John Searle And the Construction of Social Reality (Continuum Studies in American Philosophy)

John Searle (1932-) is one of the most famous living American philosophers. A pupil of J. L. Austin at Oxford in the 1950s, he is currently Mills Professor of the Philosophy of Mind and Language at the University of California, Berkeley. In 1995 John Searle published "The Construction of Social Reality", a text which not only promises to disclose the institutional backdrop against which speech takes place, but initiate a new 'philosophy of society'. Since then "The Construction of Social Reality" has been subject to a flurry of criticism. While many of Searle's interlocutors share the sense that the text marks an important breakthrough, he has time and again accused critics of misunderstanding his claims. Despite Searle's characteristic crispness and clarity there remains some confusion, among both philosophers and sociologists, regarding the significance of his proposals. This book traces some of the high points of this dialogue, leveraging Searle's own clarifications to propose a new way of understanding the text. In particular, Joshua Rust looks to Max Weber in suggesting that Searle has articulated an ideal type. In locating The Construction of Social Reality under the umbrella of one of sociology's founding fathers, this book not only makes Searle's text more accessible to the readers in the social sciences, but presents Max Weber as a thinker worthy of philosophical reconsideration. Moreover, the recharacterization of Searle's claims in terms of the ideal type helps facilitate a comparison between Searle and other social theorists such as Talcott Parsons. Continuum International Publishing Group 0826485863 1 Contents 7 Acknowledgements 10 Introduction: "X Counts as Y in C" 12 1 Searle's Institutional Atomism 20 Overview of Searle's Construction 20 Framing the construction 28 Logical atomism and analysis 31 Urmson's two types of analysis: problem and resolution 32 Distinguishing metaphysics and methodology 34 Methodological and metaphysical tasks: Searle and the atomists 36 Methodology: institutional analysis 36 Metaphysics: Searle's building blocks 38 A difficulty with the atomist reading of the constitutive formula 42 2 First Criticism of Searle's Institutional Atomism—Methodology 48 Wisdom and the impossibility of philosophical analysis 48 Wisdom and the impossibility of institutional analysis 54 Loose impediments in golf 54 Money 56 Should Searle be concerned about methodological difficulties? 65 3 Second Criticism of Searle's Institutional Atomism—Metaphysics 69 John Austin and the relation between metaphysics and methodology 69 Searle's rejection of the idea that words mirror the form of fact 70 Defending the comparison between Searle and the atomists 74 CSR, p. 90: institutional reality and intentionality 75 Difficulties with CSR, p. 90 78 Dreyfus and "bad phenomenology" 78 The Background as a proxy for intentionality 80 Social reality does not have a logical structure: Searle's conceptual relativism 83 4 Kuhn, Weber, and Instruments of Inquiry 89 The generation of puzzles in the natural and social sciences 90 Kuhn: paradigms are instruments that generate puzzles in the natural sciences 90 Weber: ideal types are instruments that generate puzzles in the social sciences 96 The etiology of a paradigm or ideal type 101 First possible response to a puzzle 104 Second possible response to a puzzle 111 Puzzles as an indication of the scope of a paradigm or ideal type 113 On the use of multiple paradigms or ideal types 115 Kuhn, Weber, and the structure of revolution 120 5 Searle and the Ideal Type—Applications of the Constitutive Formula 128 The founding of these ideal types in our background understanding 131 The ideal types of money and the first response to crisis 133 The ideal types of money and the second response to crisis 135 Conclusion: returning to John Wisdom's objection 139 6 Searle and the Ideal Type—the Constitutive Formula and the Status-function 145 Is the constitutive formula an ideal type? 145 The constitutive formula is not an ideal type 146 The constitutive formula is an ideal type 147 Is the status-function an ideal type? 149 Searle's functionalism 153 Institutional phenomena that resist articulation under the status-function 165 Aristotelian virtue: an alternative account of the participant's point of view 177 Van Fraassen and the ideal types of institutional reality 193 Conclusion 200 Bibliography 211 Index 216 A 216 B 216 C 216 D 216 E 216 F 216 G 216 H 216 I 217 K 217 L 217 M 217 N 217 O 217 P 218 R 218 S 218 T 218 U 218 V 218 W 218 ISBN-13:,9780826485861 0826485863......Page 1 Contents......Page 7 Acknowledgements......Page 10 Introduction: "X Counts as Y in C"......Page 12 Overview of Searle's Construction......Page 