James M. Buchanan: A Theorist of Political Economy and Social Philosophy (Remaking Economics: Eminent Post-War Economists)

“A fine collection of essays exploring, and in many cases extending, Jim Buchanan’s many contributions and insights to economic, political, and social theory.”– **Bruce Caldwell**, Professor of Economics, Duke University, USA"The overwhelming impression the reader gets from this very fine collection is the extraordinary expanse of James Buchanan's work. Everyone interested in economics and related fields can profit mightily from this book."– **Mario Rizzo**, Professor of Economics, New York University, USAThis book explores the academic contribution of James Buchanan, who received the Nobel Prize for economics in 1986. Buchanan’s receipt of the Prize is noteworthy because he was a maverick within the economics profession. In contrast to the preponderance of economists, Buchanan made little use of mathematics and no use of econometrics, preferring to used logic and language to insert his ideas into the scholarly community. Moreover, his ideas extended the domain of economic inquiry along many paths that numerous economists subsequently pursued. Buchanan’s scholarship brought economics and political science together under the rubric of public choice. He was also was a prime figure in bringing economic theory into closer contact with moral and social philosophy.This volume includes essays distributed across the extensive domain of Buchanan’s scholarly contributions, reflecting the range of his scholarly interests. Chapters will examine Buchanan’s scholarly work on public finance, social insurance, public debt, public choice, economic methodology, constitutional political economy, law and economics, and ethics and social theory. The book also examines Buchanan in relation to other prominent economists, both from the distant past and the recent past. A Fine Collection Of Essays Exploring, And In Many Cases Extending, Jim Buchanan's Many Contributions And Insights To Economic, Political, And Social Theory.--bruce Caldwell, Professor Of Economics, Duke University, Usa The Overwhelming Impression The Reader Gets From This Very Fine Collection Is The Extraordinary Expanse Of James Buchanan's Work. Everyone Interested In Economics And Related Fields Can Profit Mightily From This Book. - Mario Rizzo, Professor Of Economics, New York University, Usa This Book Explores The Academic Contribution Of James Buchanan, Who Received The Nobel Prize For Economics In 1986. Buchanan's Receipt Of The Prize Is Noteworthy Because He Was A Maverick Within The Economics Profession. In Contrast To The Preponderance Of Economists, Buchanan Made Little Use Of Mathematics And No Use Of Econometrics, Preferring To Used Logic And Language To Insert His Ideas Into The Scholarly Community. Moreover, His Ideas Extended The Domain Of Economic Inquiry Along Many Paths That Numerous Economists Subsequently Pursued. Buchanan's Scholarship Brought Economics And Political Science Together Under The Rubric Of Public Choice. He Was Also Was A Prime Figure In Bringing Economic Theory Into Closer Contact With Moral And Social Philosophy. This Volume Includes Essays Distributed Across The Extensive Domain Of Buchanan's Scholarly Contributions, Reflecting The Range Of His Scholarly Interests. Chapters Will Examine Buchanan's Scholarly Work On Public Finance, Social Insurance, Public Debt, Public Choice, Economic Methodology, Constitutional Political Economy, Law And Economics, And Ethics And Social Theory. The Book Also Examines Buchanan In Relation To Other Prominent Economists, Both From The Distant Past And The Recent Past. 1. Who Was James M. Buchanan And Why Is He Significant?- Richard E. Wagner -- Part I: Subjectivism And The Methodology Of Political Economy -- 2. East Anglia, What Should Economists Do Now?