Intentions in Great Power Politics : Uncertainty and the Roots of Conflict

Can great powers be confident that their peers have benign intentions? States that trust each other can live at peace; those that mistrust each other are doomed to compete for arms and allies and may even go to war. This book offers a theory—intentions pessimism—that says great powers can rarely if ever be confident that their peers have benign intentions, because it is extraordinarily difficult for them to obtain the kind of information that would allow them to reach such a conclusion. Any optimistic assertions to the contrary—and there are many—are wrong. Indeed, even in cases that supposedly involved mutual trust—Germany and Russia in the Bismarck era (1871-90); Britain and the United States during the great rapprochement (1895-1906); France and Germany, and Japan and the United States in the early interwar period (1919-30); and the Soviet Union and the United States at the end of the Cold War (1985-90)—the protagonists were acutely uncertain about each other’s intentions. As a result, they competed for security. The ramifications for the future of U.S.-China relations are profound. Uncertain about the other side’s intentions, but aware of its formidable capabilities, Washington and Beijing will go to great lengths to strengthen their military and diplomatic positions, triggering a competitive action-reaction spiral with the potential for war. Why the future of great power politics is likely to resemble its dismal past

Can great powers be confident that their peers have benign intentions? States that trust each other can live at peace; those that mistrust each other are doomed to compete for arms and allies and may even go to war. Sebastian Rosato explains that states routinely lack the kind of information they need to be convinced that their rivals mean them no harm. Even in cases that supposedly involved mutual trust—Germany and Russia in the Bismarck era; Britain and the United States during the great rapprochement; France and Germany, and Japan and the United States in the early interwar period; and the Soviet Union and United States at the end of the Cold War—the protagonists mistrusted each other and struggled for advantage. Rosato argues that the ramifications of his argument for U.S.–China relations are profound: the future of great power politics is likely to resemble its dismal past. "Can great powers be confident that their peers have benign intentions? States that trust each other can live at peace; those that mistrust each other are doomed to compete for arms and allies and may even go to war. Sebastian Rosato explains that states routinely lack the kind of information they need to be convinced that their rivals mean them no harm. Even in cases that supposedly involved mutual trust--Germany and Russia in the Bismarck era; Britain and the United States during the great rapprochement; France and Germany, and Japan and the United States in the early interwar period; and the Soviet Union and United States at the end of the Cold War--the protagonists mistrusted each other and struggled for advantage. Rosato argues that the ramifications of his argument for U.S.-China relations are profound: the future of great power politics is likely to resemble its dismal past."-- Provided by publisher Can great powers be confident that their peers have benign intentions? States that trust each other can live at peace; those that mistrust each other are doomed to compete for arms and allies and may even go to war. Sebastian Rosato explains that states routinely lack the kind of information they need to be convinced that their rivals mean them no harm. Even in cases that supposedly involved mutual trust - Germany and Russia in the Bismarck era; Britain and the United States during the great rapprochement; France and Germany, and Japan and the United States in the early interwar period; and the Soviet Union and United States at the end of the Cold War - the protagonists mistrusted each other and struggled for advantage. Rosato argues that the ramifications of his argument for U.S.-China relations are profound: the future of great power politics is likely to resemble its dismal past