Lying, Misleading, and What Is Said : An Exploration in Philosophy of Language and in Ethics

Many people (both philosophers and not) find it very natural to think that deceiving someone in a way that avoids lying--by merely misleading--is morally preferable to simply lying. Others think that this preference is deeply misguided. But all sides agree that there is a distinction. In __Lying, Misleading, and What is Said__, Jennifer Saul undertakes a close examination of the lying/misleading distinction. Saul begins by using this very intuitive distinction to shed new light on entrenched debates in philosophy of language over notions like __what is said__. Next, she tackles the puzzling but widespread moral preference for misleading over lying, and arrives at a new view regarding the moral significance of the distinction. Finally, Saul draws her conclusions together to examine a range of historically important and interesting cases, from a consideration of modern politicians to the early Jesuits. Many people (both philosophers and non-philosophers) find it very natural to think that deceiving someone in a way that avoids lying-by merely misleading is morally preferable to simply lying. Others disagree. But all sides agree that there is a distinction. In Lying, Misleading, and What is Said, Jennifer Mather Saul undertakes a close examination of the lying/misleading distinction, first using it to shed new light on entrenched debates in philosophy of language over notions like what is said. Next, she rejects the widespread moral preference for misleading over lying, arriving at a new view regarding the moral significance of the distinction. Finally, Saul examines a range of historically important and interesting cases, from modern politicians to the early Jesuits. Book jacket Some find it natural to think that deceiving someone in a way that avoids lying--by merely misleading--is morally preferable to simply lying. Others think that this preference is misguided. But all agree that there is a distinction. The author examines the lying/misleading distinction. She begins by using this intuitive distinction to shed light on debates in philosophy of language over notions like what is said. Next, she tackles the moral preference for misleading over lying, and arrives at a new view regarding the moral significance of the distinction Jennifer Saul Presents A Close Analysis Of The Distinction Between Lying To Others And Misleading Them. Shedding Light On Key Debates In Philosophy Of Language And Tackling The Widespread Moral Preference For Misleading Over Lying, She Establishes A New View On The Moral Significance Of The Distinction. 1. Lying -- 2. The Problem Of What Is Said -- 3. What Is Said -- 4. Is Lying Worse Than Merely Misleading? -- 5. Some Interesting Cases. Jennifer Mather Saul. Includes Bibliographical References (p. [139]-143) And Index.