International handbook on the economics of corruption. Volume 2

A companion volume to the __International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption__ published in 2006, the specially commissioned papers in Volume Two present some of the best policy-oriented research in the field. They stress the institutional roots of corruption and include new research on topics ranging from corruption in regulation and procurement to vote buying and private firm payoffs. Understanding the consequences of corrupt transactions requires one to know what is being bought with a bribe and how the behavior of public and private actors has been affected. The contributors therefore emphasize how the economic analysis of corruption must take account of the broader context within which bribery and self-dealing operate. Several chapters offer new approaches to empirical research on corruption that range from individual-level data to the macro-economy. Chapters with an explicit policy focus deal with the efficacy of anti-corruption agencies, multi-stakeholder initiatives, red flag warning systems and international conventions. This cutting-edge work will be an unmatched resource for scholars and students of corruption, professionals in international aid and finance organizations, and scholars and professionals with more general interests in economic and political development. **Contributors:** T.S. Aidt, D.M. Aldrighi, E. Auriol, F. Boehm, E. Buscaglia, B. Clausen, S. Cole, A. Estache, B. Flyvbjerg, Y. Jeong, C. Kenny, A. Kraay, A. Lambert-Mogiliansky, E. Molloy, P. Murrell, M. Musatova, L.V. Peisakhin, G. Piga, J.D. Potter, F. Recanatini, S. Rose-Ackerman, T. Soreide, S. Straub, M. Tavits, A. Tran, R. Truex, M. Vagliasindi, P.C. Vicente, R.J. Weiner, L. Wren-Lewis This Volume Begins With An Introductory Essay, Followed By Two Chapters Written By Leading Exponents Of Cross-country Research. However, The Focus Of The Handbook Is On Research At The Micro Level, Where Policy Can Be Made And Evaluated. The Microeconomic Studies Fall Into Several Overlapping Categories. List Of Contributors -- Introduction And Overview / Susan Rose-ackerman -- Pt. 1. Corruption And Poor Governance Around The World -- 1. Causes And Consequences Of Corruption : What Do We Know From A Cross-section Of Countries? / Johann Graf Lambsdorff -- 2. Measuring Governance Using Cross-country Perceptions Data / Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, And Massimo Mastruzzi -- 3. Measuring Institutions / Christopher Woodruff -- Pt. 2. Corruption And Institutional Structure -- 4. Bargaining For Bribes : The Role Of Institutions / Ray Fisman And Roberta Gatti -- 5. Democratic Institutions And Corruption : Incentives And Constraints In Politics / Jana Kunicová -- 6. Decentralization, Corruption And Government Accountability / Pranab Bardhan And Dilip Mookherjee -- 7. Corruption, Hierarchies And Bureaucratic Structure / Ajit Mishra -- 8. Determinants Of Corruption In Developing Countries : The Limits Of Conventional Economic Analysis / Mushtaq H. Khan -- Pt. 3. Corruption In The Transition From Socialism -- 9. The Effectiveness Of Anti-corruption Programs : Preliminary Evidence From The Post-communist Transition Countries / Alan Rousso And Franklin Steves -- 10. Corruption In China And Russia Compared : Different Legacies Of Central Planning / Jens Andvig. Pt. 4. Surveys And Experiments -- 11. Why Are Some Public Officials More Corrupt Than Others? / Jennifer Hunt -- 12. Corruption And The Demand For Regulating Capitalists / Rafael Di Tella And Robert Macculloch -- 13. Corruption In International Business Transactions : The Perspective Of Norwegian Firms / Tina Søreide -- 14. Laboratory Experiments On Corruption / Klaus Abbink -- Pt. 5. Sectoral Anti-corruption Policies -- 15. How Corruption Affects Service Delivery And What Can Be Done About It / Ritva Reinikka And Jakob Svensson -- 16. Corruption And The Management Of Public Works In Italy / Miriam Golden And Lucio Picci -- 17. Corruption In Tax Administration : Lessons From Institutional Reforms In Uganda / Odd-helge Fjeldstad -- 18. The Economics Of Anti-corruption : Lessons From A Widespread Customs Reform / Dean Yang -- 19. Prescription For Abuse? : Pharmaceutical Selection In Bulgarian Healthcare / Patrick Meagher -- Name Index -- Subject Index. Edited By Susan Rose-ackerman. Vol. 2 Co-edited By: Tina Söreide. Includes Bibliographical References And Indexes. A companion volume to the International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption published in 2006, the specially commissioned papers in Volume Two present some of the best policy-oriented research in the field. They stress the institutional roots of corruption and include new research on topics ranging from corruption in regulation and procurement to vote buying and private firm payoffs.Understanding the consequences of corrupt transactions requires one to know what is being bought with a bribe and how the behavior of public and private actors has been affected. The contributors therefore emphasize how the economic analysis of corruption must take account of the broader context within which bribery and self-dealing operate. Several chapters offer new approaches to empirical research on corruption that range from individual-level data to the macro-economy. Chapters with an explicit policy focus deal with the efficacy of anti-corruption agencies, multi-stakeholder initiatives, red flag warning systems and international conventions.This cutting-edge work will be an unmatched resource for scholars and students of corruption, professionals in international aid and finance organizations, and scholars and professionals with more general interests in economic and political development.Contributors: T.S. Aidt, D.M. Aldrighi, E. Auriol, F. Boehm, E. Buscaglia, B. Clausen, S. Cole, A. Estache, B. Flyvbjerg, Y. Jeong, C. Kenny, A. Kraay, A. Lambert-Mogiliansky, E. Molloy, P. Murrell, M. Musatova, L.V. Peisakhin, G. Piga, J.D. Potter, F. Recanatini, S. Rose-Ackerman, T. Søreide, S. Straub, M. Tavits, A. Tran, R. Truex, M. Vagliasindi, P.C. Vicente, R.J. Weiner, L. Wren-Lewis "A companion volume to the International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption published in 2006, the specially commissioned papers in Volume Two present some of the best policy-oriented research in the field. They stress the institutional roots of corruption and include new research on topics ranging from corruption in regulation and procurement to vote buying and private firm payoffs. Understanding the consequences of corrupt transactions requires one to know what is being bought with a bribe and how the behavior of public and private actors has been affected. The contributors therefore emphasize how the economic analysis of corruption must take account of the broader context within which bribery and self-dealing operate. Several chapters offer new approaches to empirical research on corruption that range from individual-level data to the macro-economy. Chapters with an explicit policy focus deal with the efficacy of anti-corruption agencies, multi-stakeholder initiatives, red flag warning systems and international conventions. -- Page [4] de la couverture A companion volume to the International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption published in 2006, the specially commissioned papers in Volume Two present some of the best policy-oriented research in the field. They stress the institutional roots of corruption and include new research on topics ranging from corruption in regulation and procurement to vote buying and private firm payoffs. Understanding the consequences of corrupt transactions requires one to know what is being bought with a bribe and how the behavior of public and private actors has been affected. The contributors therefore emphasize how the economic analysis of corruption must take account of the broader context within which bribery and self-dealing operate. Several chapters offer new approaches to empirical research on corruption that range from individual-level data to the macro-economy. Chapters with an explicit policy focus deal with the efficacy of anti-corruption agencies, multi-stakeholder initiatives, red flag warning systems and international conventions. -- Publisher description