Laws, Mind, and Free Will (Life and Mind: Philosophical Issues in Biology and Psychology (Hardcover))

Steven Horst's Laws, Mind, and Free Will has both the clarity, scope, and scholarship needed for an excellent text and the original analysis appropriate to a significant contribution to the literature, especially on the topic of laws of nature. It will reward readers in philosophy of mind and cognitive science and provide advanced students with an excellent treatment of important literature. Robert Audi , John A. O'Brien Professor of Philosophy, University of Notre Dame An account of scientific laws that vindicates the status of psychological laws and shows natural laws to be compatible with free will.In Laws, Mind, and Free Will, Steven Horst addresses the apparent dissonance between the picture of the natural world that arises from the sciences and our understanding of ourselves as agents who think and act. If the mind and the world are entirely governed by natural laws, there seems to be no room left for free will to operate. Moreover, although the laws of physical science are clear and verifiable, the sciences of the mind seem to yield only rough generalizations rather than universal laws of nature. Horst argues that these two familiar problems in philosophy—the apparent tension between free will and natural law and the absence of'strict'laws in the sciences of the mind—are artifacts of a particular philosophical thesis about the nature of laws: that laws make claims about how objects actually behave.Horst argues against this Empiricist orthodoxy and proposes an alternative account of laws—an account rooted in a cognitivist approach to philosophy of science. Horst argues that once we abandon the Empiricist misunderstandings of the nature of laws there is no contrast between'strict'laws and generalizations about the mind ('ceteris paribus'laws, laws hedged by the caveat'other things being equal'), and that a commitment to laws is compatible with a commitment to the existence of free will. Horst's alternative account, which he calls'cognitive Pluralism,'vindicates the truth of psychological laws and resolves the tension between human freedom and the sciences. An account of scientific laws that vindicates the status of psychological laws and shows natural laws to be compatible with free will. In Laws, Mind, and Free Will , Steven Horst addresses the apparent dissonance between the picture of the natural world that arises from the sciences and our understanding of ourselves as agents who think and act. If the mind and the world are entirely governed by natural laws, there seems to be no room left for free will to operate. Moreover, although the laws of physical science are clear and verifiable, the sciences of the mind seem to yield only rough generalizations rather than universal laws of nature. Horst argues that these two familiar problems in philosophy--the apparent tension between free will and natural law and the absence of strict laws in the sciences of the mind--are artifacts of a particular philosophical thesis about the nature of that laws make claims about how objects actually behave. Horst argues against this Empiricist orthodoxy and proposes an alternative account of laws--an account rooted in a cognitivist approach to philosophy of science. Horst argues that once we abandon the Empiricist misunderstandings of the nature of laws there is no contrast between strict laws and generalizations about the mind (ceteris paribus laws, laws hedged by the caveat other things being equal), and that a commitment to laws is compatible with a commitment to the existence of free will. Horst's alternative account, which he calls cognitive Pluralism, vindicates the truth of psychological laws and resolves the tension between human freedom and the sciences. Contents......Page 8 Preface......Page 12 I Laws and the Mind......Page 16 1 Laws and the Mind......Page 18 2 Laws, Vindication, and Ontology......Page 30 3 The Received Solution in Computational Psychology......Page 42 4 Cartwright, Universal Laws, and Fundamentalism......Page 52 5 Empiricism and Laws......Page 64 6 Laws and Idealization......Page 76 II Laws and Freedom......Page 102 7 Laws and Freedom......Page 104 8 Freedom, Determinism, and Two Accounts of Laws......Page 122 9 Three Appeals and a Kantian Conclusion......Page 136 III Case Studies of Explanation in the Sciences of the Mind......Page 156 10 Psychophysical Laws and Models of Early Vision......Page 158 11 Modeling Cortical Dynamics......Page 194 12 Belief-Desire Psychologies......Page 242 Notes......Page 278 Bibliography......Page 282 Index......Page 290 In This Work, Steven Horst Addresses The Apparent Dissonance Between The Picture Of The Natural World That Arises From The Sciences And Our Understanding Of Ourselves As Agents Who Think And Act. Laws And The Mind -- Laws, Vindication, And Ontology -- The Received Solution In Computational Psychology -- Cartwritght, Universal Laws, And Fundamentalism -- Empiricism And Laws -- Laws And Idealization -- Laws And Freedom -- Freedom, Determinism, And Two Accounts Of Laws -- Three Appeals And A Kantian Conclusion -- Psychophysical Laws And Models Of Early Vision -- Modeling Cortical Dynamics -- Belief-desire Psychologies. Steven Horst. Includes Bibliographical References And Index. 9780262015257 MIT Press Contents 8 Preface 12 I Laws and the Mind 16 1 Laws and the Mind 18 2 Laws, Vindication, and Ontology 30 3 The Received Solution in Computational Psychology 42 4 Cartwright, Universal Laws, and Fundamentalism 52 5 Empiricism and Laws 64 6 Laws and Idealization 76 II Laws and Freedom 102 7 Laws and Freedom 104 8 Freedom, Determinism, and Two Accounts of Laws 122 9 Three Appeals and a Kantian Conclusion 136 III Case Studies of Explanation in the Sciences of the Mind 156 10 Psychophysical Laws and Models of Early Vision 158 11 Modeling Cortical Dynamics 194 12 Belief-Desire Psychologies 242 Notes 278 Bibliography 282 Index 290