- Robert Sugden -- 3. Duke, Starting From Where We Are: The Importance Of The Status Quo In James Buchanan- Michael Munger -- 4. Brown, James Buchanan And The Properly Trained Economist- Peter J. Boettke, George Mason And Rosolino Candela -- 5. James Buchanan And The New Economics Of Order Research Program- Stefan Kolev -- 6. George Mason, Emergence, Equilibrium, And Agent-based Modeling: Updating James Buchanan's Democratic Political Economy- Abigail N. Devereaux, George Mason And Richard E. Wagner -- Part Ii: Public Finance And The Theory Of The State -- 7. The Conflict Between Constitutionally Constraining The State And Empowering The State To Provide Public Goods- Lawrence H. White-- 8. Fiscal Constitutions, Institutional Congruence, And The Organization Of Governments- Charles Beat Blankart And David Ehmke -- 9. The Irrelevance Of Balanced Budget Amendments- David Hebert -- 10. Subsidizing Health Insurance: Tax Illusion And Public Choice For A Mostly Private Good- Mark V. Pauly -- 11. Inconsistencies In The Finance Of Public Services: Government Responses To Excess Demand- Andrew Abbott And Philip Jones -- 12. The Unproductive Protective State: The U.s. Defense Sector As A Fiscal Commons- Christopher J. Coyne And Thomas K. Duncan -- 13. Contraception Without Romance: The Entangled Political Economy Of State And Federal Contraception Mandates- Marta Podemska-mikluch And Gustavus Adolphus -- 14. Samaritan's Dilemmas, Wealth Redistribution, And Polycentricity- Meg Tuszynski And Richard E. Wagner -- Part Iii: Collective Action And Constitutional Political Economy -- 15. Constitutional Reform: Promise And Reality- Dennis Mueller-- 16. Constitutional, Political, And Behavioral Feasibility- Alan Hamlin -- 17. Blockchain And Buchanan: Code As Constitution- Shruti Rajagopalan -- 18. Blockchains As Constitutional Orders- Chris Berg, Sinclair Davidson And Jason Potts -- 19. The Questionable Morality Of Compromising The Influence Of Public Choice By Embracing A Nobel Lie- J.r. Clark And Dwight R. Lee.-20. Beneficent Bullshit- Peter T. Leeson -- 21. Groups, Sorting, And Inequality In Constitutional Political Economy- Jayme Lemke -- 22. Votes, Vetoes, Voice, And Exit: Constitutional Protections In The Work Of James M. Buchanan And Vincent Ostrom- Roberta Herzberg -- 23. On The Definition And Nature Of Fiscal Coercion- George Tridimas -- 24. Politics As Exchange In The Byzantine Empire- Adam Martin And James Ruhland -- Part Iv: Ethics, Social Philosophy, And Liberal Political Economy -- 25. James M. Buchanan: Political; Economist, Consistent Individualist- Viktor Vanberg-- 26. A Public Choice Analysis Of James M. Buchanan's Constitutional Project- Randall Holcombe -- 27. Buchanan's Social Contract Unveiled- Enrico Colombatto -- 28. Constitutional Design And Politics-as-exchange: The Optimism Of Public Choice- Georg Vanberg -- 29. Doing Liberal Political Economy: James M. Buchanan As Exemplar- Glenn L. Furton And Alexander W. Salter -- 30. Buchanan, Hayek, And The Limits Of Constitutional Ambitions- Donald Boudreaux -- 31. James Buchanan And The Return To An Economics Of Natural Equals- David M. Levy And Sandra J. Peart -- 32. From Highways To Clubs: On Buchanan And The Pricing Of Public Goods- Alain Marciano -- Part V: Economic Theory As Social Theory -- 33. In Defence Of (some) Vainglory: The Advantages Of Polymorphic Hobbesianism- Jerry Gaus -- 34. Toward A Rule-based Model Of Human Choice: On The Nature Of Homo Constitutionalus- Roger Congleton -- 35. The Constitution Of Markets- Geoffrey Brennan And Hartmut Kliemt-- 36. The Extent Of The Market And Ethics- Yong Yoon -- 37. Why Roving Bandits Settle Down: Club Theory And The Emergence Of Government- Andrew T. Young -- 38. Rules Vs. Discretion In Criminal Sentencing- Daniel D'amico -- 39. Diagnosing The Electorate: James Buchanan In The Role Of Political Economist- Solomon Stein -- 40. From Models To Experiments: James Buchanan And Charles Plott- Gil Hersch And Daniel Houser -- Part Vi: Money, Debt, And The Rule Of Law -- 41. Rules Versus Authorities: Buchanan And Simons And Fiscal Policy- Marianne Johnson -- 42. The Quest For Fiscal Rules- Lars Feld -- 43. The Irresistible Attraction Of Public Debt- Vito Tanzi -- 44. Can There Be Such A Thing As Legitimate Public Debt In A Democracy? De Viti De Marco And Buchanan Compared- Giuseppe Eusepi -- 45. Consequences Of The Anachronism Of Fractional Reserve Arrangements- Leonidas Zelmanovitz -- Part Vii: Buchanan In Relation To Other Prominent Scholars-- 46. Italian Influences On Buchanan's Research Program- Alain Marciano And Manuela Mosca -- 47. Paretian Fiscal Sociology- Michael Mclure -- 48. Artefactual And Artisanship: James M. Buchanan And Vincent Ostrom At The Core And Beyond The Boundaries Of Public Choice- Paul Dragos Aligica -- 49. The Calculus Of Consent And The Compound Republic- Robert Bish -- 50. Why James Buchanan Kept Frank Knight's Picture On The Wall Despite Fundamental Disagreements On Economics, Ethics, And Politics- Ross Emmett. Richard E. Wagner, Editor. Includes Bibliographical References And Index. Front Matter ....Pages i-xxi Who Was James M. Buchanan and Why Is He Significant? (Richard