International Coordination of National Stabilization Policies (Integrating National Economies)

This work is part of the Integrating National Economies series. As global markets for goods, services and financial assets have become increasingly integrated, national governments no longer have as much control over economic markets. With the completion of the Uruguay Round of the GATT talks, the world economy has entered a fresh phase requiring different rules and different levels of international cooperation. Policies once thought to be entirely domestic and appropriately determined by national political institutions, are now subject to international constraints. Cogent analysis of this deeper integration of the world economy, and guidelines for government policies, are urgent priorities. This series aims to meet these needs over a range of 21 books by some of the world's leading economists, political scientists, foreign policy specialists and government officials. All the books in the series are offered at the same price: #22.50 for hardbacks and #8.50 for paperbacks. As cross-border transactions and economic integration among nations have increased, formerly neglected differences among the domestic economic policies of nations have become progressively exposed to international scrutiny. National governments trying to pursue autonomous polices have found their decisions more difficult and the consequences of their decisions more uncertain. These trends have in turn provoked debate about whether governments should cooperate more fully when making their policy decisions.In this book, part of the Integrating National Economies series, Ralph A. Bryant considers how much national governments might benefit from coordination of their macroeconomic stabilization polices, the circumstances in which they might cooperation; and how ambitious that cooperation should be.Bryant argues that the potential benefits of attempted coordination are often greater than the potential risks. When national decisionmakers take into account the cross-border spillovers of their actions, and especially if the are prepared to consider mutually beneficial adjustments of their policy instruments, each cooperating nation may be able to attain higher levels of welfare. Bryant discusses circumstances in which efforts to coordinate could prove counterproductive. On the whole, however, he contends that efforts to coordinate policies internationally typically deserve examination and, frequently, can be expected to advance the common interests of nations'citizens.Bryant identifies and analyzes different forms of intergovernmental cooperation for monetary, fiscal, and exchange rate policies. One of the contributors of the book compares and evaluates three different analytical perspectives: the traditional policy-optimization approach favored by economists, the rule analysis of international regime environments, and the institutional analysis developed by scholars of international relations and political science. The book concludes with an o As cross-border transactions and economic integration among nations have increased, formerly neglected differences among the domestic economic policies of nations have become progressively exposed to international scrutiny. National governments trying to pursue autonomous policies have found their decisions more difficult and the consequences of the decisions more uncertain. These trends have in turn provoked debate about whether governments should cooperate more fully when making their policy decisions. In this book, part of the Integrating National Economies series, Ralph C. Bryant considers how much national governments might benefit from coordination of their macroeconomic stabilization policies, the circumstances in which they might cooperate, and how ambitious that cooperation should be. Considers how much national governments might benefit from coordination of their macroeconomic stabilization polices, the circumstances in which they might cooperation; and how ambitious that cooperation should be. Ralph A. Bryant argues that the potential benefits of attempted coordination are often greater than the potential risks.