Interpreting Probability: Controversies and Developments in the Early Twentieth Century (Cambridge Studies in Probability, Induction and Decision Theory)

The term probability can be used in two main senses. In the frequency interpretation it is a limiting ratio in a sequence of repeatable events. In the Bayesian view, probability is a mental construct representing uncertainty. This 2002 book is about these two types of probability and investigates how, despite being adopted by scientists and statisticians in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Bayesianism was discredited as a theory of scientific inference during the 1920s and 1930s. Through the examination of a dispute between two British scientists, the author argues that a choice between the two interpretations is not forced by pure logic or the mathematics of the situation, but depends on the experiences and aims of the individuals involved. The book should be of interest to students and scientists interested in statistics and probability theories and to general readers with an interest in the history, sociology and philosophy of science. This book is a study of the concept of probability as it has been used and applied across a number of scientific disciplines from genetics to geophysics. Probability has a dual aspect: sometimes it is a numerical ratio; sometimes, in the Bayesian interpretation, a degree of belief. David Howie examines probabilistic theories of scientific knowledge, and asks how, despite being adopted by many scientists and statisticians in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Bayesianism was discredited as a theory of scientific inference during the 1920s and 1930s. Through a close examination of a dispute between two British scientists, the author argues that a choice between the two interpretations of probability is not forced by pure logic, or the mathematics of the situation, but depends on the experiences and aims of the individuals involved, and their views of the correct form of scientific inquiry.

this Investigates How Bayesianism As One Theory Of Probability Was Discredited In The 1920s And 1930s.

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howie Focuses On Two Types Of Probability, The Frequency Interpretation And The Bayesian Interpretation,and Investigates How, After Widespread Adoption By Scientists And Statisticians, Bayesianism Was Discredited As A Theory Of Scientific Inference In The 1920s And 1930s. The Work Of Two British Scientists, Sir Harold Jeffreys (1891-1989) And Sir Ronald Aylmer Fisher (1890-1962), And Their Dispute During The 1930s, Is Central To Howie's Analysis. This Volume Grew From The Author's Recent Doctoral Dissertation In The Department Of History And Sociology Of Science At The U. Of Pennsylvania. For Academics And Students In History, Philosophy, And Sociology Of Science, Particularly In Probability And Statistics. Annotation C. Book News, Inc., Portland, Or

This 2002 book investigates how Bayesianism as one theory of probability was discredited during the 1920s and 1930s by two British scientists and shows how the choice of a certain interpretation of probability depends on the experiences of the individuals involved. David Howie. Includes Bibliographical References (p. 239-251) And Index. The single term 'probability' can be used in several distinct senses.