Knowledge, Dexterity, and Attention : A Theory of Epistemic Agency

Contemporary Cognitive Science Clearly Tells Us That Attention Is Modulated For Speech And Action. While These Forms Of Goal-directed Attention Are Very Well Researched In Psychology, They Have Not Been Sufficiently Studied By Epistemologists. In This Book, Abrol Fairweather And Carlos Montemayor Develop And Defend A Theory Of Epistemic Achievements That Requires The Manifestation Of Cognitive Agency. They Examine Empirical Work On The Psychology Of Attention And Assertion, And Use It To Ground A Normative Theory Of Epistemic Achievements And Virtues. The Resulting Study Is The First Sustained Naturalized Virtue Epistemology, And Will Be Of Interest To Readers In Epistemology, Cognitive Science, And Beyond. Machine Generated Contents Note: 1.1. Aims And Motivations -- 1.2. Dexterity, Attention, And Integration -- 1.3. A Brief Summary Of Chapters -- 1.4. A Tension In Virtue Epistemology -- 1.5. Virtue Theoretic Epistemic Psychology -- 1.6. The Attention-assertion Model -- 1.7. Methodology In Epistemology -- 1. Epistemic Virtue, Reliable Attention, And Cognitive Constitution -- 1.1. The Argument From Attention -- 1.2. Dispositions And Epistemic Abilities -- 1.3. The Situationist Challenge -- 1.4. Knowledge Of Syntax -- 1.5. Knowledge Of Logic -- 1.6. Arguments Against Consequentialist Epistemic Norms -- 2. Meta-epistemology And Epistemic Agency -- 2.1. On The Role Of Motivational States -- 2.2. The Direction Of Attention: Self Or World -- 2.3. Cognitive Needs -- 2.4. The Desire To Assert: The Content Of Epistemic Motivation -- 2.5. Epistemic Needs And The Grip Of Epistemic Norms -- 2.6. Frege On The Grip Of Assertion -- 2.7. The Frame Problem And Virtuous Insensitivity -- 2.8. Some Concerns About Internal Normative Force -- 3. Success Semantics And The Etiology Of Success -- 3.1. The Because Of Requirement For Knowledge -- 3.2. Greco's Contextualist Etiology -- 3.3. Causality: Folksy, Metaphysical, And Psychologically Constrained -- 3.4. Success Semantics And The Etiology Of Success -- 3.5. Peirce, Wittgenstein, And Ramsey: Reliability And Assertion -- 3.6. The Norm Of Assertion -- 3.7. Assertion And Action -- 4. Epistemic Agency -- 4.1. Tensions Between Credit, Agency, And Automaticity -- 4.2. Sosa's Judgments And Functionings: Personal And Sub-personal Success -- 4.3. Mental And Epistemic Action -- 4.4. Resolving The Tension -- 4.5. Language And Agency -- 5. Assertion As Epistemic Motivation -- 5.1. Attention And Communication -- 5.2. Dispositions To Assert And Successful Communication -- 5.3. Forms Of Assertoric Force And Forms Of Epistemic Attention -- 5.4. Factivity, Credit, And Social Environments -- 5.5. Epistemically Virtuous Halting Thresholds And Assertable Contents: The Case Of Epistemic Modals -- 5.6. Retraction And Virtuous Sensitivity -- 5.7. Conclusion -- 6. Curiosity And Epistemic Achievement -- 6.1. Epistemically Virtuous Curiosity -- 6.2. Basic Principles Of Curiosity -- 6.3. Curiosity And Halting Thresholds -- 6.4. Curiosity And Virtuous Insensitivity -- 6.5. Attention, Curiosity, And Creativity -- 7. Collective Agency, Assertion, And Information -- 7.1. Collective Epistemic Agency And Cognitive Integration -- 7.2. Collective Agency And Reliable Social Communication -- 7.3. Social Epistemology And Collective Assertion -- 7.4. Collective Attention And Collective Motivation -- 7.5. Reflection, Explicit Judgment, And Reliability -- 7.6. Complex Collective Agency. Abrol Fairweather, San Francisco State University, Carlos Montemayor, San Francisco State University. Includes Bibliographical References And Index. Act (philosophy).