Kings as judges : power, justice, and the origins of parliaments

"The first systematic account of how structures of justice led to the emergence of representative institutions and state-formation in Western Europe. It will be of interest to scholars and students of political science, political economy and economic history, history, historical sociology, political sociology, law and legal history. How did representative institutions become the central organs of governance in Western Europe? What enabled this distinctive form of political organization and collective action that has proved so durable and influential? The answer has typically been sought either in the realm of ideas, in the Western tradition of individual rights, or in material change, especially the complex interaction of war, taxes, and economic growth. Common to these strands is the belief that representation resulted from weak ruling powers needing to concede rights to powerful social groups. Boucoyannis argues instead that representative institutions were a product of state strength, specifically the capacity to deliver justice across social groups. Enduring and inclusive representative parliaments formed when rulers could exercise power over the most powerful actors in the land and compel them to serve and, especially, to tax them. The language of rights deemed distinctive to the West emerged in response to more effectively imposed collective obligations, especially on those with most power." Contents 6 Figures 8 Tables 10 Preface and Acknowledgments 12 Part I The Origins of Representative Institutions: Power, Land, and Courts 16 1 Introduction: From Roving to Stationary Judges 18 2 A Theory of Institutional Emergence 43 3 Explaining Functional Layering and Institutional Fusion 74 Part II The Origins of Representative Practice: Power, Obligation, and Taxation 100 4 Taxation and Representative Practice 102 5 Variations in Representative Practice 120 6 No Taxation of Elites, No Representative Institutions 145 Part III Trade, Towns, and the Political Economy of Representation 166 7 Courts, Institutions, and Cities 168 8 Courts, Institutions, and Territory 195 9 The Endogeneity of Trade 210 Part IV Land, Conditionality, and Property Rights 220 10 Power, Land, and Second-Best Constitutionalism 222 11 Conditional Land Law, Property Rights, and “Sultanism” 246 12 Land, Tenure, and Assemblies 267 Part V Why Representation in the West: Petitions, Collective Responsibility, and Supra-Local Organization 288 13 Petitions, Collective Responsibility, and Representative Practice 290 14 Conclusion 317 Bibliography 334 Index 396