JFK and de Gaulle: How America and France Failed in Vietnam, 1961-1963 (Studies In Conflict Diplomacy Peace)

Despite French President Charles de Gaulle's persistent efforts to constructively share French experience and use his resources to help engineer an American exit from Vietnam, the Kennedy administration responded to de Gaulle's peace initiatives with bitter silence and inaction. The administration's response ignited a series of events that dealt a massive blow to American prestige across the globe, resulting in the deaths of over fifty-eight thousand American soldiers and turning hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese citizens into refugees. This history of Franco-American relations during the Kennedy presidency explores how and why France and the US disagreed over the proper western strategy for the Vietnam War. France clearly had more direct political experience in Vietnam, but France's postwar decolonization cemented Kennedy's perception that the French were characterized by a toxic mixture of short-sightedness, stubbornness, and indifference to the collective interests of the West. At no point did the Kennedy administration give serious consideration to de Gaulle's proposals or entertain the notion of using his services as an honest broker in order to disengage from a situation that was rapidly spiraling out of control. Kennedy's Francophobia, the roots of which appear in a selection of private writings from Kennedy's undergraduate years at Harvard, biased his decision-making. The course of action Kennedy chose in 1963, a rejection of the French peace program, all but handcuffed Lyndon Johnson into formally entering a war he knew the United States had little chance of winning. Tags: International Relations, General, Military, Asia, Southeast Asia, Vietnam War, History, Political Science "At the end of January 1963, France's ambassador to the United States, Hervé Alphand, reported back to Paris on a top-secret American exercise at Camp David that revealed many of the stark differences between the two NATO allies. As Alphand, the Kennedy administration had decided the previous October to include representatives from Britain, France, and West Germany in a three-day series of politico-military simulations of potential conflict scenarios in divided Berlin. A French team took part in a series of strategic, limited conflict, and politico-military simulations from November 23 to 25, 1962, and while Alphand was impressed by the sheer planning and intellectual energy that went into this undertaking, he saw its glaring shortcomings. An exercise that Americans saw as a rational approach to the exigencies of the Cold War, the French found utterly dehumanizing. Intuition was discouraged, hindering creativity, yet the Americans believed that they could employ these methods to foresee every possible outcome during a given crisis--including the Vietnam War. In JFK and de Gaulle, Sean J. McLaughlin delves into the study of interstate Franco-American relations during the Kennedy presidency. He explains how John F. Kennedy came to view France as a world power from his college days at Harvard through to the end of his pre-presidential political career, while also exploring how and why France and the United States disagreed over the proper western strategy for the Vietnam War. McLaughlin also explores how de Gaulle's government made vigilant attempts to convince Kennedy that US military intervention in South Vietnam would backfire horribly; however, Kennedy chose not to heed de Gaulle's advice because he did not take France seriously as a member of the Atlantic alliance"-- Provided by publisher "America's road to disaster in Vietnam has been endlessly chronicled, but Sean L. McLaughlin takes a fresh approach to that familiar story." —James Hershberg, George Washington University Despite French President Charles de Gaulle's persistent efforts to constructively share French experience and use his resources to help engineer an American exit from Vietnam, the Kennedy administration responded to de Gaulle's peace initiatives with bitter silence and inaction. The administration's response ignited a series of events that dealt a massive blow to American prestige across the globe, resulting in the deaths of over fifty-eight thousand American soldiers and turning hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese citizens into refugees. This history of Franco-American relations during the Kennedy presidency explores how and why France and the US disagreed over the proper western strategy for the Vietnam War. France clearly had more direct political experience in Vietnam, but France's postwar decolonization cemented Kennedy's perception that the French were characterized by a toxic mixture of shortsightedness, stubbornness, and indifference to the collective interests of the West. At no point did the Kennedy administration give serious consideration to de Gaulle's proposals or entertain the notion of using his services as an honest broker in order to disengage from a situation that was rapidly spiraling out of control. Kennedy's Francophobia, the roots of which appear in a selection of private writings from Kennedy's undergraduate years at Harvard, biased his decision-making. This book explores how the course of action Kennedy chose in 1963, a rejection of the French peace program, all but handcuffed Lyndon Johnson into formally entering a war he knew the United States had little chance of winning.

Despite French President Charles de Gaulle's persistent efforts to constructively share French experience and use his resources to help engineer an American exit from Vietnam, the Kennedy administration responded to de Gaulle's peace initiatives with bitter silence and inaction. The administration's response ignited a series of events that dealt a massive blow to American prestige across the globe, resulting in the deaths of over fifty-eight thousand American soldiers and turning hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese citizens into refugees.

This history of Franco-American relations during the Kennedy presidency explores how and why France and the US disagreed over the proper western strategy for the Vietnam War. France clearly had more direct political experience in Vietnam, but France's postwar decolonization cemented Kennedy's perception that the French were characterized by a toxic mixture of short-sightedness, stubbornness, and indifference to the collective interests of the West.

At no point did the Kennedy administration give serious consideration to de Gaulle's proposals or entertain the notion of using his services as an honest broker in order to disengage from a situation that was rapidly spiraling out of control. Kennedy's Francophobia, the roots of which appear in a selection of private writings from Kennedy's undergraduate years at Harvard, biased his decision-making. The course of action Kennedy chose in 1963, a rejection of the French peace program, all but handcuffed Lyndon Johnson into formally entering a war he knew the United States had little chance of winning.

This book explores French president Charles de Gaulle’s frank, persistent, and discrete campaign to dissuade President Kennedy from expanding the American military/economic aid program in Vietnam from their first summit meeting between in May 1961 up until Kennedy green-lit a coup against South Vietnamese president Ngo Dinh Diem in the late summer of 1963. There were many thorny issues that complicated the Franco-American relationship in the early 1960s—ranging from nuclear policy, British entry into the European Economic Community (EEC), and conditions for negotiating with Moscow—but Vietnam was the one case where de Gaulle was unquestionably right and Kennedy terribly wrong in hindsight. Kennedy’s decision to ignore de Gaulle on this matter was far costlier than any other, setting off a chain of events that resulted in the deaths of over 58,000 American soldiers, turned hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese into refugees, and dealt a massive blow to American prestige across the globe. Despite de Gaulle’s efforts to constructively share French experience and use his resources to help engineer an American exit, the Kennedy administration responded to his peace initiatives with bitter silence and inaction. In the end, the Kennedy administration assumed that it was uniquely qualified to win “hearts and minds” in the Third World, while the discredited imperialists in the Élysée in Paris had lost their right to formulate Western policy in Southeast Asia by virtue of a long string of humiliating military defeats in their former colonies.