Inference, Explanation, and Other Frustrations: Essays in the Philosophy of Science (Pittsburgh Series in Philosophy and History of Science, Vol 14)

Title page ......Page 2 copyright ......Page 3 Contents ......Page 4 Introduction ......Page 6 Part I: Inference and Method ......Page 12 1. Thoroughly Modern Meno - Clark Glymour and Kevin Kelly ......Page 14 notes ......Page 33 2. The Concept of Induction in the Light of the Interrogative Approach to Inquiry - Jaakko Hintikka ......Page 34 notes ......Page 51 3. Aristotelian Natures and the Modern Experimental Method - Nancy Cartwright ......Page 55 notes ......Page 81 4. Genetic Inference. A Reconsideration of David Hume's Empiricism - Barbara D. Massey and Gerald J. Massey ......Page 83 notes ......Page 93 5. Philosophy and the Exact Sciences. Logical Positivism as a Case Study - Michael Friedman ......Page 95 notes ......Page 107 6. Language and Interpretation. Philosophical Reflections and Empirical Inquiry - Noam Chomsky ......Page 110 notes ......Page 135 Part II: Theories and Explanation ......Page 140 7. Constructivism, Realism, and Philosophical Method - Richard Boyd ......Page 142 references ......Page 206 8. Do We Need a Hierarchical Model of Science? - Diderik Batens ......Page 210 notes ......Page 224 9. Theories of Theories. A View from Cognitive Science - Richard E. Grandy ......Page 227 references ......Page 242 10. Procedural Syntax for Theory Elements - Joseph D. Sneed ......Page 245 references ......Page 263 11. Why Functionalism Didn't Work - Hilary Putnam ......Page 266 notes ......Page 281 12. Physicalism - Hartry Field ......Page 282 notes ......Page 298 Contributors ......Page 304 Index ......Page 306 These provocative essays by leading philosophers of science exemplify and illuminate the contemporary uncertainty and excitement in this changing field. The papers are rich in new perspectives, and their far-reaching criticisms challenge arguments long prevalent in classic philosophical problems of induction, empiricism, and realism. By turns empirical or analytic, historical or programmatic, confessional or argumentative, the authors' arguments both describe and demonstrate the fact that philosophy of science is in a ferment more intense than at any time since the heyday of logical positivism seventy years ago. By turns empirical or analytic, historical or programmatic, confessional or argumentative, the contributors to this book both describe and demonstrate the fact that the philosophy of science is in a ferment more intense than at any time since the heyday of logical positivism 70 years ago.