Lincoln and the Decision for War: The Northern Response to Secession (Civil War America)

When Abraham Lincoln's election in 1860 prompted several Southern states to secede, the North was sharply divided over how to respond. In this groundbreaking book, the first major study in over fifty years of how the North handled the secession crisis, Russell McClintock follows the decision-making process from bitter partisan rancor to consensus. From small towns to big cities and from state capitals to Washington, D.C., McClintock highlights individuals both powerful and obscure to demonstrate the ways ordinary citizens, party activists, state officials, and national leaders interacted to influence the Northern response to what was essentially a political crisis. He argues that although Northerners' reactions to Southern secession were understood and expressed through partisan newspapers and officials, the decision fell into the hands of an ever-smaller handful of people until finally it was Abraham Lincoln alone who would choose whether the future of the American republic was to be determined through peace or a sword. Lincoln and the Decision for War illuminates the immediate origins of the Civil War, demonstrating that Northern thought evolved quite significantly as the crisis unfolded. It also provides an intimate understanding of the antebellum political system as well as Lincoln's political acuity in his early presidential career. "When Abraham Lincoln's election in 1860 prompted several Southern states to secede, the North was sharply divided over how to respond. Some argued that disunion must be prevented, even if it meant going to war; others insisted that responding with force would only render reunion impossible. In this groundbreaking book, the first major study in over fifty years of how the North handled the secession crisis, Russell McClintock follows the decision-making process to the one man who could ultimately make the call for war: Lincoln. From small towns to big cities and from state capitals to Washington, D.C., McClintock highlights individuals both powerful and obscure to demonstrate the ways ordinary citizens, party activists, state officials, and national leaders interacted to influence the Northern response to what was essentially a political crisis. He argues that although Northerners' reactions to Southern secession were understood and expressed through partisan newspapers and officials, the actual decision fell into the hands of an ever-smaller handful of people until finally it was Lincoln alone who would choose whether the future of the American republic was to be determined through peace or a sword. McClintock shows that only after a desperate struggle to peaceably prevent the nation's disintegration did Lincoln opt for war. At that point, in his most controversial move of the long secession winter, Lincoln arranged events in such a way that Northerners could not help but place the blame for opening hostilities where he believed it belonged: on the seceding states. With the Confederate attack on Fort Sumter, Northern partisan rancor dissolved into consensus on the critical issue of national survival, making war all but inevitable."--Jacket

When Abraham Lincoln's election in 1860 prompted several Southern states to secede, the North was sharply divided over how to respond. From small towns to big cities and from state capitals to Washington, D.C., McClintock highlights individuals both powerful and obscure to demonstrate the ways ordinary citizens, party activists, state officials, and national leaders interacted to influence the Northern response to what was essentially a political crisis. He argues that the decision fell into the hands of an ever-smaller group of people until finally it was Lincoln alone who would make the decision for war.

Randall M. Miller - Library Journal

In his first book, McClintock insists, rightly, that in defining the secession crisis, the words of party leaders and of petitions, the press, and letters to the editors were of central import. How party leaders, especially Lincoln, understood and shaped the crisis created the constitutional and political framework for Northern responses. With deft strokes, McClintock describes the various competing concepts of union among Republicans, Democrats, and others and discovers that in the end they agreed that representative democracy must oppose disunion or else self-government itself would be lost. Lincoln used the power of patronage to secure his hand in managing the crisis and gained his own appreciation of the practicalities of not conceding a right to secession or, should war come, not firing the first shot, thus enabling Northerners to rally to a common love for the "union." More than any other scholar, McClintock incisively shows that in the end the North and Lincoln simply could not let the South go. Highly recommended for academic and large public libraries.

Contents......Page 8 Preface......Page 10 Introduction......Page 14 1. On the Brink of the Precipice: The Election of 1860......Page 27 2. I Would Not Endanger the Perpetuity of This Union: November......Page 43 3. Proportions of Which I Had but a Faint Conception: Early December......Page 73 4. The Issues of the Late Campaign Are Obsolete: Late December......Page 98 5. We Know Not What a Day or Two or an Hour May Bring Forth: December–January......Page 118 6. One’s Opinions Change Fast in Revolutionary Times: January–February......Page 146 7. The Storm Is Weathered: January–February, Revisited......Page 178 8. A Calm Pervades the Political World: March......Page 200 9. Any Decision Would Be Preferable to This Uncertainty: March–April......Page 239 10. Everybody Now Is for the Union: April–May......Page 267 Conclusion: Shall It Be Peace, or a Sword?......Page 288 Notes......Page 294 Bibliography......Page 354 B......Page 384 C......Page 386 D......Page 388 E......Page 389 F......Page 390 J......Page 391 L......Page 392 N......Page 394 R......Page 396 S......Page 398 T......Page 400 Y......Page 401 When Abraham Lincoln's election in 1860 prompted several Southern states to secede, the North was sharply divided over how to respond. In this groundbreaking book, the first major study in over 50 years of how the North handled the secession crisis, McClintock follows the decision-making process from bitter partisan rancor to consensus. From small towns to big cities and from state capitals to Washington, D.C., McClintock highlights individuals both powerful and obscure to demonstrate the ways ordinary citizens, party activists, state officials, and national leaders interacted to influence the Northern response to what was essentially a political crisis. He argues that although Northerners' reactions to Southern secession were expressed through partisan newspapers and officials, the decision fell into the hands of an ever-smaller handful of people until Abraham Lincoln alone would choose whether the future of the American republic was to be determined through peace or a sword. When Abraham Lincoln's election in 1860 prompted several Southern states to secede, the North was sharply divided over how to respond. In this groundbreaking and highly praised book, McClintock follows the decision-making process from bitter partisan rancor to consensus. From small towns to big cities and from state capitals to Washington, D.C., McClintock highlights individuals both powerful and obscure to demonstrate the ways ordinary citizens, party activists, state officials, and national leaders interacted to influence the Northern response to what was essentially a political crisis. He argues that although Northerners'reactions to Southern secession were understood and expressed through partisan newspapers and officials, the decision fell into the hands of an ever-smaller group of people until finally it was Lincoln alone who would choose whether the future of the American republic was to be determined through peace or by sword.