معرفی کتاب «Intentionality in Husserl and Heidegger: The Problem of the Original Method and Phenomenon of Phenomenology (Contributions to Phenomenology (11))» نوشتهٔ Burt C. Hopkins (auth.)، منتشرشده توسط نشر Springer Netherlands در سال 1993. این کتاب در فرمت pdf، زبان انگلیسی ارائه شده است.
§ 1. Remarks on the Current Status of the Problematic. The literature treating the relationship between the phenomenologies of Husserl and Heidegger has not been kind to Husserl. Heidegger's "devastating" phenomenologically ontological critique of traditional epistemology and ontology, advanced under the rubric of "fundamental ontology" in Being and Time, has almost been universallyl received, despite the paucity of its references to Husserl, as sounding the death knell for Husserl's original formulation of phenomenology. The recent publication of Heidegger's lectures from the period surrounding his composition of Being and Time, lectures that contain detailed references and critical analyses of Husserl's phenomenology, and which, in the words of one respected commentator, Rudolf Bernet, "offer at long last, insight into the principal sources of fundamental ontology,"2 will, if 3 the conclusions reached by the same commentator are any indication, serve only to reinforce the perception of Heidegger's phenomenological /I superiority" over Husserl. This is not to suggest that the tendency toward Heidegger partisan ship in the literature treating the relationship of his phenomenology to Husserl's has its basis in extra-philosophical or extra-phenome nological concerns and considerations. Rather, it is to draw attention to the undeniable 'fact' that Heidegger's reformulation of Husserl's phenomenology has cast a "spell" over all subsequent discussions of the basic problems and issues involved in what has become known as their "controversy. Front Matter....Pages i-xv Introduction....Pages 1-12 Front Matter....Pages 13-15 Husserl’s Phenomenological Method....Pages 17-31 The Intentionality of Logical Significance and Material Ontological Meaning....Pages 32-43 The Intentionality of Psychologically Pure Consciousness....Pages 44-54 The Intentionality of Transcendentally Pure Consciousness....Pages 55-77 Front Matter....Pages 79-81 Heidegger’s Concept of Phenomenology....Pages 82-102 The Phenomenological Inquiry into the Being of Intentionality....Pages 103-121 Being in the World Manifests Dasein’s Original Transcendence....Pages 122-145 The Temporal Meaning of Transcendence....Pages 146-161 Front Matter....Pages 163-166 The Phenomenological Method: Reflective or Hermeneutical ?....Pages 167-188 Intentionality: An Original or Derived Phenomenon?....Pages 189-214 Front Matter....Pages 215-219 Gadamer’s Assessment of the Controversy between Husserl and Heidegger....Pages 220-230 Ricoeur’s Attempted Rapprochement between Phenomenology and Hermeneutics....Pages 231-238 Mohanty’s Account of the Complementarity of Descriptive and Interpretive Phenomenology....Pages 239-245 Crowell’s Account of Husserl’s and Heidegger’s Divergent Interpretations of Phenomenology’s Transcendental Character....Pages 246-250 Landgrebe’s Critique of Husserl’s Theory of Phenomenological Reflection....Pages 251-264 Back Matter....Pages 265-303
This book reassesses the phenomenological 'controversy' between Husserl and Heidegger over the proper status of the phenomenon of intentionality. It seeks to determine whether Heidegger's hermeneutical critique of intentionality is sensitive to Husserl's reflective account of its 'Sachen selbst'. Hopkins argues that Heidegger's critique is directed toward the 'cogito' modality of intentionality, and therefore, passes over its 'non-actional', or 'horizonal', dimension in Husserl's phenomenology. As a result of this, he concludes that Heidegger misinterprets Husserl's account of the intentional 'immanence' exhibited by phenomenological reflection.
On the basis of these findings, Hopkins suggests that the phenomenological methodology, operative in the so-called hermeneutic critique of transcendental consciousness, itself involves transcendental 'presuppositions' that are most appropriately characterized in terms of intentional, and reflective, phenomena.
Reassesses the phenomenological "controversy" between Hesserl and Heidegger over the proper status of the phenomenon of intentionality. It aims to determine whether the latter's hermeneutical critique of intentionality is sensitive to Husserl's reflective account of its "sachen selbst". By Burt C. Hopkins. Includes Bibliographical References (p. 291-294) And Index.