Inquiry as Inquiry: A Logic of Scientific Discovery (Jaakko Hintikka Selected Papers Book 5)

Is a genuine logic of scientific discovery possible? In the essays collected here, Hintikka not only defends an affirmative answer; he also outlines such a logic. It is the logic of questions and answers. Thus inquiry in the sense of knowledge-seeking becomes inquiry in the sense of interrogation. Using this new logic, Hintikka establishes a result that will undoubtedly be considered the fundamental theorem of all epistemology, __viz__., the virtual identity of optimal strategies of pure discovery with optimal deductive strategies. Questions to Nature, of course, must include observations and experiments. Hintikka shows, in fact, how the logic of experimental inquiry can be understood from the interrogative vantage point. Other important topics examined include induction (in a forgotten sense that has nevertheless played a role in science), explanation, the incommensurability of theories, theory-ladenness of observations, and identifiability.

vol. 1: Ludwig Wittgenstein: Half-truths And One-and-a-half-truths

because Of His Legendary Impatience, Wittgenstein's Published Books Are Focused On His Solutions To His Latest Problems And Consequently Often Fail To Explain Not Only His Earlier Solutions But Also His Problem Situation. In The Essays Collected In This Volume, Jaakko Hintikka Counteracts The Difficulty Which This Peculiarity Of Wittgenstein's Poses To His Readers By Analysing In Depth The Crucial Stages Of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Career And The Relation Of His Ideas To Those Of Other Philosophers, Especially Russell, Carnap And Husserl, With Sometimes Surprising Results.

vol. 2: Lingua Universalis Vs. Calculus Ratiocinator

twentieth-century Philosophy Has Tacitly Been Dominated By A Deep Contrast Between Universalist And Model-theoretical Visions Of Language. The Role Of This Contrast Is Studied Here In Peirce, Frege, Wittgenstein, Carnap, Quine, Husserl, Heidegger And In The Development Of Logical Theory. Hintikka Also Develops A New Approach To Truth-definitions Which Strongly Supports The Model-theoretical View.

vol. 3: Language, Truth And Logic In Mathematics

the Foundations Of Mathematics Are Examined By Reference To Such Crucial Concepts As The Informational Independence Of Quantifiers, The Standard-nonstandard Distinction, Completeness, Computability, Parallel Processing And The Extremality Of Models.

vol. 4: Paradigms For Language Theory And Other Essays

several Of The Basic Ideas Of Current Language Theory Are Subjected To Critical Scrutiny And Found Wanting, Including The Concept Of Scope, The Hegemony Of Generative Syntax, The Frege-russell Claim That Verbs Like `is' Are Ambiguous, And The Assumptions Underlying The So-called New Theory Of Reference. In Their Stead, New Constructive Ideas Are Proposed.

vol. 5: Inquiry As Inquiry: A Logic Of Scientific Discovery

in The Essays Collected Here, Hintikka Both Defends And Outlines A Genuine Logic Of Scientific Discovery, The Logic Of Questions And Answers. Thus Inquiry In The Sense Of Knowledge-seeking Becomes Inquiry In The Sense Of Interrogation. Using This New Logic, Hintikka Establishes A Result That Will Undoubtedly Be Considered The Fundamental Theorem Of All Epistemology, Viz., The Virtual Identity Of Optimal Strategies Of Pure Discovery With Optimal Deductive Strategies.

vol. 6: Analyses Of Aristotle

this Collection Comprises Several Striking Interpretations Of Aristotle's Logic And Methodology That Jaakko Hintikka Has Put Forward Over The Years, Constituting A Challenge Not Only To Aristotelian Scholars And Historians Of Ideas, But To Everyone Interested In Logic, Epistemology Or Metaphysics And In Their History.

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a Collection Of 16 Essays, Previously Or Subsequently Published Elsewhere, That Delve Below The Impatience Wittgenstein Displayed When Writing His Major Works, And Draws Fuller Accounts Of His Thought From His Notebooks. They Focus On The Two Grand Visions Concerning The Interrelations Of Language, Self, And The World, Arguing That The Picture Theory Of Language Was A Combination Of Several Independent Assumptions; And That The Idea Of Language Games As The Vehicles Of Meaning Was The End Product Of Intriguing Development. A Projected Second Collection Of Hintikka's Papers Will Deal With Universal Language. No Index. Annotation C. By Book News, Inc., Portland, Or.

