Kant's Intuitionism: A Commentary On The Transcendental Aesthetic (toronto Studies In Philosophy)

Ever since the publication of his Critique of Pure Reason in 1781, Immanuel Kant has occupied a central position in the philosophical world. In Kant's Intuitionism ? the most detailed study of Kant's views on the opening sections of the Critique since Hans Vaihinger's Commentar zur Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft more than a century ago ? Lorne Falkenstein focuses on one aspect of Kant's Transcendental Aesthetic, namely, his position on how we manage to intuit the properties and relations of objects as they exist in space and time. The question of how much structure sensory input has of itself and how much we give it through processing is a major problem not only in philosophy, but in cognitive science in general. How much do our faculties do to structure our knowledge of objects and to give them their spatial and temporal existence? Recent interpretations of Kant's doctrine of intuition have emphasized the constructivist answer to this question, but Falkenstein argues that our knowledge of objects in space and time is not grounded in concepts but in the quasi-physiological constitution of our senses. Kant's Intuitionism examines Kant's account of the human cognitive faculties, his views on space, and his reasons for denying that we have knowledge of things as they are in themselves. It is key to understanding the thinking of the philosopher and revitalizes the debate about the implications of the Transcendental Aesthetic. Introduction. I. Nativism And Empirism. Ii. Intuitionism And Constructivism. Iii. Formal Intuitionism. Iv. Kant's Formal Intuitionism. V. Grounds For The Popular Neglect Of Formal Intuitionism -- Pt. I. Kant's Representation Terminology. 1. The Distinction Between Intuition And Understanding. I. The Sense/intellect Distinction In Id. Ii. The Argument Of Id. Iii. Strategic Difficulties. Iv. The Distinction Between The Faculties In The Critique. V. The Circularity Problem. Vi. Regressive Terminology. 2. The Distinction Between Form And Matter Of Intuition. I. The Two Basic Features Of An Intuitive Representation. Ii. Textual Evidence Against Forms As Mechanisms. Iii. Textual Evidence Against Forms As Representations. Iv. Conflicting Passages. 3. Sensation And The Matter Of Intuition. I. The Epistemological Role Of Sensation. Ii. The Ontological Status Of Sensation. 4. Origins Of The Form And The Matter Of Intuition -- Pt. Ii. The Expositions. 5. The First Exposition. I. Kant's Objectives In The First Exposition. Ii. Kant's Sensationist Opposition. Iii. The Standard Objection To The First Exposition. Iv. The Grounds Of Kant's Rejection Of Sensationism. 6. The Second Exposition. I. Analysis Of The Argument. Ii. The Inextricability Argument. Iii. The Third Exposition In A And The Validity Of Geometry. Iv. The Independence Argument. 7. The Later Expositions. I. The Singularity Argument. Ii. The Whole/part Priority Argument. Iii. The Infinity Argument. Iv. The Completeness Of The Later Expositions. V. The Composition Of Intelligible Spaces And Times. 8. The Transcendental Expositions. I. The Buttressing Argument. Ii. The Subjectivity Argument. Iii. The Explanation Of The Possibility Of Geometry And Mechanics -- Pt. Iii. Conclusions From The Above Concepts. 9. Kant's Argument For The Non-spatiotemporality Of Things In Themselves. I. Substantival Space And Time. Ii. Relative Space And Time. Iii. Limits Of Kant's Result. 10. The Unknowability Thesis And The Problem Of Affection. I. Unknowability. Ii. Affection. 11. Kant, Mendelssohn, Lambert, And The Subjectivity Of Time. I. Kant's Subjectivity Thesis. Ii. Mendelssohn's Objection. Iii. Kant's Response To Mendelssohn And The Subjectivity Thesis. Lorne Falkenstein. Includes Bibliographical References (p. [437]-444) And Indexes.

ever Since The Publication Of His critique Of Pure Reason In 1781, Immanuel Kant Has Occupied A Central Position In The Philosophical World. In kant's Intuitionism—the Most Detailed Study Of Kant's Views On The Opening Sections Of The critique Since Hans Vaihinger's commentar Zur Kants Kritik Der Reinen Vernunft More Than A Century Ago—lorne Falkenstein Focuses On One Aspect Of Kant's Transcendental Aesthetic, Namely, His Position On How We Manage To Intuit The Properties And Relations Of Objects As They Exist In Space And Time.

the Question Of How Much Structure Sensory Input Has Of Itself And How Much We Give It Through Processing Is A Major Problem Not Only In Philosophy, But In Cognitive Science In General. How Much Do Our Faculties Do To Structure Our Knowledge Of Objects And To Give Them Their Spatial And Temporal Existence? Recent Interpretations Of Kant's Doctrine Of Intuition Have Emphasized The Constructivist Answer To This Question, But Falkenstein Argues That Our Knowledge Of Objects In Space And Time Is Not Grounded In Concepts But In The Quasi-physiological Constitution Of Our Senses. kant's Intuitionism Examines Kant's Account Of The Human Cognitive Faculties, His Views On Space, And His Reasons For Denying That We Have Knowledge Of Things As They Are In Themselves. It Is Key To Understanding The Thinking Of The Philosopher And Revitalizes The Debate About The Implications Of The Transcendental Aesthetic.

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falkenstein (u. Of Western Ontario) Focuses On One Aspect Of Immanuel Kant's Transcendental Aesthetic, Namely, His Position On How We Manage To Intuit The Properties And Relations Of Objects As They Exist In Time And Space. In Contrast To Recent Constructivist Interpretations That Stress The Imposition Of A Structure Through Synthetic Processes Of The Imagination Or Understanding, Falkenstein Rehabilitates An Interpretation Of Kant Outlined In The 19th Century, Arguing That Our Knowledge Of Objects In Space And Time Is Not Grounded In Concepts But In The Quasi-physiological Constitution Of Our Senses. Annotation C. Book News, Inc., Portland, Or (booknews.com)

"Ever since the publication of his Critique of Pure Reason in 1781, Immanuel Kant has occupied a central position in the philosop Transcendental Aesthetic, namely, his position on how we manage to intuit the properties and relations of objects as they exist in space and time." "It is a major problem not only in philosophy, but in cognitive science in general, to decide how much structure sensory input has of itself and how much we give it through processing. How much do our faculties do to structure our knowledge of objects and to give them their spatial and temporal existence? Recent interpretations of Kant's doctrine of intuition have emphasized the constructivist answer to this question, stressing that sensations have no structure of their own and that, for the objects of our experience to have any spatial or temporal structure at all, we must impose a structure through synthetic processes of the imagination or understanding. Rehabilitating an interpretation of Kant outlined in the nineteenth century, Falkenstein argues that our knowledge of objects in space and time is not grounded in concepts but in the quasi-physiological constitution of our senses." "Falkenstein begins with a careful critique of both historical and contemporary approaches to this problem and goes on the develop a cogent and stimulating argument for his position. The dialectic that results advances the discussion into controversial new realms, revitalizing the debate about the implications of Kant's Transcendental Aesthetic."--BOOK JACKET Ever since the publication of his __Critique of Pure Reason__ in 1781, Immanuel Kant has occupied a central position in the philosophical world. In __Kant's Intuitionism__ ? the most detailed study of Kant's views on the opening sections of the __Critique__ since Hans Vaihinger's __Commentar zur Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft__ more than a century ago ? Lorne Falkenstein focuses on one aspect of Kant's Transcendental Aesthetic, namely, his position on how we manage to intuit the properties and relations of objects as they exist in space and time. The first obstacle confronting anyone who seeks to understand Kant's Critique of Pure Reason is the barrage of technical terminology that work contains.