Locke’s Ideas of Mind and Body (Routledge Studies in Seventeenth-Century Philosophy)

This book begins with a survey of various readings of Locke as a materialist, as a substance dualist, and as a property dualist, and demonstrates that these inconsistent interpretations result from a general failure of modern commentators to notice the significance of Locke’s ‘mind-body nominalism’. By illuminating this largely overlooked aspect of Locke’s philosophy, this book reveals a common mistake of previous interpretations: that of treating what Locke conceives to be ‘nominal’ as real. The nominal symmetry that Locke posits between mind and body is distinct from any form of metaphysical dualism, whether substance dualism or property dualism. It is a brand of naturalism, but does not insist that the material is ontologically more basic than the mental or that the former determines the latter. On this view, the material and the mental both relate solely to a certain set of functional roles, rather than to an intrinsic property that plays these roles. The term ‘matter’ is thus rendered vague, and materialism is conceived as a precariously grounded ontological doctrine. Elaborating on this interpretation of Locke’s Essay, this book examines the insightful readings of Locke developed by seventeenth- and eighteenth-century thinkers such as Richard Burthogge, William Carroll, and Joseph Priestley. This book also seeks to clarify what Locke’s position would look like in a modern setting by noting some significant parallels with the ideas of leading contemporary philosophers such as Donald Davidson, David Lewis, and Colin McGinn. "This book begins with a survey of various readings of Locke as a materialist, as a substance dualist, and as a property dualist, and demonstrates that these inconsistent interpretations result from a general failure of modern commentators to notice the significance of Locke's 'mind-body nominalism'. By illuminating this largely overlooked aspect of Locke's philosophy, this book reveals a common mistake of previous interpretations: that of treating what Locke conceives to be 'nominal' as real. The nominal symmetry that Locke posits between mind and body is distinct from any form of metaphysical dualism, whether substance dualism or property dualism. It is a brand of naturalism, but does not insist that the material is ontologically more basic than the mental or that the former determines the latter. On this view, the material and mental both relate solely to a certain set of functional roles, rather than to an intrinsic property that plays these roles. The term 'matter' is thus rendered vague, and materialism is conceived as a precariously grounded ontological doctrine. Elaborating on this interpretation of Locke's Essay, this book examines the insightful readings of Locke developed by seventeenth- and eighteenth-century thinkers such as Richard Burthogge, William Carroll, and Joseph Priestley. This book also seeks to clarify what Locke's position would look like in a modern setting by noting some significant parallels with the ideas of leading contemporary philosophers such as Donald Davidson, David Lewis, and Colin McGinn"-- Provided by publisher "This book offers a systematic and sustained attempt to address the interpretive challenge of Locke's philosophy of mind. Locke has been considered a Cartesian dualist, a reductive materialist, and even an idealist. These conflicting interpretations have given rise to the widespread accusation that Locke is inconsistent on the mind-body issue. This book proposes a novel interpretive theory of Locke's philosophy of mind that is structured around four neglected topics in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding: (i) his epistemic humility, (ii) his nominal dualism, (iii) his mind-body functionalism, and (iv) his naturalistic approach to the human mind. The book also explores the relevance of these overlooked views to contemporary debates in philosophy of mind, including Donald Davidson's anomalous monism, David Lewis' Ramseyan Humility, and Colin McGinn's cognitive closure. Locke's Ideas of Mind and Body will appeal to Locke scholars as well as anyone interested in early modern philosophy of mind and the history of the mind-body problem."--Provided by publisher Cover Half Title Series Page Title Copyright Dedication Contents Preface Abbreviations and Notes Introduction 1 Locke and the Mind-Body Problem 2 Mind-Body Nominalism 3 Epistemic Humility 4 The Superadded Power of Thought 5 Burthogge, Carroll, and McGinn 6 A Functionalist Account of Substrata 7 Locke and Dynamic Realism Bibliography Index