Institutions, property rights, and economic growth : the legacy of Douglass North

This volume showcases the impact of the work of Douglass C. North, winner of the Nobel Prize and father of the field of new institutional economics. Leading scholars contribute to a substantive discussion that best illustrates the broad reach and depth of Professor North's work. The volume speaks concisely about his legacy across multiple social sciences disciplines, specifically on scholarship pertaining to the understanding of property rights, the institutions that support the system of property rights, and economic growth. After Ten Rounds Of Playing The Prisoners' Dilemma Game, Subjects Were Given The Possibility Of Eliminating One Of The Two Actions By Plurality. Each Subject Voted On Whether To Keep All Actions, Eliminate D, Or Eliminate C. After Voting, The Subject Participated In Ten More Rounds Depending On The Decision Made By Plurality. To Study The Effect Of Subjects' Understanding Of The Game On Voting Decisions I Modify How Game Is Presented To The Subjects. In Half The Sessions, The Computer Screen Shows The Payoff Matrix With The Subject Action As Rows And Their Partners As Columns. Feedback About The Outcome Is Also Provided By Highlighting The Chosen Row And Column. The Other Half Of The Sessions Did Not See The Payoffs Displayed As A Matrix And Feedback Did Not Stress The Behavior Of The Partner By Highlighting His/her Behavior In The Matrix (but This Behavior Was Reported). Figure 1 Shows A Screen Shot Of Each Treatment (payoffs Are Set In Cents). I Hypothesize That Not Showing The Game As A Matrix May Diminish Subjects' Understanding Of The Structure Of The Game And The Likely Effect Of Modifying The Game By Eliminating A Strategy. I Called These Two Treatments As See Matrix And Do Not See Matrix Treatments, Respectively. The Participants Were 80 Brown University Or Risd Undergraduates. Half The Subjects Participated In Each Of The Treatments. As Figure 2 Shows, In The First Ten Rounds The Evolution Of Cooperation Is Consistent To What Has Been Found In The Literature: A Significant Cooperation Rate That Decreases With Experience (see Andreoni And Miller 1993, And Dal B. The Contribution Of Douglass C. North To New Institutional Economics / Claude Ménard And Mary M. Shirley -- Persistence And Change In Institutions: The Evolution Of Douglass C. North / John Joseph Wallis -- The New Institutionalism / Robert Bates -- 'the Rules Of The Game': What Rules? Which Game? / Kenneth A. Shepsle-- Institutions And Sustainability Of Ecological Systems / Elinor Ostrom -- Land Property Rights / Sebastian Galiani And Ernesto Schargrodsky -- Constitutions As Coordinating Devices / Gillian K. Hadfield And Barry R. Weingast -- Culture, Institutions, And Modern Growth / Joel Mokyr -- What Really Happened During The Glorious Revolution? / Steven C. A. Pincus And James A. Robinson -- The Grand Experiment That Wasn't? New Institutional Economics And The Postcommunist Experience / Scott Gehlbach And Edmund J. Malesky -- Using Economic Experiments To Measure Informal Institutions / Pamela Jakiela -- Experimental Evidence On The Workings Of Democratic Institutions / Pedro Dal Bó. Edited By Sebastian Galiani, Itai Sened. Includes Bibliographical References And Index.