Israeli Fortifications of the October War 1973 (Fortress)

The Bar Lev Line along the Suez Canal was born out of the overwhelming victory of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) in the Six Day War of 1967. Devastated by their defeat, the Egyptian army began a prolonged campaign of artillery bombardments of Israeli positions causing many casualties. Accordingly, the IDF Chief of Staff, General Haim Bar-Lev, ordered the construction of a series of fortified positions and observation posts that were named the Bar Lev Line by the Israeli press, thanks to its inevitable association with the heavily fortified Maginot Line. This book examines the original 23 positions of the Bar Lev Line, known as Moazims (Moaz is 'castle keep' in Hebrew), each of which were between five and 15 kilometers apart and surrounded by barbed wire and minefields. With rare photographs and cutaway artwork, the design of these positions is described. Finally, the author analyzes the effectiveness of these positions when the Egyptians launched an offensive on Yom Kippur 1973. Manned by just 436 reservists the Moazims were quickly cut off and the Israeli defenders paid a high price with a casualty rate of almost 50 percent. Although widely criticized, the Bar Lev Line proved a success during the war of attrition, and in 1973 it was the political and military failures which allowed the Moazims to be surrounded, rather than the failure of the defensive line itself. The Bar Lev Line along the Suez Canal was born out of the overwhelming victory of the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) in the Six Day War of 1967. Devastated by their defeat, the Egyptian army bombarded Israeli positions, causing many casualties. Accordingly, the IDF Chief of Staff, General Haim Bar-Lev, ordered the construction of a series of fortified positions named the Bar Lev Line. Each position was surrounded by barbed wire and minefields and virtually immune to strikes by artillery shells and even 500kg bombs. On 6 October 1973, Yom Kippur, the positions were manned by just 436 reservists when the Egyptian Second and Third Armies launched a massive offensive along the Suez Canal. The positions were quickly cut off from the supporting elements, and the Israeli defenders paid a high price with a casualty rate of almost 50 per cent. Despite these losses, it was not the Bar Lev Line that failed but Israel's military and political establishment, which realised Arab intentions too late. Fort 79 0......Page 1 Fort 79 01......Page 2 Fort 79 02......Page 3 Fort 79 04......Page 4 Fort 79 06......Page 5 Fort 79 08......Page 6 Fort 79 10......Page 7 Fort 79 12......Page 8 Fort 79 14......Page 9 Fort 79 16......Page 10 Fort 79 18......Page 11 Fort 79 20......Page 12 Fort 79 22......Page 13 Fort 79 24......Page 14 Fort 79 26......Page 15 Fort 79 28......Page 16 Fort 79 30......Page 17 Fort 79 32......Page 18 Fort 79 34......Page 19 Fort 79 36......Page 20 Fort 79 38......Page 21 Fort 79 40......Page 22 Fort 79 42......Page 23 Fort 79 44......Page 24 Fort 79 46......Page 25 Fort 79 48......Page 26 Fort 79 50......Page 27 Fort 79 52......Page 28 Fort 79 54......Page 29 Fort 79 56......Page 30 Fort 79 58......Page 31 Fort 79 60......Page 32 Fort 79 62......Page 33 Fort 79 64......Page 34 Fort 79 82......Page 35 This book describes the fortified positons and observation posts on the Bar Lev Line, along with those on the Golan Heights and examines their effectiveness when the Egyptians and Syrians launched a massive joint offensive against the fortifications on 6 October 1973, surrounding and isolating a number of the positions with deadly results