Jimmy Carter and the Middle East [recurso electrónico] : the Politics of Presidential Diplomacy

Based on newly declassified documents, this book offers a provocative new analysis of President Jimmy Carter's political role in Arab-Israeli diplomacy. It analyzes the reflexive relationship between domestic politics and foreign policy, especially the roles played by the media, public opinion and pro-Israel lobby groups. 'This book makes a critical contribution to our understanding of American foreign policy in the 1970s, an understudied period particularly relevant to the understanding of contemporary Egyptian-Israeli relations and the Israeli-Palestinian stalemate. The book focuses on American attitudes (as shaped and reinforced in the news media) toward the Middle East and its people. Indeed, it is from these broader societal conditions that foreign policy itself springs. Strieff shows that whenever the president becomes directly involved in diplomatic initiatives, politics never stops at the proverbial water's edge.'-Fawaz Gerges, Professor of International Relations at London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), UK, and author of Obama and the Middle East: The End of America's Moment?'This book offers a useful and original contribution to its field, including analyses (such as that of the 1977 Communique and the warplanes sales) which break new ground. The sheer scholarly weight of the study constitutes a landmark work of academic analysis in the area. A vital point of reference for future researchers in the area.'-John Dumbrell, Professor of Government, Durham University, UK Based on newly declassified documents, Jimmy Carter and the Middle East offers a provocative analysis of Carter's role as 'diplomat-in-chief' in the Arab-Israeli conflict during his single-term presidency. As the first US leader to articulate a position on the Palestinian 'question' and deal with a conservative Israeli government, and the only one to mediate a peace treaty between Israel and an Arab state, Carter left an indelible mark on the conflict. His efforts led to the effervescent triumph of the 1978 Camp David Accords and the dramatic 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty, but his central role serves as a cautionary tale about the political constraints on a president's ability to conduct foreign policy. Against the background of splintering domestic coalitions and shifting geopolitical challenges, battles with the press, Congress, and pro-Israeli lobby groups like AIPAC further undermined Carter's labors Front Matter....Pages i-xi Introduction: President and Peacemaker....Pages 1-18 The Limits of Candor (January–May 1977)....Pages 19-38 “The Need for a Political Plan” (May–July 1977)....Pages 39-57 Firestorm over US-Soviet Joint Communiqué (August–October 1977)....Pages 59-77 “Cronkite Diplomacy,” Sadat’s Jerusalem Initiative, and US Policy (November 1977–February 1978)....Pages 79-99 Capitol Hill Fight over “Package” Airplane Deal (February–May 1978)....Pages 101-120 “Getting Control” at Camp David (June–September 1978)....Pages 121-139 Desperate Diplomacy and the Egypt-Israel Treaty (October 1978–March 1979)....Pages 141-160 Lines Blur as Election Approaches (April 1979–November 1980)....Pages 161-180 Conclusion: Reconciling the Irreconcilable?....Pages 181-188 Back Matter....Pages 189-270