LOGICAL EMPIRICISM AND NATURALISM : neurath and carnap's meta-theory of science

This text provides an extensive exploration of the relationship between the thought of Otto Neurath and Rudolf Carnap, providing a new argument for the complementarity of their mature philosophies as part of a collaborative metatheory of science. In arguing that both Neurath and Carnap must be interpreted as proponents of epistemological naturalism, and that their naturalisms rest on shared philosophical ground, it is also demonstrated that the boundaries and possibilities for epistemological naturalism are not as restrictive as Quinean orthodoxy has previously suggested. Both building on and challenging the scholarship of the past four decades, this naturalist reading of Carnap also provides a new interpretation of Carnap’s conception of analyticity, allowing for a refutation of the Quinean argument for the incompatibility of naturalism and the analytic/synthetic distinction. In doing so, the relevance and potential importance of their scientific meta-theory for contemporary questions in the philosophy of science is demonstrated. This text appeals to students and researchers working on Logical Empiricism, Quine, the history of analytic philosophy and the history of philosophy of science, as well as proponents of naturalized epistemology. Acknowledgements 6 Contents 7 Introduction 10 1 The Historiography of Logical Empiricism 10 2 Chapter Overview 16 1 Naturalism and the Vienna Circle 18 1.1 What Is Epistemological Naturalism? 18 1.1.1 What Epistemological Naturalism Opposes 19 1.1.2 Distinctions Within Epistemological Naturalism 20 1.1.3 Epistemological Commitments of Replacement and Cooperative Naturalism 21 1.2 Naturalism in the Vienna Circle 26 1.2.1 The Wings of the Vienna Circle 26 1.2.2 Schlick and the Right Wing 28 1.2.2.1 A Priority and Independence of Science 29 1.2.2.2 Foundationalism and Scepticism 30 1.2.3 Neurath's Naturalism 32 1.2.3.1 Neurath's Rejection of Traditional Epistemology 33 1.2.3.2 Unified Science and Philosophy 34 1.2.3.3 Foundationalism and Scepticism 37 1.2.3.4 Neurath's Affirmation of Naturalism 40 1.3 Carnap and Naturalism 43 1.3.1 Carnap's Convergence with Neurath 44 1.3.2 Carnap's Approval of Neurath's Naturalism 47 1.4 The Cooperation of Neurath and Carnap: The Bipartite Metatheory 49 2 Neurath's Epistemology of Science 53 2.1 Neurath's Empiricism 53 2.1.1 Empiricism and Verificationism 53 2.1.2 Science and Pseudo-Rationalism 56 2.2 Language, Knowledge, and Science 58 2.2.1 Science as a Social Instrument 58 2.2.2 The Indispensability of Public Language 59 2.2.3 Physicalism 60 2.2.4 The Encyclopedia and Encyclopedism 63 2.3 Decisionism 65 2.3.1 Underdetermination and Decisions 65 2.3.2 Auxiliary Motives and Decision Procedures 67 2.3.3 Auxiliary Motives, Values, and Theoretical Virtues 69 2.3.4 Decisions and Theory-Choice 71 2.4 Methodological Constructivism and the Behaviouristics of Science 75 2.4.1 Methodological Constructivism 75 2.4.2 Behaviouristics of Scholars 78 2.5 Neurath's Epistemic Agent 80 3 Neurath's Conception of Protocol Statements 82 3.1 The Protocol Sentence Debates 82 3.2 What Is a Protocol Statement? 84 3.3 The Structure of Neurath's Protocol Statements 91 3.4 The Four Conditions for Testimony Acceptance 97 3.5 The Pragmatic Condition 103 3.6 Utilising Testimony: Extraction 106 3.7 Utilising Testimony: Abduction 108 3.8 Conclusion 110 4 Carnapian Explication 112 4.1 Explication and the Bipartite Metatheory 112 4.2 Carnapian Explication 113 4.2.1 Explication: Process and Goals 113 4.2.2 Criteria for Explication 117 4.2.3 Explication as Naturalism 119 4.3 Carnap's Critics 120 5 Quine, Carnap, and Analyticity 128 5.1 The Development of Quine's Thinking About Analyticity 128 5.1.1 Initial Enthusiasm 129 5.1.2 Growing Concerns 130 5.1.3 Quine's Break with Carnap 131 5.2 What Is Carnap's Notion of Analyticity? 134 5.3 Which of Quine's Arguments Pose a Problem For Carnap? 137 5.3.1 ``Analyticity'' Is Unclear 137 5.3.2 Natural vs Formal Languages 141 5.3.3 Quine's Observation 141 5.3.4 Factual vs Non-factual Truth 143 5.3.5 Holism, Revisability and Analyticity 147 5.3.6 Changing Beliefs vs Changing Language 151 5.3.7 The Significance of the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction 156 5.3.8 Semantics and Epistemology 160 5.4 Divergent Conceptions of Empiricism? 161 5.5 Conclusion 164 6 Challenges to the Bipartite Metatheory Interpretation 166 6.1 Analyticity 166 6.2 Ballungen and Explication 167 6.3 Conceptions of Protocol Statements 169 6.3.1 Carnap's Changing Conception 170 6.3.2 Mature Positions, Apparent Disagreement 172 6.3.3 Carnap's Formal Objection 173 6.3.4 Carnap's Context Objection 174 6.4 Physicalism and Private Languages 176 6.5 Truth and Semantics 178 6.5.1 Carnap on Truth and Semantics 179 6.5.2 Neurath on Truth 181 6.5.3 Deflationary Truth 184 6.5.4 Mormann's Defence of Neurath 186 6.6 Conceptions of Unity 189 6.6.1 Linguistic Unity of Science 190 6.6.2 Carnap and Neurath on the Unity of Science 191 6.6.3 Different Conceptions or Difference of Emphasis? 193 6.7 Conclucions 195 7 Bipartite Metatheory in Application 196 7.1 The Bipartite Dialectic 196 7.2 Decisionism, Conventionalism and Constructivism 200 7.2.1 The Pragmatic and the Formal 200 7.2.2 Methodological Constructivism 203 7.3 Self-Reflexivity and Self-Direction 205 7.3.1 Self-Reflexivity and Pseudo-Rationalism 205 7.3.2 Neurath's Anti-Totalitarianism: Mosaics and Orchestration 207 7.4 Conclusion 212 References 213