One can distinguish, roughly speaking, two different approaches to the philosophy of mathematics. On the one hand, some philosophers (and some mathematicians) take the nature and the results of mathematicians' activities as given, and go on to ask what philosophical morals one might perhaps find in their story. On the other hand, some philosophers, logicians and mathematicians have tried or are trying to subject the very concepts which mathematicians are using in their work to critical scrutiny. In practice this usually means scrutinizing the logical and linguistic tools mathematicians wield. Such scrutiny can scarcely help relying on philosophical ideas and principles. In other words it can scarcely help being literally a study of language, truth and logic in mathematics, albeit not necessarily in the spirit of AJ. Ayer. As its title indicates, the essays included in the present volume represent the latter approach. In most of them one of the fundamental concepts in the foundations of mathematics and logic is subjected to a scrutiny from a largely novel point of view. Typically, it turns out that the concept in question is in need of a revision or reconsideration or at least can be given a new twist. The results of such a re-examination are not primarily critical, however, but typically open up new constructive possibilities. The consequences of such deconstructions and reconstructions are often quite sweeping, and are explored in the same paper or in others. R. G. Collingwood saw one of the main tasks of philosophers and of historians of human thought in uncovering what he called the ultimate presuppositions of different thinkers, of different philosophical movements and of entire eras of intellectual history. He also noted that such ultimate presuppositions usually remain tacit at first, and are discovered only by subsequent reflection. Collingwood would have been delighted by the contrast that constitutes the overall theme of the essays collected in this volume. Not only has this dichotomy ofviews been one ofthe mostcrucial watersheds in the entire twentieth-century philosophical thought. Not only has it remained largely implicit in the writings of the philosophers for whom it mattered most. It is a truly Collingwoodian presupposition also in that it is not apremise assumed by different thinkers in their argumentation. It is the presupposition of a question, an assumption to the effect that a certain general question can be raised and answered. Its role is not belied by the fact that several philosophers who answered it one way or the other seem to be largely unaware that the other answer also makes sense - if it does. This Collingwoodian question can be formulated in a first rough approximation by asking whether language - our actual working language, Tarski's "colloquiallanguage" - is universal in the sense of being inescapable. This formulation needs all sorts of explanations, however. IF WITI'GENSTEIN COULD TALK, COULD WE UNDERSTAND HIM? Perusing the secondary literature on Wittgenstein, I have frequently experienced a perfect Brechtean Entfremdungseffekt. This is interesting, I have felt like saying when reading books and papers on Wittgenstein, but who is the writer talking about? Certainly not Ludwig Wittgenstein the actual person who wrote his books and notebooks and whom I happened to meet. Why is there this strange gap between the ideas of the actual philosopher and the musings of his interpreters? Wittgenstein is talking to us through the posthumous publication of his writings. Why don't philosophers understand what he is saying? A partial reason is outlined in the first essay of this volume. Wittgenstein was far too impatient to explain in his books and book drafts what his problems were, what it was that he was trying to get clear about. He was even too impatient to explain in full his earlier solutions, often merely referring to them casually as it were in a shorthand notation. For one important instance, in The Brown Book, Wittgenstein had explained in some detail what name-object relationships amount to in his view. There he offers both an explanation of what his problem is and an account of his own view illustrated by means of specific examples of language-games. But when he raises the same question again in Philosophical Investigations I, sec.

Several of the basic ideas of current language theory are subjected to critical scrutiny and found wanting, including the concept of scope, the hegemony of generative syntax, the Frege-Russell claim that verbs like `is' are ambiguous, and the assumptions underlying the so-called New Theory of Reference. In their stead, new constructive ideas are proposed.

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Most of the 11 essays were originally published in the 1990s and late 1980s, though a couple go back to 1978 and 1980 and one is previously unpublished. In addition to the title essay, the topics include the games of logic and the games of inquiry, logical form and linguistic theory, the fallacies of the new theory of reference, semantical games and semantical relativity, the thesis and the methodology of linguistics, and game-theoretical semantics as a synthesis of verificationist and truth-conditional meaning theories. Essays on informational independence as a semantical phenomenon, and metaphors and other kinds of non-literal meaning Hintikka wrote in collaboration with Gabriel Sandu. Reproduced from earlier publications, some double- spaced. No index. Annotation c. by Book News, Inc., Portland, Or.

The foundations of mathematics are examined by reference to such crucial concepts as the informational independence of quantifiers, the standard-nonstandard distinction, completeness, computability, parallel processing and the extremality of models.

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A dozen essays, most previously published, critique the concepts that mathematicians use, particularly their logical and linguistic tools. Typically finds that the concept under scrutiny needs revision or reconsideration. Argues that quantification theory has been only partially and inadequately captured by the received first-order logic, that much of the discussions of the implications of Gdel-type incompleteness results are superficial and misleading, that the characterization of Hilbert as a formalist hides rather than reveals the true dynamics of his thought, and that implication of the contrast between standard and non-standard interpretations of higher-order logics have remained largely unacknowledged. Also offers several alternative concepts. No index. Annotation c. by Book News, Inc., Portland, Or.

