Meaning and Metaphysical Necessity

"This book is about the idea that some true statements would have been true no matter how the world had turned out, while others could have been false. It develops and defends a version of the idea that we tell the difference between these two types of truths in part by reflecting on the meanings of words. It has often been thought that modal issues--issues about possibility and necessity--are related to issues about meaning. In this book, the author defends the view that the analysis of meaning is not just a preliminary to answering modal questions in philosophy; it is not merely that before we can find out whether something is possible, we need to get clear on what we are talking about. Rather, clarity about meaning often brings with it answers to modal questions. In service of this view, the author analyzes the notion of necessity and develops ideas about linguistic meaning, applying them to several puzzles and problems in philosophy of language. Meaning and Metaphysical Necessity will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in metaphysics, philosophy of language, and philosophical logic"-- Provided by publisher This book is about the idea that some true statements would have been true no matter how the world had turned out, while others could have been false. It develops and defends a version of the idea that we tell the difference between these two types of truths in part by reflecting on the meanings of words.It has often been thought that modal issues—issues about possibility and necessity—are related to issues about meaning. In this book, the author defends the view that the analysis of meaning is not just a preliminary to answering modal questions in philosophy; it is not merely that before we can find out whether something is possible, we need to get clear on what we are talking about. Rather, clarity about meaning often brings with it answers to modal questions. In service of this view, the author analyses the notion of necessity and develops ideas about linguistic meaning, applying them to several puzzles and problems in philosophy of language.Meaning and Metaphysical Necessity will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in metaphysics, philosophy of language, and philosophical logic. Cover 1 Half Title 2 Series Information 3 Title Page 4 Copyright Page 5 Dedication 6 Table of Contents 8 Preface 10 Introduction: Necessity, Meaning, and Method 12 1 Modality and Linguistic Meaning in Philosophy 12 2 Kripke On Modality 16 3 Methodological Consequences 19 4 Factorizing Necessity, Preview 21 5 Four Developments in Philosophy of Language 23 5.1 Kripke and Donnellan On Names 23 5.2 Putnam On Meaning 26 5.3 Quine On Synonymy 27 5.4 Wittgensteinian Anti-Mentalism 28 6 Plan 28 1 Groundwork On Necessity 30 1 The Target Notion 30 2 Why Not Stick to Indicative Necessity? 33 3 The Alignment Arguments 35 4 Empirical Linguistic Worries 39 2 An Encouraging Link 42 1 Something A Priori About Necessity 42 2 Grounds for Hope 42 3 Difficulties 43 4 Hope Restored 48 3 Factorizing Necessity 52 1 The First Factorization 52 1.1 Main Ideas 52 1.2 The First Factorization in Action 59 2 Second Factorization: The CI Decider Account 61 3 Interpretative Considerations On Genuineness 63 4 The Epistemic and Metaphysical Status of Genuineness 66 4 Two Aspects of Linguistic Meaning 85 1 Introduction 85 2 Three Problems for Millianism 86 2.1 Identity Statements 86 2.2 Empty Names and Negative Existentials 87 2.3 Apparent Substitution Failures 87 2.4 Plan for Avoiding the Problems While Respecting Kripkean Insights 88 2.5 Residual Puzzlement About Identity and Existence 89 3 Ways of Using Expressions 91 4 External Meaning 94 5 Why Distinguish Internal and External? 100 5 The Doctrine of Flexible Granularity 103 1 The Time Has Come 103 2 What Is the Doctrine? 107 3 Motivating Philosophical Applications 110 4 A Commonsense Defence 117 6 On the Theory of Propositions 122 1 The Theory of Propositions 122 2 Pluralism About the Role-Players 125 3 Propositions as ‘Expressed-Meanings’ 128 4 A Solution to Kripke’s Puzzle About Belief 130 5 How Will ‘Proposition’ Be Used? 133 6 Two Divisions Among Accounts of Propositions 136 7 Schiffer’s Pleonastic Theory 140 8 Structure and Constitution 148 9 Conclusion 153 7 Strongly Metaphysical Modality? 155 1 A Package of Views 155 2 The Problem of De Re Modality 157 3 Extensional and Conceptual Difficulties 162 4 The Spectre of (Strongly) Metaphysical Modality 165 5 The Need for an Overtly Metaphysical Element 172 8 Toward a Form of Scepticism 178 1 The Cutting Edge of Scepticism About Metaphysical Modality 178 2 The Dream of Metaphysical Modality 183 3 The Constitutive Element 187 4 Sceptical Relations to the Metaphysical Modal Notions 191 5 A Position 192 Bibliography 193 Index 202 This book is about the idea that some true statements would have been true no matter how the world had turned out, while others could have been false. It develops and defends a version of the idea that we tell the difference between these two types of truths in part by reflecting on the meanings of words.It has often been thought that modal issuesâ••issues about possibility and necessityâ••are related to issues about meaning. In this book, the author defends the view that the analysis of meaning is not just a preliminary to answering modal questions in philosophy; it is not merely that before we can find out whether something is possible, we need to get clear on what we are talking about. Rather, clarity about meaning often brings with it answers to modal questions. In service of this view, the author analyses the notion of necessity and develops ideas about linguistic meaning, applying them to several puzzles and problems in philosophy of language.Meaning and Metaphysical Necessity will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in metaphysics, philosophy of language, and philosophical logic.