Ends 32 II. Instrumental versus End-Regarding Treatment 36 III. Treating Solely as a Means versus Merely as a Means 40 2 Instrumental Treatment as Human Conduct 47 I. The Motivation and Controllability of Merely Instrumental Conduct 47 II. Constraints, Moral Character, and Self-Control 50 III. Motivation and Constraints in the Appraisal of Character 53 3 Action, Treatment, and Conduct 57 I. Action, Endeavor, and Consequence 59 II. Two Levels of Behavioral Description 63 III. Conduct as a Morally Important Category 66 IV. Manners of Action versus Actions as Defined by Manner 73 4 The Wrong-making Character Of Merely Instrumental Treatment 77 I. Thick and Thin Moral Questions 78 II. Substantive and Contrastive Views of Merely Instrumental Treatment 87 III. Persons as Ends versus Good Ends for Persons 91 IV. Internal and External Goods for Persons 95 Part II The Ethics Of Respecting Persons 100 5 Treating Others as Ends in Themselves 102 I. Caring about the Good of Others 104 II. Two Kinds of Normativity 107 III. Descriptive Grounds of End-Regarding Treatment 111 6 End-regarding Treatment And Respect For Persons 119 I. Good Deeds, Good Reasons, and Good Conduct 119 II. End-Regarding Treatment, Intention, and Interpersonal Behavior 124 III. The Particularity of Persons and the Interchangeability of Means 127 7 Autonomy And The Moral Significance Of Our Self-conceptions 135 I. Psychological Dispositions and the Basis of Consent 136 II. Respect for Persons, Point of View, and Informed Rational Desire 143 III. End-Regarding Treatment and Respecting Moral Rights 148 IV. Conduct toward Persons versus Behavior Affecting Them 151 8 Conduct, Intention, And Will 158 I. Motivational Self-Control and the Scope of Intentions 160 II. Moral Requirements and the Content of Intention 166 III. Conduct Requirements and the Love Commandments 174 Conclusion 178 Index 186 Means,ends,and persons Kant's injunction that we must treat persons as ends in themselves and never merely as means is plausible but often misunderstood. This book shows how the notions of treating persons as ends in themselves and, by contrast, merely as means, can be anchored outside Kant and clarified in ways that enhance their usefulness in ethical theory and in practical ethics, where they are often felt to have considerable intuitive force