Judges beyond Politics in Democracy and Dictatorship: Lessons from Chile (Cambridge Studies in Law and Society)

Why did formerly independent Chilean judges, trained under and appointed by democratic governments, facilitate and condone the illiberal, antidemocratic, and anti-legal policies of the Pinochet regime? Challenging the assumption that adjudication in non-democratic settings is fundamentally different and less puzzling than it is in democratic regimes, this 2007 book offers a longitudinal analysis of judicial behavior, demonstrating striking continuity in judicial performance across regimes in Chile. The work explores the relevance of judges' personal policy preferences, social class, and legal philosophy, but argues that institutional factors best explain the persistent failure of judges to take stands in defense of rights and rule of law principles. Specifically, the institutional structure and ideology of the Chilean judiciary, grounded in the ideal of judicial apoliticism, furnished judges with professional understandings and incentives that left them unequipped and disinclined to take stands in defense of liberal democratic principles, before, during, and after the authoritarian interlude. COVER......Page 1 HALF-TITLE......Page 3 SERIES-TITLE......Page 5 TITLE......Page 7 COPYRIGHT......Page 8 DEDICATION......Page 9 CONTENTS......Page 11 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS......Page 15 INTRODUCTION......Page 19 OVERVIEW OF THE ARGUMENT......Page 23 METHODOLOGY AND DATA REPORTING......Page 26 PLAN OF THE BOOK......Page 29 CHAPTER ONE THE JUDICIARY, THE RULE OF LAW, AND DEMOCRACY: ASPIRATIONS AND IMPEDIMENTS......Page 31 THE JUDICIAL ROLE IN DEMOCRACY AND DEMOCRATIZATION......Page 32 SO WHY BOTHER WITH JUDGES?......Page 36 THE ROOTS OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR IN GENERAL......Page 41 The Regime-Related Explanation......Page 45 The Attitudinal Explanation......Page 47 The Class-Based Explanation......Page 48 The Legal Theory Explanation......Page 49 THE INSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENT......Page 51 CHAPTER TWO THE INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE JUDICIAL ROLE IN CHILE......Page 59 LAW AND COURTS IN COLONIAL TIMES AND IN EARLY INDEPENDENCE......Page 60 LAW AND COURTS UNDER THE PORTALIAN REPUBLIC......Page 64 LAW AND COURTS BEFORE AND DURING THE PARLIAMENTARY REPUBLIC......Page 69 THE JUDICIARY IN CONSTITUTIONAL TRANSITION AND DICTATORSHIP......Page 73 THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONSERVATIVE JUDICIAL ACTIVISM FROM 1932 TO THE 1960S......Page 81 CONCLUSION......Page 89 CHAPTER THREE CONSERVATIVE ACTIVISM IN THE HEYDAY OF DEMOCRACY, 1964-1973......Page 91 THE JUDICIAL ROLE IN THE FREI AND ALLENDE YEARS......Page 93 EXPLAINING THE JUDICIAL ROLE UNDER FREI AND ALLENDE......Page 106 CONCLUSION......Page 119 CHAPTER FOUR LEGITIMIZING AUTHORITARIANISM, 1973-1990......Page 120 THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT’S APPROACH TO LAW (1973–1980)......Page 124 THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO MILITARY LAW AND POLICY (1973–1980)......Page 132 Habeas Corpus (Amparo)......Page 133 Review of Military Court Decisions......Page 138 Constitutional Review (Inaplicabilidad por Inconstitucionalidad)......Page 140 The New Constitutional Review Mechanism: Recurso de Protección......Page 142 High-Profile Public Law Cases......Page 144 Summary, 1973–1980......Page 147 THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT’S APPROACH TO LAW (1981–1990)......Page 149 THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO MILITARY LAW AND POLICY (1981–1990)......Page 155 Habeas Corpus (Amparo)......Page 159 Constitutional Review I: Recursos de Protección......Page 162 Constitutional Review II: Inaplicabilidad por Inconstitucionalidad......Page 165 High-Profile Public Law Cases......Page 168 Summary, 1981–1990......Page 174 REGIME-RELATED FACTORS......Page 175 POLITICAL ATTITUDES AND PREFERENCES......Page 178 LEGAL PHILOSOPHY......Page 184 INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND IDEOLOGY......Page 186 CONCLUSION......Page 194 CHAPTER FIVE CONTINUITY AND CHANGE AFTER THE RETURN TO DEMOCRACY, 1990–2000......Page 195 DEMOCRATIC-ERA EFFORTS TO LIBERALIZE LAW AND JUSTICE......Page 197 Decisions in Authoritarian-Era Rights Cases......Page 207 Decisions in Postauthoritarian Rights Cases......Page 221 EXPLAINING THE JUDICIAL ROLE IN THE NEW DEMOCRACY......Page 226 CONCLUSION......Page 240 CHAPTER SIX CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS......Page 241 INSTITUTIONALIZED APOLITICISM......Page 242 INSTITUTIONALIZED APOLITICISM IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE......Page 247 BROADER IMPLICATIONS OF THE ARGUMENT......Page 257 The Limits of Judicial Independence......Page 258 INSTITUTIONS AS RULES AND ROLES......Page 260 In Defense of Political Courts......Page 261 APPENDIX A ORIENTING INFORMATION ON CHILEAN LAW AND COURTS......Page 269 APPENDIX B LIST OF INTERVIEWEES (ALPHABETICAL BY CATEGORY)......Page 275 REFERENCES......Page 279 INDEX......Page 305 COVER 1 HALF-TITLE 3 SERIES-TITLE 5 TITLE 7 COPYRIGHT 8 DEDICATION 9 CONTENTS 11 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 15 INTRODUCTION 19 OVERVIEW OF THE ARGUMENT 23 METHODOLOGY AND DATA REPORTING 26 PLAN OF THE BOOK 29 CHAPTER ONE THE JUDICIARY, THE RULE OF LAW, AND DEMOCRACY: ASPIRATIONS AND IMPEDIMENTS 31 THE JUDICIAL ROLE IN DEMOCRACY AND DEMOCRATIZATION 32 SO WHY BOTHER WITH JUDGES? 