Front Matter....Pages i-xiii Is Logic the Key to All Good Reasoning?....Pages 1-24 The Role of Logic in Argumentation....Pages 25-46 Interrogative Logic as a General Theory of Reasoning....Pages 47-90 What is Abduction? The Fundamental Problem of Contemporary Epistemology....Pages 91-113 True and False Logics of Scientific Discovery....Pages 115-126 A Spectrum of Logics of Questioning....Pages 127-142 What is the Logic of Experimental Inquiry?....Pages 143-160 The Concept of Induction in The Light of the Interrogative Approach to Inquiry....Pages 161-181 Semantics and Pragmatics for Why-Questions....Pages 183-204 The Varieties of Information and Scientific Explanation....Pages 205-225 On the Incommensurability of Theories....Pages 227-240 Theory-Ladenness of Observations as as Test Case of Kuhn’s Approach to Scientific Inquiry....Pages 241-250 Ramsey Sentences and the Meaning of Quantifiers....Pages 251-266 Towards a General Theory of Identifiability....Pages 267-289

Is a genuine logic of scientific discovery possible? In the essays collected here, Hintikka not only defends an affirmative answer; he also outlines such a logic. It is the logic of questions and answers. Thus inquiry in the sense of knowledge-seeking becomes inquiry in the sense of interrogation. Using this new logic, Hintikka establishes a result that will undoubtedly be considered the fundamental theorem of all epistemology, viz., the virtual identity of optimal strategies of pure discovery with optimal deductive strategies. Questions to Nature, of course, must include observations and experiments. Hintikka shows, in fact, how the logic of experimental inquiry can be understood from the interrogative vantage point. Other important topics examined include induction (in a forgotten sense that has nevertheless played a role in science), explanation, the incommensurability of theories, theory-ladenness of observations, and identifiability.

The essays collected here explore a fundamental contrast between two overall visions of language and its availability to self-examination. They can be characterized as "language as the universal medium" and "language as calculus" (or the model-theoretical view). The former normally includes the ineffability of semantics and a one-world ontology. This contrast has dominated twentieth-century philosophy but has scarcely been acknowledged before. Tarski's famous result concerning the indefinability of truth seems to decide the issue in favor of the universalists. Hintikka nevertheless shows that Tarski's result is inconclusive and that truth can in fact be defined in languages which are in certain respects comparable to ordinary language. This unique volume is a must for every contemporary philosopher and for everyone interested in the semantics of our language Origin Of The Essays -- 1. Contemporary Philosophy And The Problem Of Truth -- 2. Is Truth Ineffable? -- 3. Defining Truth, The Whole Truth And Nothing But The Truth -- 4. On The Development Of The Model-theoretic Viewpoint In Logical Theory -- 5. The Place Of C. S. Peirce In The History Of Logical Theory -- 6. Wittgenstein And Language As The Universal Medium / Jaakko Hintikka And Merrill B. Hintikka -- 7. Carnap's Work In The Foundations Of Logic And Mathematics In A Historical Perspective -- 8. Quine As A Member Of The Tradition Of The Universality Of Language -- App. 1. Logic As Calculus And Logic As Language / Jean Van Heijenoort -- App. 2. Husserl And Heidegger On Meaning / Martin Kusch. Jaakko Hintikka. Includes Bibliographical References. Some of the most fundamental concepts of mathematics and logic are shown to need re-examination and re-definition. They include the received logic of quantification, the idea of the completeness of a mathematical system as well as the notions of a model in higher-order logic, of formalism, of computability and of parallel processing. Even the notion of a model in first-order logic admits of interesting variation. These analyses have important repercussions concerning such matters as the notion of proofs, Church's Thesis, the foundational projects of Frege, Russell, Hilbert and Carnap, and the philosophical significance of the impossibility results of Godel and Tarski, which turns out to be much smaller than has been generally assumed Frequently, a genuine understanding of a thinker's ideas is possible only by following them further than he did himself. Wittgenstein's Viennese contemporary Karl Kraus spoke in a similar context of one-and-a-half truths in contradistinction to half-truths. In this volume of essays, Jaakko Kintikka examines in the spirit of Kraus's bon mot the two grand visions concerning the interrelations of language, self and the world that guided Wittgenstein's thought at the different stages of his philosophical development. Thus this book opens a radically new perspective on the entire foundations of mathematics. This book would be of interest to research libraries and university libraries, philosophers, logicians and mathematicians An outside observer looking at the contemporary scene in philosophy may very well be excused if his or her first impression is of people talking past each other.