L'air et les songes : essai sur l'imagination du mouvement

The book is intended as a reader-friendly introduction to issues in the philosophy of mind, including mental–physical causal interaction, computational models of thought, the relation minds bear to brains, and assorted -isms: behaviorism, dualism, eliminativism, emergentism, functionalism, materialism, neutral monism, and panpsychism. The Fourth Edition reintroduces a chapter on Donald Davidson and a discussion of ‘Non-Cartesian Dualism', along with a wholly new chapter on emergence and panpsychism. A concluding chapter draws together material in earlier chapters and offers what the author regards as a plausible account of the mind's place in nature. Suggested readings at the conclusion of each chapter have been updated, with a focus on accessible, non-technical material. Key Features of the Fourth Edition Includes a new chapter,'Emergence and Panpsychism'(Chapter 13), reflecting growing interest in these areas Reintroduces and updates a chapter on Donald Davidson,'Radical Interpretation'(Chapter 8), which was excised from the previous edition Updates'Descartes'Legacy'(Chapter 3) to include a discussion of E. J. Lowe's arresting'Non-Cartesian Dualism', also removed from the previous edition Includes a highly revised final chapter, which draws together much of the previous material and sketches a plausible account of the mind's place in nature Updated'Suggested Reading'lists at the end of each chapter The book is intended as a reader-friendly introduction to issues in the philosophy of mind, including mental–physical causal interaction, computational models of thought, the relation minds bear to brains, and assorted -isms: behaviorism, dualism, eliminativism, emergentism, functionalism, materialism, neutral monism, and panpsychism. The Fourth Edition reintroduces a chapter on Donald Davidson and a discussion of ‘Non-Cartesian Dualism’, along with a wholly new chapter on emergence and panpsychism. A concluding chapter draws together material in earlier chapters and offers what the author regards as a plausible account of the mind’s place in nature. Suggested readings at the conclusion of each chapter have been updated, with a focus on accessible, non-technical material. Key Features of the Fourth EditionIncludes a new chapter, ‘Emergence and Panpsychism’ (Chapter 13), reflecting growing interest in these areas Reintroduces and updates a chapter on Donald Davidson, ‘Radical Interpretation’ (Chapter 8), which was excised from the previous edition Updates ‘Descartes’s Legacy’ (Chapter 3) to include a discussion of E. J. Lowe’s arresting ‘Non-Cartesian Dualism’, also removed from the previous edition Includes a highly revised final chapter, which draws together much of the previous material and sketches a plausible account of the mind’s place in nature Updated ‘Suggested Reading’ lists at the end of each chapter Cover 1 Half Title 2 Series Page 3 Title 4 Copyright 5 Dedication 6 Contents 8 List of Figures 13 Preface to the Fourth Edition 15 Preface to the Third Edition 17 Preface to the Second Edition 19 Preface to the First Edition 21 1 Introduction 26 1.1 Appearance and Reality 26 1.2 The Unavoidability of the Philosophy of Mind 28 1.3 Science and Metaphysics 29 1.4 Metaphysics and Cognitive Science 30 1.5 A Look Ahead 31 Suggested Reading 39 2 Cartesian Dualism 42 2.1 Science and Philosophy 42 2.2 Descartes’s Dualism 43 2.3 Substances, Attributes, Modes 46 2.4 The Metaphysics of Cartesian Dualism 47 2.5 Mind–Body Interaction 49 2.6 A Causally Closed Universe 53 Suggested Reading 54 3 Descartes’s Legacy 56 3.1 Dualism Without Interaction: Parallelism 56 3.2 Occasionalism 58 3.3 Causation and Occasionalism 59 3.4 Idealism 63 3.5 Mind and Meaning 64 3.6 Epiphenomenalism 67 3.7 Coda: Non-Cartesian Dualism 69 Suggested Reading 73 4 Mind and Behavior 75 4.1 Moving Away From Dualism 75 4.2 Historical and Philosophical Background 76 4.3 Other Minds 78 4.4 The Beetle in the Box 79 4.5 Philosophical Behaviorism 81 4.6 Dispositions 83 4.7 Behavioral Analysis 84 4.8 Sensation 86 4.9 The Legacy of Philosophical Behaviorism 87 4.10 Intrinsic Characteristics 88 4.11 ‘Experimental Methods and Conceptual Confusion’ 89 4.12 Psychological Behaviorism 90 4.13 The Demise of Behaviorism 92 4.14 Behavior 92 Suggested Reading 94 5 The Identity Theory 96 5.1 From Correlation to Identification 96 5.2 Parsimony 97 5.3 Self-Conscious Thought 98 5.4 Locating Mental Qualities 99 5.5 Substances, Properties, States, and Events 100 5.6 Predicates and Properties 102 5.7 Strict Identity 103 5.8 Leibniz’s Law 104 5.9 The $64 Question 105 5.10 The Phenomenological Fallacy 106 5.11 Epistemological Loose Ends 109 5.12 Taking Stock 110 Suggested Reading 112 6 Functionalism 113 