E. Wagner)....Pages 1-9 Front Matter ....Pages 11-11 What Should Economists Do Now? (Robert Sugden)....Pages 13-37 Starting from Where We Are: The Importance of the Status Quo in James Buchanan (Michael C. Munger)....Pages 39-64 James Buchanan and the Properly Trained Economist (Peter J. Boettke, Rosolino A. Candela)....Pages 65-83 James Buchanan and the “New Economics of Order” Research Program (Stefan Kolev)....Pages 85-108 Emergence, Equilibrium, and Agent-Based Modeling: Updating James Buchanan’s Democratic Political Economy (Abigail N. Devereaux, Richard E. Wagner)....Pages 109-129 Front Matter ....Pages 131-131 The Conflict Between Constitutionally Constraining the State and Empowering the State to Provide Public Goods (Lawrence H. White)....Pages 133-146 Fiscal Constitutions, Institutional Congruence, and the Organization of Governments (Charles B. Blankart, David C. Ehmke)....Pages 147-167 The Irrelevance of Balanced Budget Amendments (David J. Hebert)....Pages 169-185 Subsidizing Health Insurance: Tax Illusion and Public Choice for a Mostly Private Good (Mark Pauly)....Pages 187-203 Inconsistencies in the Finance of Public Services: Government Responses to Excess Demand (Andrew Abbott, Philip Jones)....Pages 205-233 The Unproductive Protective State: The U.S. Defense Sector as a Fiscal Commons (Christopher J. Coyne, Thomas K. Duncan)....Pages 235-261 Contraception Without Romance: The Entangled Political Economy of State and Federal Contraceptive Insurance Mandates (Marta Podemska-Mikluch)....Pages 263-290 Samaritan’s Dilemmas, Wealth Redistribution, and Polycentricity (Meg Patrick Tuszynski, Richard E. Wagner)....Pages 291-311 Front Matter ....Pages 313-313 Constitutional Reform: Promise and Reality (Dennis C. Mueller)....Pages 315-336 Constitutional, Political and Behavioral Feasibility (Alan Hamlin)....Pages 337-358 Blockchain and Buchanan: Code as Constitution (Shruti Rajagopalan)....Pages 359-381 Blockchains as Constitutional Orders (Chris Berg, Sinclair Davidson, Jason Potts)....Pages 383-397 The Questionable Morality of Compromising the Influence of Public Choice by Embracing a “Nobel” Lie (J. R. Clark, Dwight R. Lee)....Pages 399-423 Beneficent Bullshit (Peter T. Leeson)....Pages 425-440 Groups, Sorting, and Inequality in Constitutional Political Economy (Jayme S. Lemke)....Pages 441-465 Votes, Vetoes, Voice, and Exit: Constitutional Protections in the Work of James M. Buchanan and Vincent Ostrom (Roberta Q. Herzberg)....Pages 467-486 On the Definition and Nature of Fiscal Coercion (George Tridimas, Stanley L. Winer)....Pages 487-509 Politics as Exchange in the Byzantine Empire (Adam G. Martin, James H. Ruhland)....Pages 511-536 Front Matter ....Pages 537-537 James M. Buchanan: Political Economist, Consistent Individualist (Viktor J. Vanberg)....Pages 539-576 A Public Choice Analysis of James M. Buchanan’s Constitutional Project (Randall G. Holcombe)....Pages 577-602 Buchanan’s Social Contract Unveiled (Enrico Colombatto)....Pages 603-626 Constitutional Design and Politics-as-Exchange: The Optimism of Public Choice (Georg Vanberg)....Pages 627-648 Doing Liberal Political Economy: James M. Buchanan as Exemplar (Glenn L. Furton, Alexander W. Salter)....Pages 649-670 Buchanan, Hayek, and the Limits of Constitutional Ambitions (Donald J. Boudreaux)....Pages 671-692 James Buchanan and the Return to an Economics of Natural Equals (David M. Levy, Sandra J. Peart)....Pages 693-712 From Highway to Clubs: Buchanan and the Pricing of Public Goods (Alain Marciano)....Pages 713-737 Front Matter ....Pages 739-739 In Defense of (Some) Vainglory: The Advantages of Polymorphic Hobbesianism (Gerald Gaus)....Pages 741-767 Toward a Rule-Based Model of Human Choice: On the Nature of Homo Constitutionalus (Roger D. Congleton)....Pages 769-805 The Constitution of Markets (Geoffrey Brennan, Hartmut Kliemt)....Pages 807-838 The Extent of the Market and Ethics (Yong J. Yoon)....Pages 839-851 When Roving Bandits Settle Down: Club Theory and the Emergence of Government (Andrew T. Young)....Pages 853-881 Rules Versus Discretion in Criminal Sentencing (Daniel J. D’Amico)....Pages 883-902 Diagnosing the Electorate: James Buchanan in the Role of Political Economist (Solomon M. Stein)....Pages 903-920 From Models to Experiments; James Buchanan and Charles Plott (Gil Hersch, Daniel Houser)....Pages 921-937 Front Matter ....Pages 939-939 Rules Versus Authorities: Buchanan and Simons and Fiscal Policy (Marianne Johnson)....Pages 941-963 The Quest for Fiscal Rules (Lars