Market power politics : war, institutions, and strategic delays in world politics

This book explores how market power competition between states can create disruptions in the global political economy and potentially lead to territorial aggression and war. When a state’s firms have the ability to set prices in a key commodity market like oil or natural gas, state leaders can benefit from increased revenue, stability, and political leverage. Given these potential benefits, states may be motivated to expand their territorial reach in order to gain or maintain such market power. This market power motivation can sometimes lead to war. However, when states are economically interdependent, they may be constrained from using force to achieve their market power goals. This can open up an opportunity for institutional settlements. However, in some cases, institutional rules and procedures can preclude states from reaching a settlement in line with their market power ambitions. When this happens, states may opt for strategic delay and try to gradually accumulate market power over time through salami tactics. To explore how these dynamics play out empirically, the authors examine three cases of market power competition in hard commodity markets: Iraq’s invasion and occupation of Kuwait to seize market power in the oil export market, Russia’s territorial encroachment into Georgia and Ukraine to preserve and expand its market power in the natural gas market, and China’s ongoing use of strategic delay and gray zone tactics in the South and East China Seas to maintain its dominant position in the global market for rare earth elements. "This book explores how market power competition between states can create disruptions in the global political economy and potentially lead to territorial aggression and war. When a state's firms have the ability to set prices in a key commodity market like oil or natural gas, state leaders can benefit from increased revenue, stability, and political leverage. Given these potential benefits, states may be motivated to expand their territorial reach in order to gain or maintain such market power. This market power motivation can sometimes lead to war. However, when states are economically interdependent, they may be constrained from using force to achieve their market power goals. This can open up an opportunity for institutional settlements. However, in some cases, institutional rules and procedures can preclude states from reaching a settlement in line with their market power ambitions. When this happens, states may opt for strategic delay and try to gradually accumulate market power over time through salami tactics. To explore how these dynamics play out empirically, we examine three cases of market power competition in hard commodity markets: Iraq's invasion and occupation of Kuwait to seize market power in the oil export market, Russia's territorial encroachment into Georgia and Ukraine to preserve and expand its market power in the natural gas market, and China's ongoing use of strategic delay and gray zone tactics in the South and East China Seas to maintain its dominant position in the global market for rare-earth elements"-- Provided by publisher **A new theory of market power politics that explains when and why states will delay cooperation or even fight wars in pursuit of this elusive goal.** How are the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the Russian incursions into Ukraine and Georgia, and China's occupation of islands in the South China Sea related? All three of these important moments in modern history were driven by the motivation to capture market power. Whether it was oil for Iraq, natural gas for Russia, or rare earth elements for China, the goal isn't just the commodities themselves--it is the ability to determine their price on the global market. In _Market Power Politics_, [Stephen Gent](/authors/OL9742149A) and [Mark Crescenzi](/authors/OL2812156A) develop a new theory of market power politics that explains when and why states will delay cooperation or even fight wars in pursuit of this elusive goal. Empirically examining case studies from different regions of the world, they explore how competition between states over market power can create disruptions in the global political economy and potentially lead to territorial aggression and war. They also provide clear policy recommendations, urging international institutions to establish norms that reduce the potential for open conflict. Ultimately, _Market Power Politics_ shows that nations' desire to increase their market power means that the push for territorial expansion will continue to shape the trajectory of world politics. A new theory of market power politics that explains when and why states will delay cooperation or even fight wars in pursuit of this elusive goal.How are the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the Russian incursions into Ukraine and Georgia, and China's occupation of islands in the South China Sea related? All three of these important moments in modern history were driven by the motivation to capture market power. Whether it was oil for Iraq, natural gas for Russia, or rare earth elements for China, the goal isn't just the commodities themselves--it is the ability to determine their price on the global market. In Market Power Politics, Stephen Gent and Mark Crescenzi develop a new theory of market power politics that explains when and why states will delay cooperation or even fight wars in pursuit of this elusive goal. Empirically examining case studies from different regions of the world, they explore how competition between states over market power can create disruptions in the global political economy and potentially lead to territorial aggression and war. They also provide clear policy recommendations, urging international institutions to establish norms that reduce the potential for open conflict. Ultimately, Market Power Politics shows that nations' desire to increase their market power means that the push for territorial expansion will continue to shape the trajectory of world politics. cover 1 Half title 2 Market Power Politics 4 Copyright 5 Dedication 6 Contents 8 Figures 10 Tables 12 Preface 14 Abbreviations 18 1. Introduction 20 2. Markets, Institutions, and Property Rights Disputes 42 3. Market Power, War, and Strategic Delay 63 4. Empirical Cases 100 5. Iraq: Fighting for Market Power 113 6. Russia: Cornering the Gas Market 144 7. China: Capturing Seabed Resources 189 8. Conclusion 225 Bibliography 248 Index 266 This text explores how market power competition between states can create disruptions in the global political economy and potentially lead to territorial aggression and war