6.1 The Rise of Functionalism 113 6.2 The Functionalist Picture 114 6.3 Abstraction as Partial Consideration 115 6.4 Minds as Programs 115 6.5 Functional Explanation 116 6.6 Functionalist Metaphysics 117 6.7 Functionalism and Materialism 119 6.8 Functional Properties 120 6.9 Mental Properties as Functional Properties 122 6.10 Functionalism and Behaviorism 123 6.11 Characterizing Functional States 125 6.12 Functional Systems Generally 128 6.13 Moving Beyond Analogy 129 Suggested Reading 129 7 The Representational Theory of Mind 131 7.1 Mental Representation 131 7.2 Semantic Engines 134 7.3 Minds as Semantic Engines 137 7.4 The Turing Test 138 7.5 The Chinese Room 140 7.6 From Syntax to Semantics 142 7.7 Thinking as Computing 143 7.8 Levels of Description 144 7.9 From Taxonomy to Ontology 146 7.10 Layers of Reality 149 Suggested Reading 150 8 Radical Interpretation 152 8.1 Minds as Constructs 152 8.2 The Propositional Attitudes 153 8.3 Semantic Opacity 154 8.4 Radical Interpretation: Background Issues 154 8.5 T-Theories 157 8.6 From T-Theories to I-Theories 159 8.7 Decision Theory 160 8.8 Sound and Fury Signifying Nothing? 161 8.9 Charity 162 8.10 Indeterminacy 163 8.11 The Omniscient Interpreter 164 8.12 Interpretation and Measurement 165 8.13 Structure and Content 167 8.14 Mental Causation and the Propositional Attitudes 169 8.15 An Apparent Regress 171 Suggested Reading 174 9 The Intentional Stance 176 9.1 From Davidson to Dennett 176 9.2 Taking a Stance 176 9.3 From Intentional Stance to Design Stance 179 9.4 From Design Stance to Physical Stance 180 9.5 The Emerging Picture 181 9.6 Thought and Language 182 9.7 Kinds of Mind 184 9.8 Consciousness 186 9.9 Searle’s Objection 188 Suggested Reading 190 10 Eliminativism 191 10.1 From Instrumentalism to Eliminativism 191 10.2 Ontological Commitment 192 10.3 Theories and Theory Reduction 194 10.4 Stich’s Argument 196 10.5 Prospects for Reduction or Elimination 199 10.6 Is Eliminativism Self-Refuting? 200 Suggested Reading 201 11 Non-Reductive Physicalism 203 11.1 From Substances to Properties 203 11.2 Substance Monism, Property Dualism 204 11.3 Mental Causation: Background Issues 206 11.4 Mental–Physical Supervenience 207 11.5 Causal Relevance 209 11.6 The Causal Relevance of Mental Properties 211 11.7 The Challenge of Causal Relevance 213 11.8 Jettisoning Higher-Level Properties 215 11.9 The Upshot 216 Suggested Reading 217 12 Consciousness 219 12.1 The Status of ‘Raw Feels’ 219 12.2 The Mystery of Consciousness 222 12.3 Qualities of Conscious Experiences 223 12.4 Zombies 225 12.5 Biting the Bullet 227 12.6 Contrary Mary 229 12.7 Representationalism 232 12.8 Consciousness as Higher-Order Representation 235 12.9 Explaining Consciousness 237 Suggested Reading 237 13 Emergence and Panpsychism 239 13.1 Emergence 239 13.2 ‘Downward Causation’ 241 13.3 Panpsychism 245 13.4 Emergence or Panpsychism? 248 Suggested Reading 248 14 The Mind’s Place in Nature 250 14.1 Applied Metaphysics 250 14.2 Multiple Realizability and Levels of Reality 250 14.3 Zapping Zombies 251 14.4 Qualities of Conscious Experience 253 14.5 Imagery and Intentionality 255 14.6 Putting Imagery to Work 257 14.7 Twin-Earth 258 14.8 Intentionality Delivered 259 14.9 Functionalism Adieu 261 14.10 Dénouement 262 14.11 An Affectionate Farewell 265 Suggested Reading 265 References 268 Index 281 The book is intended as a reader-friendly introduction to issues in the philosophy of mind, including mental-physical causal interaction, computational models of thought, the relation minds bear to brains, and assorted -isms: behaviorism, dualism, eliminativism, emergentism, functionalism, materialism, neutral monism, and panpsychism. The Fourth Edition reintroduces a chapter on Donald Davidson and a discussion of Non-Cartesian Dualism', along with a wholly new chapter on emergence and panpsychism. A concluding chapter draws together material in earlier chapters and offers what the author regards as a plausible account of the mind's place in nature. Suggested readings at the conclusion of each chapter have been updated, with a focus on accessible, non-technical material. Key Features of theFourth Edition Includes a new chapter, 'Emergence and Panpsychism' (Chapter 13), reflecting growing interest in these areas Reintroduces and updates a chapter on Donald Davidson, 'Radical Interpretation' (Chapter 8), whichwas excised from the previous edition Updates 'Descartes' Legacy' (Chapter 3) to include a discussion of E.J. Lowe's arresting 'Non-Cartesian Dualism', also removed from the previous edition Includes a highly revised final chapter, which draws together much of the previous material and sketches a plausible account of the mind's place in nature Updated 'Suggested Reading' lists at the end of each chapter