P. Feld)....Pages 965-990 The Irresistible Attraction of Public Debt (Vito Tanzi)....Pages 991-1007 Can There Be Such a Thing as Legitimate Public Debt in Democracy? De Viti de Marco and Buchanan Compared (Giuseppe Eusepi)....Pages 1009-1029 Consequences of the Anachronism of Fractional Reserve Arrangements (Leonidas Zelmanovitz)....Pages 1031-1049 Front Matter ....Pages 1051-1051 Italian Influences on Buchanan’s Research Program (Alain Marciano, Manuela Mosca)....Pages 1053-1078 Paretian Fiscal Sociology (Michael McLure)....Pages 1079-1103 Artefactual and Artisanship: James M. Buchanan and Vincent Ostrom at the Core and Beyond the Boundaries of Public Choice (Paul Dragos Aligica)....Pages 1105-1129 The Calculus of Consent and the Compound Republic (Robert L. Bish)....Pages 1131-1154 Why James Buchanan Kept Frank Knight’s Picture on His Wall Despite Fundamental Disagreements on Economics, Ethics, and Politics (Ross B. Emmett)....Pages 1155-1170 Back Matter ....Pages 1171-1182 “A fine collection of essays exploring, and in many cases extending, Jim Buchanan’s many contributions and insights to economic, political, and social theory.”– Bruce Caldwell , Professor of Economics, Duke University, USA"The overwhelming impression the reader gets from this very fine collection is the extraordinary expanse of James Buchanan's work. Everyone interested in economics and related fields can profit mightily from this book."– Mario Rizzo , Professor of Economics, New York University, USA This book explores the academic contribution of James Buchanan, who received the Nobel Prize for economics in 1986. Buchanan’s receipt of the Prize is noteworthy because he was a maverick within the economics profession. In contrast to the preponderance of economists, Buchanan made little use of mathematics and no use of econometrics, preferring to used logic and language to insert his ideas into the scholarly community. Moreover, his ideas extended the domain of economic inquiry along many paths that numerous economists subsequently pursued. Buchanan’s scholarship brought economics and political science together under the rubric of public choice. He was also was a prime figure in bringing economic theory into closer contact with moral and social philosophy.This volume includes essays distributed across the extensive domain of Buchanan’s scholarly contributions, reflecting the range of his scholarly interests. Chapters will examine Buchanan’s scholarly work on public finance, social insurance, public debt, public choice, economic methodology, constitutional political economy, law and economics, and ethics and social theory. The book also examines Buchanan in relation to other prominent economists, both from the distant past and the recent past. “A fine collection of essays exploring, and in many cases extending, Jim Buchanan’s many contributions and insights to economic, political, and social theory.” – Bruce Caldwell, Professor of Economics, Duke University, USA "The overwhelming impression the reader gets from this very fine collection is the extraordinary expanse of James Buchanan's work. Everyone interested in economics and related fields can profit mightily from this book." – Mario Rizzo, Professor of Economics, New York University, USA This book explores the academic contribution of James Buchanan, who received the Nobel Prize for economics in 1986. Buchanan’s receipt of the Prize is noteworthy because he was a maverick within the economics profession. In contrast to the preponderance of economists, Buchanan made little use of mathematics and no use of econometrics, preferring to used logic and language to insert his ideas into the scholarly community. Moreover, his ideas extended the domain of economic inquiry along many paths that numerous economists subsequently pursued. Buchanan’s scholarship brought economics and political science together under the rubric of public choice. He was also was a prime figure in bringing economic theory into closer contact with moral and social philosophy. This volume includes essays distributed across the extensive domain of Buchanan’s scholarly contributions, reflecting the range of his scholarly interests. Chapters will examine Buchanan’s scholarly work on public finance, social insurance, public debt, public choice, economic methodology, constitutional political economy, law and economics, and ethics and social theory. The book also examines Buchanan in relation to other prominent economists, both from the distant past and the recent past.