Lectures On The History Of Moral Philosophy Rawls

The premier political philosopher of his day, John Rawls, in three decades of teaching at Harvard, has had a profound influence on the way philosophical ethics is approached and understood today. This book brings together the lectures that inspired a generation of students--and a regeneration of moral philosophy. It invites readers to learn from the most noted exemplars of modern moral philosophy with the inspired guidance of one of contemporary philosophy's most noteworthy practitioners and teachers. Central to Rawls's approach is the idea that respectful attention to the great texts of our tradition can lead to a fruitful exchange of ideas across the centuries. In this spirit, his book engages thinkers such as Leibniz, Hume, Kant, and Hegel as they struggle in brilliant and instructive ways to define the role of a moral conception in human life. The lectures delineate four basic types of moral reasoning: perfectionism, utilitarianism, intuitionism, and--the ultimate focus of Rawls's course--Kantian constructivism. Comprising a superb course on the history of moral philosophy, they also afford unique insight into how John Rawls has transformed our view of this history. Mary Carroll - Booklist This volume draws together the final version of Rawls' lecture notes on the history of modern moral philosophy. It offers probing discussions of Hume, Leibniz, Kant, and Hegel and of the four basic types of moral reasoning--perfectionism, utilitarianism, intuitionism, and Kantian constructivism. Readers could hardly find a more enlightening (if sometimes challenging) companion in exploring key historical approaches to life's most fundamental moral and philosophical questions. Title Page 3 Contents 5 Editor's Forward 11 A Note on the Texts 21 Introduction / Modern Moral Philosophy, 1600-1800 25 §1. A Difference between Classical and Modern Moral Philosophy 25 §2. The Main Problem of Greek Moral Philosophy 27 §3. The Background of Modern Moral Philosophy 29 §4. The Problems of Modern Moral Philosophy 32 §5. The Relation between Religion and Science 35 §6. Kant on Science and Religion 38 §7. On Studying Historical Texts 41 Hume 43 Hume I / Morality Psychologized and the Passions 45 §1. Background:Skepticism and the Fideism of Nature 45 §2. Classi .cation of the Passions 48 §3. Outline of Section .of Part III of Book II 51 §4. Hume ’s Account of (Nonmoral)Deliberation:The Of .cial View 55 Hume II / Rational Deliberation and the Role of Reason 60 §1. Three Questions about Hume ’s Of .cial View 60 §2. Three Further Psychological Principles 61 §3. Deliberation as Transforming the System of Passions 64 §4. The General Appetite to Good 67 §5. The General Appetite to Good:Passion or Principle? 69 Hume II / Rational Deliberation and the Role of Reason 60 §1. Three Questions about Hume ’s Of .cial View 60 §2. Three Further Psychological Principles 61 §3. Deliberation as Transforming the System of Passions 64 §4. The General Appetite to Good 67 §5. The General Appetite to Good:Passion or Principle? 69 Hume III / Justice as an Arti .cial Virtue 75 §1. The Capital of the Sciences 75 §2. The Elements of Hume ’s Problem 77 §3. The Origin of Justice and Property 80 §4. The Circumstances of Justice 82 §5. The Idea of Convention 83 Examples and Supplemental Remarks 85 §6. Justice as a Best Scheme of Conventions 88 §7. The Two Stages of Development 90 Hume IV / The Critique of Rational Intuitionism 93 §1. Introduction 93 §2. Some of Clarke ’s Main Claims 94 §3. The Content of Right and Wrong 99 §4. Rational Intuitionism ’s Moral Psychology 101 §5. Hume ’s Critique of Rational Intuitionism 102 §6. Hume ’s Second Argument:Morality Not Demonstrable 105 Hume V // The Judicious Spectator 108 §1. Introduction 108 §2. Hume ’s Account of Sympathy 109 §3. The First Objection:The Idea of the Judicious Spectator 112 §4. The Second Objection:Virtue in Rags Is Still Virtue 115 §5. The Epistemological Role of the Moral Sentiments 117 §6. Whether Hume Has a Conception of Practical Reason 120 §7. The Concluding Section of the Treatise 122 Appendix: Hume ’s Disowning the Treatise 125 Leibniz 127 Leibniz I / His Metaphysical Perfectionism 129 §1. Introduction 129 §2. Leibniz ’s Metaphysical Perfectionism 132 §3. The Concept of a Perfection 135 §4. Leibniz ’s Predicate-in-Subject Theory of Truth 138 §5. Some Comments on Leibniz ’s Account