Learning from Six Philosophers: Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke, Berkeley, Hume (Vol. 2)

Overview: Jonathan Bennett engages with the thought of six great thinkers of the early modern period: Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. While not neglecting the historical setting of each, his chief focus is on the words they wrote. What problem is being tackled? How exactly is the solution meant to work? Does it succeed? If not, why not? What can be learned from its success or failure? For newcomers to the early modern scene, this clearly written work is an excellent introduction to it. Those already in the know can learn how to argue with the great philosophers of the past, treating them as colleagues, antagonists, students, teachers. In this second volume, Bennett focuses on the work of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. Contents 8 VOLUME 2 12 Preface to Volume 2 6 Abbreviations 18 CHAPTER 21: LOCKEAN IDEAS, OVERVIEW AND FOUNDATIONS 22 154. Locke’s explanation of the term ‘idea’ 22 155. The roles played by Lockean ideas 23 156. How ideas represent: two theories 26 157. A third theory 28 158. Against reification 29 159. Locke and the reification of ideas 31 CHAPTER 22: LOCKEAN IDEAS, SOME DETAILS 34 160. Are all Lockean ideas images? 34 161. Locke’s two accounts of abstract ideas 37 162. Berkeley’s first attack on abstract ideas 38 163. Can images be abstract? 40 164. Berkeley’s second attack 42 165. Hume’s variant on it 44 166. Abstract ideas and complex ideas 46 167. Ideas and concepts 47 168. Ideas and qualities 51 169. Explaining the idea/quality conflation 53 CHAPTER 23: KNOWLEDGE OF NECESSITY 55 170. Innate knowledge: introduction 55 171. Dispositional innate knowledge 58 172. Leibniz on dispositional innatism 61 173. Locke on modal discovery: the relevance problem 63 174. Other relations 68 175. Locke on modal discovery: the necessity problem 69 176. Leibniz’s first modal epistemology 70 177. Leibniz’s second modal epistemology 73 178. Leibniz’s relevance problem 74 179. Innately possessed ideas 75 CHAPTER 24: DESCARTES’S THEORY OF MODALITY 80 180. Descartes’s voluntarism about modal truths 80 181. The two parts of Descartes’s voluntarism: the tandem puzzle 83 182. Omnipotence and small achievements 85 183. Subjective and objective: the bootstraps problem 87 184. Theorizing about the basis of modality: the libertinism threat 90 185. Descartes’s handling of the threat 91 186. Can Descartes’s God deceive? 93 CHAPTER 25: SECONDARY QUALITIES 95 187. Locke’s corpuscularianism 95 188. The corpuscularian thesis about what secondary qualities are 96 189. Why the central thesis is true 100 190. A diffference of kind 102 191. How Locke defends the central thesis 104 192. How the central thesis solves the problem 106 193. The ‘no resemblance’ thesis 109 194. Is the central thesis a semantic one? 110 CHAPTER 26: LOCKE ON ESSENCES 113 195. Essences of individuals 113 196. The first opinion about real essences 115 197. The second opinion about real essences 116 198. How we classify 118 199. Guessing at real essences 120 200. Meanings and essences 121 201. The nature and source of Locke’s failure 125 202. Essences and universals 127 CHAPTER 27: SUBSTANCE IN LOCKE 129 203. The substratum theory 129 204. Locke’s attitude to it 132 205. How to avoid Locke’s impasse 135 206. Ayers’s interpretation of ‘substance’ in Locke 138 207. Two exegetical problems 141 CHAPTER 28: BERKELEY AGAINST MATERIALISM 145 208. Foundationalism 145 209. Descartes on the existence of matter 147 210. Locke on the existence of matter 148 211. Berkeley’s first attack: materialism clashes with common sense 152 212. Second attack: materialism is not supported by evidence 157 213. Third attack: materialism is certainly false 160 214. The occasionalist escape 162 215. Fourth attack: materialism is conceptually defective 163 CHAPTER 29: BERKELEY’S USES OF LOCKE’S WORK 167 216. Why Berkeley cares about abstract ideas 167 217. What Berkeley says about secondary qualities 169 218. What Berkeley says about substratum substance 170 CHAPTER 30: BERKELEY ON SPIRITS 174 219. Berkeley on ‘spirit’ 174 220. Berkeley against solipsism 179 221. Only spirits can be causes 180 222. Berkeley’s natural theology 183 223. Human agency 186 224. Other people 188 CHAPTER 31: BERKELEIAN SENSIBLE THINGS 191 225. Each sensible thing is a collection of ideas 191 226. Problems with collections 193 227. Berkeley’s disrespect towards ‘sensible thing’ 196 228. The vulgar sense of ‘same’ 198 229. The continuity of sensible things 201 230. The continuity argument 203 231. Idealism and phenomenalism 206 232. Was Berkeley a phenomenalist? 