36 THE ROOTS OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR IN GENERAL 41 JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR IN ILLIBERAL CONTEXTS: SPECIFIC HYPOTHESES 45 The Regime-Related Explanation 45 The Attitudinal Explanation 47 The Class-Based Explanation 48 The Legal Theory Explanation 49 THE INSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENT 51 CHAPTER TWO THE INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE JUDICIAL ROLE IN CHILE 59 LAW AND COURTS IN COLONIAL TIMES AND IN EARLY INDEPENDENCE 60 LAW AND COURTS UNDER THE PORTALIAN REPUBLIC 64 LAW AND COURTS BEFORE AND DURING THE PARLIAMENTARY REPUBLIC 69 THE JUDICIARY IN CONSTITUTIONAL TRANSITION AND DICTATORSHIP 73 THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONSERVATIVE JUDICIAL ACTIVISM FROM 1932 TO THE 1960S 81 CONCLUSION 89 CHAPTER THREE CONSERVATIVE ACTIVISM IN THE HEYDAY OF DEMOCRACY, 1964-1973 91 THE JUDICIAL ROLE IN THE FREI AND ALLENDE YEARS 93 EXPLAINING THE JUDICIAL ROLE UNDER FREI AND ALLENDE 106 CONCLUSION 119 CHAPTER FOUR LEGITIMIZING AUTHORITARIANISM, 1973-1990 120 Part I 1973-1980: "THE RULE OF LAW SHOW" 124 THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT’S APPROACH TO LAW (1973–1980) 124 THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO MILITARY LAW AND POLICY (1973–1980) 132 Habeas Corpus (Amparo) 133 Review of Military Court Decisions 138 Constitutional Review (Inaplicabilidad por Inconstitucionalidad) 140 The New Constitutional Review Mechanism: Recurso de Protección 142 High-Profile Public Law Cases 144 Summary, 1973–1980 147 Part II 1981-1990: THE "NEW INSTITUTIONAL ORDER" 149 THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT’S APPROACH TO LAW (1981–1990) 149 THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO MILITARY LAW AND POLICY (1981–1990) 155 Habeas Corpus (Amparo) 159 Constitutional Review I: Recursos de Protección 162 Constitutional Review II: Inaplicabilidad por Inconstitucionalidad 165 High-Profile Public Law Cases 168 Summary, 1981–1990 174 Part III EXPLAINING THE JUDICIAL ROLE UNDER PINOCHET, 1973-1990 175 REGIME-RELATED FACTORS 175 POLITICAL ATTITUDES AND PREFERENCES 178 LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 184 INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND IDEOLOGY 186 CONCLUSION 194 CHAPTER FIVE CONTINUITY AND CHANGE AFTER THE RETURN TO DEMOCRACY, 1990–2000 195 DEMOCRATIC-ERA EFFORTS TO LIBERALIZE LAW AND JUSTICE 197 THE JUDICIAL ROLE IN THE 1990S 207 Decisions in Authoritarian-Era Rights Cases 207 Decisions in Postauthoritarian Rights Cases 221 EXPLAINING THE JUDICIAL ROLE IN THE NEW DEMOCRACY 226 CONCLUSION 240 CHAPTER SIX CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 241 INSTITUTIONALIZED APOLITICISM 242 INSTITUTIONALIZED APOLITICISM IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 247 BROADER IMPLICATIONS OF THE ARGUMENT 257 The Limits of Judicial Independence 258 INSTITUTIONS AS RULES AND ROLES 260 In Defense of Political Courts 261 APPENDIX A ORIENTING INFORMATION ON CHILEAN LAW AND COURTS 269 APPENDIX B LIST OF INTERVIEWEES (ALPHABETICAL BY CATEGORY) 275 REFERENCES 279 INDEX 305 "Why did Chilean judges, trained under and appointed by democratic governments, facilitate and condone the liberal, antidemocratic, and antilegal policies of the Pinochet regime? Challenging the common assumption that adjudication in nondemocratic settings is fundamentally different and less puzzling than it is in democratic regimes, this book offers a longitudinal analysis of judicial behavior, demonstrating striking continuity in judicial performance across regimes in Chile. The work explores the relevance of judges' personal policy preferences, social class, and legal philosophy but argues that institutional factors best account for the persistent failure of judges to take stands in defense of rights and rule of law principles. Specifically, the institutional structure and ideology of the Chilean judiciary, grounded in the ideal of judicial apoliticism, furnished judges with professional understandings and incentives that left them unequipped and disinclined to take stands in defense of liberal democratic principles before, during, and after the authoritarian interlude."--book jacket A longitudinal case study of Chile that assesses competing hypotheses regarding judicial behavior in both democratic and undemocratic contexts, this book explores the relevance of regime-related factors, judges' personal policy preferences, social class, and legal philosophy, but argues that institutional features grounded in the ideal of "apoliticism" best explain the persistent failure of Chilean judges to take stands in defense of rights and rule of law principles, before, during, and after the authoritarian interlude. Dr. Hilbink offers comparative examples to support broader theoretical claims about when judges will be willing and able to assert their independence against abuses of public power. This book examines different hypotheses about Chilean judicial behavior before, during, and after the authoritarian interlude. The book explores arguments based on judges' personal policy preferences, social class, and legal philosophy, but contends that institutional features, grounded in the ideal of 'apoliticism', best explain judges' conservative and conformist conduct.