In Situ and Laboratory Experiments on Electoral Law Reform: French Presidential Elections (Studies in Public Choice Book 25)

In the modern era, representation is the hallmark of democracy, and electoral rules structure how representation works and how effectively governments perform. Moreover, of the key structural variables in constitutional design, it is the choice of electoral system that is usually the most open to change. There are three distinctive approaches to electoral system research. One, associated largely with economics, involves the study of electoral system effects through the deductive method, using mathematical tools to derive theorems about the properties of voting methods and behaviors. A second, associated largely with political science, has a primarily empirical focus, and looks in depth at how electoral rules impact on political outcomes, through large cross-sectional or case studies. A third, and more recent tradition, inspired largely by work in experimental economics, involves experimentation, either in the form of controlled laboratory experiments or in the form of in situ field studies. This volume employs the third approach to report on experiments that look at alternatives to the present two round (majority runoff) system used for the election of French presidents. This system is of considerable importance not just because of its use in France but also because of its wide adoption in presidential elections in new democracies, such as Bulgaria, Poland, Romania, Russia and Ukraine. The editors have assembled the top experimental economists and political scientists specializing in French politics to provide in-depth analysis of the double ballot electoral system, and, more broadly, of the effect of electoral rules on the number of candidates, voter strategies, and ideological choice. Ultimately, the editors and contributors argue that experimental methods have great potential to inform our understanding of institutional mechanisms in the context of voting behavior. Editors' Introduction : The Role Of Controlled Experiments In Evaluating Proposed Institutional Reforms / Bernard Dolez, Bernard Grofman, And Annie Laurent -- Election By Majority Judgment : Experimental Evidence / Michel Balinski And Rida Laraki -- French Presidential Election : A Field Experiment On The Single Transferable Vote / Etienne Farvaque, Hubert Jayet, And Lionel Ragot -- Framed-field Experiment On Approval Voting And Evaluation Voting. Some Teachings To Reform The French Presidential Electoral System / Antoinette Baujard And Herrade Igersheim -- Lessons From In Situ Experiments During French Elections / Jean-françois Laslier -- Measuring Duvergerian Effects Of The French Majority Runoff System With Laboratory Experiments : Duverger's Laws Under The Microscope / Bernard Dolez And Annie Laurent -- French Double Ballot Effects : American Experiments / Jill Wittrock And Michael S. Lewis-beck Bernard Dolez, Bernard Grofman, Annie Laurent, Editors. Revised Versions Of Papers Prepared For A Conference Held In Paris, June 15-16, 2009. Includes Bibliographical References (p. 155-161) And Index. Front Matter....Pages i-ix Editors’ Introduction: The Role of Controlled Experiments in Evaluating Proposed Institutional Reforms....Pages 1-11 Election by Majority Judgment: Experimental Evidence....Pages 13-54 French Presidential Election: A Field Experiment on the Single Transferable Vote....Pages 55-68 Framed-field Experiment on Approval Voting and Evaluation Voting. Some Teachings to Reform the French Presidential Electoral System....Pages 69-89 Lessons from In Situ Experiments during French Elections....Pages 91-104 Measuring Duvergerian Effects of the French Majority Runoff System with Laboratory Experiments: Duverger’s Laws Under the Microscope....Pages 105-121 French Double Ballot Effects: American Experiments....Pages 123-141 Back Matter....Pages 143-173