210 233. Phenomenalism and the creation 213 234. Why was Berkeley not a phenomenalist? 216 CHAPTER 32: HUME’S ‘IDEAS’ 218 235. Approaching Hume 218 236. What kind of philosopher was Hume? 219 237. A case-study: the belief in body 221 238. The idea/impression line: distractions 223 239. The idea/impression line: what it is 225 240. An odd problem 227 241. Memory 228 242. The line between simple and complex ideas 230 243. The copy thesis: problems 232 244. The copy thesis: a triple revision 234 245. The missing shade of blue 237 246. Passion and reflection 240 CHAPTER 33: HUME AND BELIEF 242 247. Propositional thoughts 242 248. Beliefs and other propositional thoughts 244 249. Looking for an account of belief 247 250. Hume’s account of belief 250 251. Belief: feeling versus intellect 252 CHAPTER 34: SOME HUMEAN DOCTRINE ABOUT RELATIONS 255 252. The association of ideas: preliminaries 255 253. Three of the four natural relations 256 254. The fourth relation: causation 258 255. The importance of the thesis in Hume’s thought 259 256. Seven kinds of relations 261 257. Two dichotomies 263 CHAPTER 35: HUME ON CAUSATION, NEGATIVELY 266 258. Observing particular cause–effect pairs 266 259. The gateway to the neighbouring fields 269 260. The status of the principle of universal causation 271 261. Hume’s influential error about distinctness of ideas 273 262. Steering around it 274 263. The point of the question about universal causation 277 264. Causal inferences from memory and sensory experience 278 265. Causation and absolute necessity 280 266. The Lockean inference to power 282 267. Four of Hume’s objections to the Lockean inference 283 268. A further objection 286 CHAPTER 36: HUME ON CAUSATION, POSITIVELY 289 269. The causes of causal inferences 289 270. Hume’s best account of causation 292 271. The elusiveness of impressions of compulsion 294 272. The absurdity of ‘impression of compulsion’ 295 273. Was Hume a sceptic about causation? 297 274. The great objection to the ‘Humean view of causation’ 300 275. Did Hume accept the ‘Humean view of causation’? 302 CHAPTER 37: HUME ON THE EXISTENCE OF BODIES 305 276. The project in Treatise I.iv.2 305 277. The role of the senses 308 278. The role of reason 309 279. Imagination: creaking and contradiction 310 280. Imagination: oceans and explanation 313 281. The ‘what genus?’ question 316 282. Hume’s ‘system’: the identity move 318 283. Hume’s ‘system’: the remainder 322 284. What is wrong with The Belief 325 CHAPTER 38: REASON 328 285. Reasoning in man and beast 328 286. Demonstrative reasoning 330 287. A sceptical attack on reason: preliminaries 333 288. A sceptical attack on reason: the argument 335 289. How Hume responds to the attack 337 290. The real importance of Treatise iv.1 339 CHAPTER 39: LOCKE ON DIACHRONIC IDENTITY-JUDGEMENTS 342 291. Atoms and aggregates of them 342 292. Organisms 344 293. Relative identity 346 294. ‘Same man’ 347 295. Persons 348 296. Persons and substances 349 297. Personal identity 352 298. Locke’s analysis is too weak 353 299. Locke’s analysis is too strong 354 300. People as animals 357 301. ‘A forensic concept’ 359 302. Same person, same substance? 361 CHAPTER 40: HUME AND LEIBNIZ ON PERSONAL IDENTITY 364 303. Diachronic identity statements: Hume’s approach and Locke’s 364 304. Optimal diachronic identity statements 365 305. Hume tries to explain some of Locke’s results 367 306. Hume on personal identity: negative 369 307. Hume on personal identity: positive 372 308. Pears on omitting the body 375 309. Hume’s recantation 376 310. Coda: Hume and Berkeley on the passage of time 377 311. Leibniz on what a substance is 380 312. Leibniz and Hume compared 384 Bibliography 386 Index of Persons 392 A 392 B 392 C 392 D 392 E 392 F 392 G 392 H 392 I 392 J 392 K 392 L 392 M 392 N 393 O 393 P 393 Q 393 R 393 S 393 T 393 V 393 W 393 Y 393 Index of Subjects 394 A 394 B 394 C 394 D 394 E 394 F 394 G 394 H 395 L 395 M 396 O 396 P 396 R 396 S 396 T 396