Leading Questions: How Hegemony Affects the International Political Economy (Michigan Studies in International Political Economy)

Considers the impact of dominant powers on cooperation between states in the world economy | Leadership has long been an important subject in the study of international economic relations. Many scholars give American leadership credit for strong economic growth in western Europe and Japan after World War II. Other scholars have accused leading nations of using their power to the detriment of foreign countries. For example, it is often argued that a failure of both British and American leadership was a cause of the Great Depression of the 1930s. In Leading Questions , Robert Pahre develops a series of formal models to determine under what conditions leadership will be beneficial or harmful for the international political economy. He begins with a simple model of collective action and then adds leadership, security concerns, cooperation, and multilateral regimes to this basic model. He tests each model against a different historical period between 1815 and 1967. Pahre's findings challenge conventional wisdom on international leadership. He finds that a leading state harms others when it has many allies but is good for the international political economy when it lacks allies. Leaders are less likely to engage in international cooperation than are other states, but having a leader in the system makes cooperation among follower states more likely. Cooperation by others may cause the leader to join a system of multilateral cooperation. Pahre presents the technical material in an accessible style. By challenging the conventional interpretations of political economy in several historical periods, Leading Questions will be of interest not only to political scientists but also to economists and historians. Robert Pahre is Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. In Leading Questions, Robert Pahre Develops A Series Of Formal Models To Determine Under What Conditions Leadership Will Be Beneficial Or Harmful For The International Political Economy. Pahre's Findings Challenge Conventional Wisdom On International Leadership. He Finds That A Leading State Harms Others When It Has Many Allies, But Strengthens The International Political Economy When It Lacks Allies. Moreover, Though Leaders Are Less Likely To Engage In International Cooperation Than Are Other States, Having A Leader In The System Makes Cooperation Among Follower States More Likely. Conversely, Cooperation By Others May Cause A Leading State To Join A System Of Multilateral Cooperation. By Challenging The Conventional Interpretations Of Political Economy In Several Historical Periods, Leading Questions Will Be Of Interest Not Only To Political Scientists But Also To Economists And Historians.--jacket. Pt. 1. Introduction -- Ch. 1. Leadership And Hegemony -- Pt. 2. Hegemony And Collective Goods -- Ch. 2. A Collective-goods Model Of International Interdependence -- Ch. 3. Stackelberg Leadership And Public Goods -- Ch. 4. Predatory Hegemony: The 1920s -- Ch. 5. Security Concerns And Foreign Economic Policy -- Ch. 6. The Rise Of Free Trade In Britain, 1815-1853 -- Pt. 3. Hegemony And Cooperation -- Ch. 7. Bargaining And Cooperation -- Ch. 8. Hegemony And Commercial Negotiations, 1815-1913 -- Ch. 9. Multilateral Cooperation -- Ch. 10. From Malevolence To Multilateralism, 1945-1967 -- Pt. 4. Conclusions -- Ch. 11. The Future Of International Leadership -- App. A.a Political Support Model Of Trade -- App. B. Data Sources. Robert Pahre. Includes Bibliographical References And Index. Leadership has long been an important subject in the study of international economic relations. Many scholars give American leadership credit for strong economic growth in western Europe and Japan after World War II. Other scholars have accused leading nations of using their power to the detriment of foreign countries. For example, it is often argued that a failure of both British and American leadership was a cause of the Great Depression of the 1930s.In Leading Questions, Robert Pahre develops a series of formal models to determine under what conditions leadership be beneficial or harmful for the international political economy. He begins with a simple model of collective action and then adds leadership, security concerns, cooperation, and multilateral regimes to this basic model. He tests each model against a different historical period between 1815 and 1967.Pahre's findings challenge conventional wisdom on international leadership. He finds that a leading state harms others when it has many allies but is good for the international political economy when it lacks allies. Leaders are less likely to engage an international cooperation than are other states, but having a leader in the system makes cooperation among follower states more likely. Cooperation by others may cause the leader to join a system of multilateral cooperation. "In Leading Questions, Robert Pahre develops a series of formal models to determine under what conditions leadership will be beneficial or harmful for the international political economy."--BOOK JACKET. "Pahre's findings challenge conventional wisdom on international leadership. He finds that a leading state harms others when it has many allies, but strengthens the international political economy when it lacks allies. Moreover, though leaders are less likely to engage in international cooperation than are other states, having a leader in the system makes cooperation among follower states more likely. Conversely, cooperation by others may cause a leading state to join a system of multilateral cooperation."--BOOK JACKET. "By challenging the conventional interpretations of political economy in several historical periods, Leading Questions will be of interest not only to political scientists but also to economists and historians."--BOOK JACKET. University of Michigan Press Contents 8 List of Figures 10 List of Tables 12 Preface 14 Part 1: Introduction 18 1. Leadership and Hegemony 20 Part 2: Hegemony and Collective Goods 38 2. A Collective-Goods Model of International Interdependence 40 3. Stackelberg Leadership and Public Goods 56 4. Predatory Hegemony: The 1920s 68 5. Security Concerns and Foreign Economic Policy 90 6. The Rise of Free Trade in Britain, 1815−1853 108 Part 3: Hegemony and Cooperation 138 7. Bargaining and Cooperation 140 8. Hegemony and Commercial Negotiations, 1815−1913 166 9. Multilateral Cooperation 194 10. From Malevolence to Multilateralism, 1945−1967 206 Part 4: Conclusions 238 11. The Future of International Leadership 240 Appendixes 252 Appendix A: A Political Support Model of Trade 254 Appendix B: Data Sources 262 References 264 Index 286 0472109707,9780472109708