معرفی کتاب «Mansfield and Vietnam: A Study in Rhetorical Adaptation (Rhetoric and Public Affairs Series)» نوشتهٔ Gregory Allen Olson; ProQuest (Firm)، منتشرشده توسط نشر Michigan State University Press در سال 1995. این کتاب در فرمت pdf، زبان انگلیسی ارائه شده است.
__Mansfield and Vietnam: A Study in Rhetorical Adaptation__ is the first major work to examine the role played by Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield, Democrat from Montana, in the formulation and execution of U.S. Vietnam policy. Drawing upon material from the Mansfield Papers, personal interviews, public speeches, and recently declassified documents, Olson traces Mansfield's journey from ardent supporter of Diem in the late 1950s to quiet critic of LBJ in the mid-1960s, and finally, to outspoken opponent of the Vietnam War in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Olson focuses his attention on Mansfield's speaking ability and his use of the written word, analyzing the ways in which they proved crucial in shaping the policies of the Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, and Ford presidential administrations. He also examines the way personal and political situations converged to force Mansfield into the center of the stormy Vietnam controversy, and eventually into a position of leadership in the campaign to end America's military presence in Southeast Asia. To date, little has been done to evaluate the roles played by key congressional figures in the Vietnam War debate; thus, __Mansfield and Vietnam__ is bound to become a significant contribution, not only to rhetorical studies, but also to twentieth-century diplomatic history and to the study of congressional-presidential relations.
Mansfield and Vietnam: A Study in Rhetorical Adaptation is the first major work to examine the role played by Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield, Democrat from Montana, in the formulation and execution of U.S. Vietnam policy. Drawing upon material from the Mansfield Papers, personal interviews, public speeches, and recently declassified documents, Olson traces Mansfield's journey from ardent supporter of Diem in the late 1950s to quiet critic of LBJ in the mid-1960s, and finally, to outspoken opponent of the Vietnam War in the late 1960s and early 1970s.
Olson focuses his attention on Mansfield's speaking ability and his use of the written word, analyzing the ways in which they proved crucial in shaping the policies of the Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, and Ford presidential administrations. He also examines the way personal and political situations converged to force Mansfield into the center of the stormy Vietnam controversy, and eventually into a position of leadership in the campaign to end America's military presence in Southeast Asia. To date, little has been done to evaluate the roles played by key congressional figures in the Vietnam War debate; thus, Mansfield and Vietnam is bound to become a significant contribution, not only to rhetorical studies, but also to twentieth-century diplomatic history and to the study of congressional-presidential relations.
Intro -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Abbreviations -- Introduction -- Part I: 1903-1955: A Freshman Senator Helps Commit America to South Vietnam -- Chapter 1: Mansfield becomes an Asia Expert -- Chapter 2: Mansfield becomes an Indochina Expert -- Chapter 3: Mansfield's Report becomes the "Cornerstone" of U.S. Support for Diem -- Chapter 4: Mansfield becomes "The Deciding Factor" in Saving Diem -- Part II: 1956-1963: Senate Leadership Brings Decreased Indochina Influence -- Chapter 5: The Warming of a Cold Warrior -- Chapter 6: The Beginning of Mansfield's Private Dissent -- Chapter 7: The Deaths of Two Presidents -- Part III: 1963-1968: Private Dissent Yet Public Compliance -- Chapter 8: Johnson Moves toward War in Vietnam -- Chapter 9: America Goes to War -- Chapter 10: Mansfield's Fifth Visit to Vietnam and Early Efforts to Get to the Bargaining Table -- Chapter 11: "Tugging" at Johnson's Coat -- Part IV: 1969-1975: Cambodia and the End of Mansfield's "Quiet" Criticism -- Chapter 12: Nixon, Cambodia, and the Second Indochina War -- Chapter 13: The Senate Asserts Itself -- Chapter 14: A Missed Opportunity and the End of the Indochina War -- Epilogue -- Endnotes -- Bibliography -- Index