20 Framing the construction......Page 28 Logical atomism and analysis......Page 31 Urmson's two types of analysis: problem and resolution......Page 32 Distinguishing metaphysics and methodology......Page 34 Methodology: institutional analysis......Page 36 Metaphysics: Searle's building blocks......Page 38 A difficulty with the atomist reading of the constitutive formula......Page 42 Wisdom and the impossibility of philosophical analysis......Page 48 Loose impediments in golf......Page 54 Money......Page 56 Should Searle be concerned about methodological difficulties?......Page 65 John Austin and the relation between metaphysics and methodology......Page 69 Searle's rejection of the idea that words mirror the form of fact......Page 70 Defending the comparison between Searle and the atomists......Page 74 CSR, p. 90: institutional reality and intentionality......Page 75 Dreyfus and "bad phenomenology"......Page 78 The Background as a proxy for intentionality......Page 80 Social reality does not have a logical structure: Searle's conceptual relativism......Page 83 4 Kuhn, Weber, and Instruments of Inquiry......Page 89 Kuhn: paradigms are instruments that generate puzzles in the natural sciences......Page 90 Weber: ideal types are instruments that generate puzzles in the social sciences......Page 96 The etiology of a paradigm or ideal type......Page 101 First possible response to a puzzle......Page 104 Second possible response to a puzzle......Page 111 Puzzles as an indication of the scope of a paradigm or ideal type......Page 113 On the use of multiple paradigms or ideal types......Page 115 Kuhn, Weber, and the structure of revolution......Page 120 5 Searle and the Ideal Type—Applications of the Constitutive Formula......Page 128 The founding of these ideal types in our background understanding......Page 131 The ideal types of money and the first response to crisis......Page 133 The ideal types of money and the second response to crisis......Page 135 Conclusion: returning to John Wisdom's objection......Page 139 Is the constitutive formula an ideal type?......Page 145 The constitutive formula is not an ideal type......Page 146 The constitutive formula is an ideal type......Page 147 Is the status-function an ideal type?......Page 149 Searle's functionalism......Page 153 Institutional phenomena that resist articulation under the status-function......Page 165 Aristotelian virtue: an alternative account of the participant's point of view......Page 177 Van Fraassen and the ideal types of institutional reality......Page 193 Conclusion......Page 200 Bibliography......Page 211 H......Page 216 O......Page 217 W......Page 218 In 1995 John Searle Published The Construction Of Social Reality, A Text Which Promises Not Only To Disclose The Institutional Backdrop Against Which Speech Takes Place, But Also To Initiate A New Philosophy Of Society. Since Then The Construction Of Social Reality Has Been Subject To A Flurry Of Criticism. While Many Of Searle's Interlocutors Share The Sense That The Text Marks An Important Breakthrough, He Has Time And Again Accused Critics Of Misunderstanding His Claims. Despite Searle's Characteristic Crispness And Clarity There Remains Some Confusion, Among Both Philosophers And Sociologists, Regarding The Significance Of His Proposals. This Book Traces Some Of The High Points Of This Dialogue, Leveraging Searle's Own Clarifications To Propose A New Way Of Understanding The Text. In Particular, Joshua Rust Looks To Max Weber In Suggesting That Searle Has Articulated An Ideal Type. In Locating The Construction Of Social Reality Under The Umbrella Of One Of Sociology's Founding Fathers, This Book Not Only Makes Searle's Text More Accessible To Readers In The Social Sciences, But Also Presents Max Weber As A Thinker Worthy Of Philosophical Reconsideration. Moreover, The Recharacterization Of Searle's Claims In Terms Of The Ideal Type Helps Facilitate A Comparison Between Searle And Other Social Theorists Such As Margaret Gilbert.--jacket. Introduction : X Counts As Y In C -- Searle's Institutional Atomism -- First Criticism Of Searle's Institutional Atomism--methodology -- Second Criticism Of Searle's Institutional Atomism--metaphysics -- Kuhn, Weber, And Instruments Of Inquiry -- Searle And The Ideal Type--applications Of The Constitutive Formula -- Searle And The Ideal Type--the Constitutive Formula And The Status-function. Joshua Rust. Includes Bibliographical References (p. [200]-204) And Index. Not only discloses the institutional backdrop against which speech takes place, also initiates a 'philosophy of society'. In locating The Construction of Social Reality, this book not only makes John Searle's text accessible to the readers in the social sciences, but presents Max Weber as a thinker worthy of philosophical reconsideration