Justice As Fairness : A Restatement

This book originated as lectures for a course on political philosophy that Rawls taught regularly at Harvard in the 1980s. In time the lectures became a restatement of his theory of justice as fairness, revised in light of his more recent papers and his treatise Political Liberalism (1993). As Rawls writes in the preface, the restatement presents "in one place an account of justice as fairness as I now see it, drawing on all [my previous] works." He offers a broad overview of his main lines of thought and also explores specific issues never before addressed in any of his writings. Rawls is well aware that since the publication of A Theory of Justice in 1971, American society has moved farther away from the idea of justice as fairness. Yet his ideas retain their power and relevance to debates in a pluralistic society about the meaning and theoretical viability of liberalism. This book demonstrates that moral clarity can be achieved even when a collective commitment to justice is uncertain. (20010701) Cover......Page 1 Front title......Page 4 Copyright......Page 5 Contents......Page 8 Editor's Foreword......Page 12 Preface (by Rawls)......Page 16 §1. Four Roles of Political Philosophy......Page 22 §2. Society as a Fair System of Cooperation......Page 26 §3. The Idea of a Weil-Ordered Society......Page 29 §4. The Idea of the Basic Structure......Page 31 §5. Limits to Our Inquiry......Page 33 §6. The Idea of the Original Position......Page 35 §7. The Idea of Free and Equal Persons......Page 39 §8. Relations between the Fundamental Ideas......Page 45 §9. The Idea of Public Justification......Page 47 §10. The Idea of Reflective Equilibrium......Page 50 §11. The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus......Page 53 §12. Three Basic Points......Page 60 §13. Two Principles of Justice......Page 63 §14. The Problem of Distributive Justice......Page 71 §15. The Basic Structure as Subject: First Kind of Reason......Page 73 §16. The Basic Structure as Subject: Second Kind of Reason......Page 76 §17. Who Are the Least Advantaged?......Page 78 §18. The Difference Principle: Its Meaning......Page 82 §19. Objections via Counterexamples......Page 87 §20. Legitimate Expectations, Entidement, and Desert......Page 93 §21. On Viewing Native Endowments as a Common Asset......Page 95 §22. Summary Comments on Distributive Justice and Desert......Page 98 §23. The Original Position: The Set-Up......Page 101 §24. The Circumstances of Justice......Page 105 §25. Formal Constraints and the Veil of Ignorance......Page 106 §26. The Idea of Public Reason......Page 110 §27. First Fundamental Comparison......Page 115 §28. The Structure of the Argument and the Maximin Rule......Page 118 §29. The Argument Stressing the Third Condition......Page 122 §30. The Priority of the Basic Liberties......Page 125 §31. An Objection about Aversion to Uncertainty......Page 127 §32. The Equal Basic Liberties Revisited......Page 132 §33. The Argument Stressing the Second Condition......Page 136 §34. Second Fundamental Comparison: Introduction......Page 140 §35. Grounds Falling under Publicity......Page 141 §36. Grounds Falling under Reciprocity......Page 143 §37. Grounds Falling under Stability......Page 145 §38. Grounds against the Principle of Restricted Utility......Page 147 §39. Comments on Equality......Page 151 §40. Concluding Remarks......Page 153 §41. Property-Owning Democracy: Introductory Remarks......Page 156 §42. Some Basic Contrasts between Regimes......Page 159 §43. Ideas of the Good injustice as Fairness......Page 161 §44. Constitutional versus Procedural Democracy......Page 166 §45. The Fair Value of the Equal Political Liberties......Page 169 §46. Denial of the Fair Value for Other Basic Liberties......Page 171 §47. Political and Comprehensive Liberalism: A Contrast......Page 174 §48. A Note on Head Taxes and the Priority of Liberty......Page 178 §49. Economic Institutions of a Property-Owning Democracy......Page 179 §50. The Family as a Basic Institution......Page 183 §51. The Flexibility of an Index of Primary Goods......Page 189 §52. Addressing Marx's Critique of Liberalism......Page 197 §53. Brief Comments on Leisure Time......Page 200 §54. The Domain of the Political......Page 201 §55. The Question of Stability......Page 205 §56. Is Justice as Fairness Political in the Wrong Way?......Page 209 §57. How Is Political Liberalism Possible?......Page 210 §58. An Overlapping Consensus Not Utopian......Page 213 §59. A Reasonable Moral Psychology......Page 216 §60. The Good of Political Society......Page 219 Index......Page 225 Cover 1 Front title 4 Copyright 5 Contents 8 Editor's Foreword 12 Preface (by Rawls) 16 Part I: Fundamental ideas 22 §1. Four Roles of Political Philosophy 22 §2. Society as a Fair System of Cooperation 26 §3. The Idea of a Weil-Ordered Society 29 §4. The Idea of the Basic Structure 31 §5. Limits to Our Inquiry 33 §6. The Idea of the Original Position 35 §7. The Idea of Free and Equal Persons 39 §8. Relations between the Fundamental Ideas 45 §9. The Idea of Public Justification 47 §10. The Idea of Reflective Equilibrium 50 §11. The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus 53 Part II: Principles of Justice 60 §12. Three Basic Points 60 §13. Two Principles of Justice 63 §14. The Problem of Distributive Justice 71 §15. The Basic Structure as Subject: First Kind of Reason 73 §16. The Basic Structure as Subject: Second Kind of Reason 76 §17. Who Are the Least Advantaged? 78 §18. The Difference Principle: Its Meaning 82 §19. Objections via Counterexamples 87 §20. Legitimate Expectations, Entidement, and Desert 93 §21. On Viewing Native Endowments as a Common Asset 95 §22. Summary Comments on Distributive Justice and Desert 98 Part III: The Argument from the Original Position 101 §23. The Original Position: The Set-Up 101 §24. The Circumstances of Justice 105 §25. Formal Constraints and the Veil of Ignorance 106 §26. The Idea of Public Reason 110 §27. First Fundamental Comparison 115 §28. The Structure of the Argument and the Maximin Rule 118 §29. The Argument Stressing the Third Condition 122 §30. The Priority of the Basic Liberties 125 §31. An Objection about Aversion to Uncertainty 127 §32. The Equal Basic Liberties Revisited 132 §33. The Argument Stressing the Second Condition 136 §34. Second Fundamental Comparison: Introduction 140 §35. Grounds Falling under Publicity 141 §36. Grounds Falling under Reciprocity 143 §37. Grounds Falling under Stability 145 §38. Grounds against the Principle of Restricted Utility 147 §39. Comments on Equality 151 §40. Concluding Remarks 153 Part IV: Institutions of a Just Basic Structure 156 §41. Property-Owning Democracy: Introductory Remarks 156 §42. Some Basic Contrasts between Regimes 159 §43. Ideas of the Good injustice as Fairness 161 §44. Constitutional versus Procedural Democracy 166 §45. The Fair Value of the Equal Political Liberties 169 §46. Denial of the Fair Value for Other Basic Liberties 171 §47. Political and Comprehensive Liberalism: A Contrast 174 §48. A Note on Head Taxes and the Priority of Liberty 178 §49. Economic Institutions of a Property-Owning Democracy 179 §50. The Family as a Basic Institution 183 §51. The Flexibility of an Index of Primary Goods 189 §52. Addressing Marx's Critique of Liberalism 197 §53. Brief Comments on Leisure Time 200 Part V: The Question of Stability 201 §54. The Domain of the Political 201 §55. The Question of Stability 205 §56. Is Justice as Fairness Political in the Wrong Way? 209 §57. How Is Political Liberalism Possible? 210 §58. An Overlapping Consensus Not Utopian 213 §59. A Reasonable Moral Psychology 216 §60. The Good of Political Society 219 Index 225