of Truth 143 Leibniz II / Spirits as Active Substances:Their Freedom 147 §1. The Complete Individual Concept Includes Active Powers 147 §2. Spirits as Individual Rational Substances 151 §3. True Freedom 155 §4. Reason,Judgment,and Will 158 §5. A Note on the Practical Point of View 163 Kant 165 Kant I / Groundwork:Preface and Part I 167 §1. Introductory Comments 167 §2. Some Points about the Preface:Paragraphs 11–13 170 §3. The Idea of a Pure Will 173 §4. The Main Argument of Groundwork I 176 §5. The Absolute Value of a Good Will 178 §6. The Special Purpose of Reason 181 §7. Two Roles of the Good Will 182 Kant II / The Categorical Imperative:The First Formulation 186 §1. Introduction 186 §2. Features of Ideal Moral Agents 188 §3. The Four-Step CI-Procedure 191 §4. Kant ’s Second Example:The Deceitful Promise 194 §5. Kant ’s Fourth Example:The Maxim of Indifference 196 §6. Two Limits on Information 199 §7. The Structure of Motives 201 Kant III / The Categorical Imperative:The Second Formulation 205 §1. The Relation between the Formulations 205 §2. Statements of the Second Formulation 207 §3. Duties of Justice and Duties of Virtue 209 §4. What Is Humanity? 211 §5. The Negative Interpretation 214 §6. The Positive Interpretation 218 §7. Conclusion:Remarks on Groundwork II:46–49(427–429) 219 Kant IV / The Categorical Imperative:The Third Formulation 224 §1. Gaining Entry for the Moral Law 224 §2. The Formulation of Autonomy and Its Interpretation 227 §3. The Supremacy of Reason 229 §4. The Realm of Ends 232 §5. Bringing the Moral Law Nearer to Intuition 235 §6. What Is the Analogy? 238 Kant V / The Priority of Right and the Object of the Moral Law 241 §1. Introduction 241 §2. The First Three of Six Conceptions of the Good 243 §3. The Second Three Conceptions of the Good 247 §4. Autonomy and Heteronomy 250 §5. The Priority of Right 254 §6. A Note on True Human Needs 256 Kant VI / Moral Constructivism 259 §1. Rational Intuitionism:A Final Look 259 §2. Kant ’s Moral Constructivism 261 §3. The Constructivist Procedure 262 §4. An Observation and an Objection 265 §5. Two Conceptions of Objectivity 267 §6. The Categorical Imperative:In What Way Synthetic A Priori? 271 Kant VII / The Fact of Reason 277 §1. Introduction 277 §2. The First Fact of Reason Passage 279 §3. The Second Passage:§§5–8 of Chapter I of the Analytic 282 §4. The Third Passage:Appendix I to Analytic I, Paragraphs 8–15 285 §5. Why Kant Might Have Abandoned a Deduction for the Moral Law 288 §6. What Kind of Authentication Does the Moral Law Have? 290 §7. The Fifth and Sixth Fact of Reason Passages 292 §8. Conclusion 295 Kant VIII / The Moral Law as the Law of Freedom 297 §1. Concluding Remarks on Constructivism and Due Re .ection 297 §2. The Two Points of View 299 §3. Kant ’s Opposition to Leibniz on Freedom 301 §4. Absolute Spontaneity 304 §5. The Moral Law as a Law of Freedom 306 §6. The Ideas of Freedom 309 §7. Conclusion 313 Kant IX / The Moral Psychology of the Religion, Book I 315 §1. The Three Predispositions 315 §2. The Free Power of Choice 318 §3. The Rational Representation of the Origin of Evil 322 §4. The Manichean Moral Psychology 327 §5. The Roots of Moral Motivation in Our Person 330 Kant X / The Unity of Reason 333 §1. The Practical Point of View 333 §2. The Realm of Ends as Object of the Moral Law 335 §3. The Highest Good as Object of the Moral Law 337 §4. The Postulates of Vernunftglaube 341 §5. The Content of Reasonable Faith 343 §6. The Unity of Reason 346 Hegel 351 Hegel I / His Rechtsphilosophie 353 §1. Introduction 353 §2. Philosophy as Reconciliation 355 §3. The Free Will 360 §4. Private Property 364 §5. Civil Society 368 Hegel II / Ethical Life and Liberalism 373 §1. Sittlichkeit:The Account of Duty 373 §2. Sittlichkeit:The State 376 §3. Sittlichkeit:War and Peace 382 §4. A Third Alternative 386 §5. Hegel ’s Legacy as a Critic of Liberalism 389 Appendix / Course Outline:Problems in Moral Philosophy 397 Index 401 Title Page......Page 3 Contents......Page 5 Editor's Forward......Page 11 A Note on the Texts......Page 21 §1. A Difference between Classical and Modern Moral Philosophy......Page 25 §2. The Main Problem of Greek Moral Philosophy......Page 27 §3. The Background of Modern Moral Philosophy......Page 29 §4. The Problems of Modern Moral Philosophy......Page 32 §5. The Relation between Religion and Science......Page 35 §6. Kant on Science and Religion......Page 