Masters of war : military dissent and politics in the Vietnam era

"Throughout the Vietnam War, military officials such as Matthew Ridgway, James Gavin, Maxwell Taylor, Harold K. Johnson, Wallace Greene, Victor Krulak, and John Paul Vann consistently warned against the peril of waging conventional war in Vietnam, while even advocates of U.S. involvement like William Westmoreland and Earle Wheeler recognized the political and military obstacles to American success. Within the armed forces, there was further division over the Army-devised strategy of attrition, as well as constant feuding with the White House to avoid blame for the likely failure in Indochina."--BOOK JACKET. "Masters of War convincingly disproves the claim that America's defeat was the result of a failure of will because national leaders, principally Lyndon B. Johnson, forced the troops to "fight with one hand tied behind their backs." Robert Buzzanco demonstrates that political leaders, not the military brass, pressed for war; that American policy makers always understood the problems of war in Indochina; and that civil-military acrimony and the political desire to defer responsibility for Vietnam helped draw the United States into the conflict. For the first time, these crucial issues of military dissent, interservice rivalries, and civil-military relations and politics have been tied together to provide a cogent and comprehensive analysis of the U.S. role in Vietnam: Buzzanco proves that the war was lost on the ground in Vietnam, not because of politicians or antiwar movements at home."--Jacket

This volume convincingly disproves the 'fighting with one hand tied behind our backs' explanation of America's defeat in Vietnam.

Publishers Weekly

This comprehensively researched monograph, based on the author's Ph.D. dissertation, depicts U.S. political leaders as the consistent driving force behind America's Vietnam commitment. Military leaders were wary of intervention from 1945 onward and deeply divided over U.S. prospects to the point that they frequently offered bleak evaluations of the situation. Dissenters in the armed forces, however, were stifled by a command structure that shifted the burden of decision-making onto political authority by demanding levels of escalation that were politically impossible to implement. The military thus dodged its share of responsibility for ``losing'' an unwinnable war. Buzzanco exaggerates the armed forces' appropriate role in policy-making; at times he virtually implies that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should have said ``Enough'' on their own authority, defying the political leadership if necessary. That overstated argument makes this a book to be used with caution, despite its valuable analysis of the military's negative perspective on the Vietnam War. (Feb.)

Cover 1 Frontmatter 3 Contents 9 Acknowledgments 11 List of Abbreviations 14 Introduction: Losing Battles and Winning Wars 17 Prologue to Tragedy: U.S. Military Opposition to Intervention in Vietnam, 1950–1954 41 Preparing for and Avoiding War: Military Affairs and Politics in Vietnam and the United States, 1955–1960 71 Pinning Down the President: JFK, the Military, and Political Maneuvering over Vietnam, January-October 1961 97 The Best and Worst of Times: The U.S. War against Vietnam, October 1961–November 1963 131 “Seeing Things Through in Vietnam”: LBJ, the Military, and the Growing U.S. Commitment to Vietnam, November 1963-December 1964 169 Hope for the Best, Expect the Worst: U.S. Ground Troops Enter the Vietnam War, January-July 1965 203 War on Three Fronts: U.S. Forces versus the Viet Cong, Westmoreland versus the Marines, and Military Leaders versus the White House, July 1965-December 1966 245 “The Platform of False Prophets Is Crowded”: Public Hope and Private Despair in Vietnam, 1967 291 The Myth of Tet: Military Failure and the Politics of War 327 Conclusion: Bringing It All Back Home 357 Epilogue: “This Is a Real War”: Military Dissent and Politics after Vietnam 369 Bibliography 379 Index 395 Throughout the past decade, defenders of the U.S. role in Vietnam have argued that America's defeat was not the result of an illegitimate intervention or military shortcomings, but rather a failure of will because national leaders, principally Lyndon B. Johnson, forced the troops to "fight with one hand tied behind their backs." In this volume, Robert Buzzanco disproves this theory by demonstrating that political leaders, not the military brass, pressed for war; that American policymakers always understood the problems and peril of war in Indochina; and that civil-military acrimony and the political desire to defer responsibility for Vietnam helped lead the United States into the war. For the first time, these crucial issues of military dissent, interservice rivalries, and civil-military relations and politics have been tied together to provide a cogent and comprehensive analysis of the U.S. role in Vietnam. Throughout the last decade, defenders of the US role in Vietnam have argued that America's defeat was not the result of an illegitimate intervention or military shortcomings but rather a failure of will because national leaders, principally Lyndon B. Johnson, forced the troops to 'fight with one hand tied behind their backs.' In this volume, Robert Buzzanco disproves this theory by demonstrating that political leaders, not the military brass, pressed for war; that American policymakers always understood the problems and peril of war in Indochina; and that civil-military acrimony and the political desire to defer responsibility for Vietnam helped lead the United States into the war. For the first time, these crucial issues of military dissent, interservice rivalries, and civil-military relations and politics have been tied together to provide a cogent and comprehensive analysis of the US role in Vietnam. Defenders of the U.S. role in Vietnam have argued that America's defeat was not the result of an illegitimate intervention or military shortcomings, but rather a failure of will because national leaders, principally Lyndon B. Johnson, forced the troops to "fight with one hand tied behind their backs." In this volume, Robert Buzzanco disproves this theory by demonstrating that political leaders, not the military brass, pressed for war; that American policymakers always understood the problems and peril of war in Indochina; and that civil-military acrimony and the political desire to defer responsibility for Vietnam helped lead the United States into the war. --From publisher's description This volume convincingly disproves the claim that America's defeat in Vietnam was the result of a failure of will because national leaders, principally Lyndon B. Johnson, forced the troops to 'fight with one hand tied behind their backs.' Although American leaders in the following decade would establish Vietnam as the central battlefield in the global cold war, U.S. military officials in the 1950s consistently opposed expanded commitments to and intervention in Indochina.