This book originated as lectures for a course on political philosophy that Rawls taught regularly at Harvard in the 1980s. In time the lectures became a restatement of his theory of justice as fairness, revised in light of his more recent papers and his treatise Political Liberalism (1993). As Rawls writes in the preface, the restatement presents "in one place an account of justice as fairness as I now see it, drawing on all [my previous] works." He offers a broad overview of his main lines of thought and also explores specific issues never before addressed in any of his writings.

Rawls is well aware that since the publication of A Theory of Justice in 1971, American society has moved farther away from the idea of justice as fairness. Yet his ideas retain their power and relevance to debates in a pluralistic society about the meaning and theoretical viability of liberalism. This book demonstrates that moral clarity can be achieved even when a collective commitment to justice is uncertain.

This book originated as lectures for a course on political philosophy that Rawls taught regularly at Harvard in the 1980s. In time the lectures became a restatement of his theory of justice as fairness, revised in light of his more recent papers and his treatise Political Liberalism (1993). Rawls offers a broad overview of his main lines of thought and also explores specific issues never before addressed in any of his writings. He is well aware that since the publication of A Theory of Justice in 1971, American society has moved farther away from the idea of justice as fairness. Yet his ideas retain their power and relevance to debates in a pluralistic society about the meaning and theoretical viability of liberalism. This book demonstrates that moral clarity can be achieved even when a collective commitment to justice is uncertain This book originated as lectures for a course on political philosophy that Rawls taught regularly at Harvard University in the 1980s. In time the lectures became a restatement of his theory of justice as fairness, revised in light of his more recent papers and his treatise Political Liberalism (1993). 1.1 We begin by distinguishing four roles that political philosophy may have as part of a society's public political culture.