38 §7. On Studying Historical Texts......Page 41 Hume......Page 43 §1. Background:Skepticism and the Fideism of Nature......Page 45 §2. Classi .cation of the Passions......Page 48 §3. Outline of Section .of Part III of Book II......Page 51 §4. Hume ’s Account of (Nonmoral)Deliberation:The Of .cial View......Page 55 §1. Three Questions about Hume ’s Of .cial View......Page 60 §2. Three Further Psychological Principles......Page 61 §3. Deliberation as Transforming the System of Passions......Page 64 §4. The General Appetite to Good......Page 67 §5. The General Appetite to Good:Passion or Principle?......Page 69 §1. The Capital of the Sciences......Page 75 §2. The Elements of Hume ’s Problem......Page 77 §3. The Origin of Justice and Property......Page 80 §4. The Circumstances of Justice......Page 82 §5. The Idea of Convention......Page 83 Examples and Supplemental Remarks......Page 85 §6. Justice as a Best Scheme of Conventions......Page 88 §7. The Two Stages of Development......Page 90 §1. Introduction......Page 93 §2. Some of Clarke ’s Main Claims......Page 94 §3. The Content of Right and Wrong......Page 99 §4. Rational Intuitionism ’s Moral Psychology......Page 101 §5. Hume ’s Critique of Rational Intuitionism......Page 102 §6. Hume ’s Second Argument:Morality Not Demonstrable......Page 105 §1. Introduction......Page 108 §2. Hume ’s Account of Sympathy......Page 109 §3. The First Objection:The Idea of the Judicious Spectator......Page 112 §4. The Second Objection:Virtue in Rags Is Still Virtue......Page 115 §5. The Epistemological Role of the Moral Sentiments......Page 117 §6. Whether Hume Has a Conception of Practical Reason......Page 120 §7. The Concluding Section of the Treatise......Page 122 Appendix: Hume ’s Disowning the Treatise......Page 125 Leibniz......Page 127 §1. Introduction......Page 129 §2. Leibniz ’s Metaphysical Perfectionism......Page 132 §3. The Concept of a Perfection......Page 135 §4. Leibniz ’s Predicate-in-Subject Theory of Truth......Page 138 §5. Some Comments on Leibniz ’s Account of Truth......Page 143 §1. The Complete Individual Concept Includes Active Powers......Page 147 §2. Spirits as Individual Rational Substances......Page 151 §3. True Freedom......Page 155 §4. Reason,Judgment,and Will......Page 158 §5. A Note on the Practical Point of View......Page 163 Kant......Page 165 §1. Introductory Comments......Page 167 §2. Some Points about the Preface:Paragraphs 11–13......Page 170 §3. The Idea of a Pure Will......Page 173 §4. The Main Argument of Groundwork I......Page 176 §5. The Absolute Value of a Good Will......Page 178 §6. The Special Purpose of Reason......Page 181 §7. Two Roles of the Good Will......Page 182 §1. Introduction......Page 186 §2. Features of Ideal Moral Agents......Page 188 §3. The Four-Step CI-Procedure......Page 191 §4. Kant ’s Second Example:The Deceitful Promise......Page 194 §5. Kant ’s Fourth Example:The Maxim of Indifference......Page 196 §6. Two Limits on Information......Page 199 §7. The Structure of Motives......Page 201 §1. The Relation between the Formulations......Page 205 §2. Statements of the Second Formulation......Page 207 §3. Duties of Justice and Duties of Virtue......Page 209 §4. What Is Humanity?......Page 211 §5. The Negative Interpretation......Page 214 §6. The Positive Interpretation......Page 218 §7. Conclusion:Remarks on Groundwork II:46–49(427–429)......Page 219 §1. Gaining Entry for the Moral Law......Page 224 §2. The Formulation of Autonomy and Its Interpretation......Page 227 §3. The Supremacy of Reason......Page 229 §4. The Realm of Ends......Page 232 §5. Bringing the Moral Law Nearer to Intuition......Page 235 §6. What Is the Analogy?......Page 238 §1. Introduction......Page 241 §2. The First Three of Six Conceptions of the Good......Page 243 §3. The Second Three Conceptions of the Good......Page 247 §4. Autonomy and Heteronomy......Page 250 §5. The Priority of Right......Page 254 §6. A Note on True Human Needs......Page 256 §1. Rational Intuitionism:A Final Look......Page 259 §2. Kant ’s Moral Constructivism......Page 261 §3. The Constructivist Procedure......Page 262 §4. An Observation and an Objection......Page 265 §5. Two Conceptions of Objectivity......Page 267 §6. The Categorical Imperative:In What Way Synthetic A Priori?......Page 271 §1. Introduction......Page 277 §2. The First Fact of Reason Passage......Page 279 §3. The Second Passage:§§5–8 of Chapter I of the Analytic......Page 282 §4. The Third Passage:Appendix I to Analytic I, Paragraphs 8–15......Page 285 §5. Why Kant Might Have Abandoned a Deduction for the Moral Law......Page 288 §6. What Kind of Authentication Does the Moral Law Have?......Page 290 §7. The Fifth and Sixth Fact of Reason Passages......Page 292 §8. Conclusion......Page 295 §1. Concluding Remarks on Constructivism and Due Re .ection......Page 297 §2. The Two Points of View......Page 299 §3. Kant ’s Opposition to Leibniz on Freedom......Page 301 §4. Absolute Spontaneity......Page 304 §5. The Moral Law as a Law of Freedom......Page 306 §6. The Ideas of Freedom......Page 309 §7. Conclusion......Page 313 §1. The Three Predispositions......Page 315 §2. The Free Power of Choice......Page 318 §3. The Rational Representation of the Origin of Evil......Page 322 §4. The Manichean Moral Psychology......Page 327 §5. The Roots of Moral Motivation in Our Person......Page 330 §1. The Practical Point of View......Page 333 §2. The Realm of Ends as Object of the Moral Law......Page 335 §3. The Highest Good as Object of the Moral Law......Page 337 §4. The Postulates of Vernunftglaube......Page 341 §5. The Content of Reasonable Faith......Page 343 §6. The Unity of Reason......Page 346 Hegel......Page 351 §1. Introduction......Page 353 §2. Philosophy as Reconciliation......Page 355 §3. The Free Will......Page 360 §4. Private Property......Page 364 §5. Civil Society......Page 368 §1. Sittlichkeit:The Account of Duty......Page 373 §2. Sittlichkeit:The State......Page 376 §3. Sittlichkeit:War and Peace......Page 382 §4. A Third Alternative......Page 386 §5. Hegel ’s Legacy as a Critic of Liberalism......Page 389 Appendix / Course Outline:Problems in Moral Philosophy......Page 397 Index......Page 401

The premier political philosopher of his day, John Rawls, in three decades of teaching at Harvard, has had a profound influence on the way philosophical ethics is approached and understood today. This book brings together the lectures that inspired a generation of students—and a regeneration of moral philosophy. It invites readers to learn from the most noted exemplars of modern moral philosophy with the inspired guidance of one of contemporary philosophy's most noteworthy practitioners and teachers.

Central to Rawls's approach is the idea that respectful attention to the great texts of our tradition can lead to a fruitful exchange of ideas across the centuries. In this spirit, his book engages thinkers such as Leibniz, Hume, Kant, and Hegel as they struggle in brilliant and instructive ways to define the role of a moral conception in human life. The lectures delineate four basic types of moral reasoning: perfectionism, utilitarianism, intuitionism, and—the ultimate focus of Rawls's course—Kantian constructivism. Comprising a superb course on the history of moral philosophy, they also afford unique insight into how John Rawls has transformed our view of this history.

The premier political philosopher of his day, Johns Rawls, in three decades of teaching at Harvard, has had a profound influence on the way philosophical ethics is approached and understood today. This book brings together the lectures that inspired a generation of students -- and a regeneration of moral philosophy. It invites readers to learn from the most noted exemplars of modern moral philosophy with the inspired guidance of one of contemporary philosophy's most noteworthy practitioners and teachers.Central to Rawls's approach is the idea that respectful attention to the great texts of our tradition can lead to a fruitful exchange of ideas across the centuries. In this spirit, his book engages thinkers such as Leibniz, Hume, Kant, and Hegel as they struggle in brilliant and instructive ways to define the role of a moral conception in human life. The lectures delineate four basic types of moral reasoning: perfectionism, utilitarianism, intuitionism, and -- the ultimate focus of Rawls's course -- Kantian constructivism. Comprising a superb course on the history of moral philosophy, they also afford unique insight into how John Rawls has transformed our view of this history. A collection of the lectures on moral philosophy given by John Rawls over three decades of teaching at Harvard. This book looks at thinkers such as Leibniz, Hume and Kant, in their struggle to define the role of a moral conception in human life