In defense of the human being : foundational questions of an embodied anthropology

With the progress of artificial intelligence, the digitalization of the lifeworld, and the reduction of the mind to neuronal processes, the human being increasingly appears to be just a product of data and algorithms. That is, we conceive ourselves "in the image of our machines", and conversely, we elevate our machines and our brains to new subjects. At the same time, demands for an enhancement of human nature culminate in transhumanist visions of taking human evolution to a new stage. Against this self-reification of the human being, this book defends a humanism of embodiment: our corporeality, vitality, embodied freedom are the foundations of a self-determined existence, which uses these new technologies only as a means, instead of letting them rule us. In Defence of the Human Being offers an array of interventions directed against a reductionist naturalism or transhumanism in various areas of science and society. As alternative it offers an embodied and enactive account of the human person: we are neither pure minds nor brains, but primarily embodied, living beings in relation with others. Fuchs applied this concept to issues such as artificial intelligence, transhumanism and enhancement, virtual reality, neuroscience, embodied freedom, psychiatry, and finally to the accelerating dynamics of current society which lead to an increasing disembodiment of our everyday conduct of life. Cutting across neuroscience, philosophy, and psychiatry, this important new book applies cutting-edge concepts of embodiment and enactivism to the current scientific, technological and cultural tendencies that will crucially influence our society's development in the 21st century. cover 1 In Defense of the Human Being 4 Copyright 5 Contents 8 Abbreviations 12 Introduction: A Humanism of Embodiment 14 Acknowledgments 21 References 21 A. Artificial Intelligence, Transhumanism, Virtuality 24 1 Human and Artificial Intelligence: A Clarification 26 Introduction: The World of Data 26 The Digitization of the World 29 Subjectivity and Its Simulation 33 Persons are Not Programs 37 Programs are Not Persons 41 Robots, Androids, and Artificial Life (AL) 48 Conclusion: Simulation and Original 54 References 58 2 Beyond the Human? A Critique of Transhumanism 62 Introduction: Between Naturalism and Culturalism 62 The Idea of Perfectibility 67 Can Human Nature be Improved? 72 Cognitive Skills 72 Happiness and Morality 74 Aging and Death 77 The Contradictions of Posthumanism 80 Mind Uploading or Transfer of Consciousness 82 Critique of Functionalism 84 Critique of Neuro-​Reductionism 87 Transhumanism as Neo-​Gnosticism 88 Conclusion 89 References 92 3 The Virtual Other: Empathy in the Age of Virtuality 96 Introduction 96 Empathy and Virtual Reality 99 Primary, Implicit, or Intercorporeal Empathy 99 Extended, Explicit or Imaginative Empathy 100 Fictional Empathy 101 Interim Summary 105 Virtualization in the Present 107 Phantomization 107 Disembodied Communication 109 Summary and Conclusion 111 References 114 B. Brain, Person, and Reality 118 4 Person and Brain: Against Cerebrocentrism 120 Introduction 120 Critique of the Cerebral Subject 122 Subjectivity and Intentionality 122 Embodiment 123 Interpersonality 125 Critique of Localizationism 126 Critique of Neuroimaging 127 Holism of Consciousness 128 Personhood as Embodied Subjectivity 129 Brain, Body, and Environment 129 Brain Transplantation 132 Conclusion 133 References 134 5 Embodied Freedom: A Libertarian Position 137 Introduction 137 Can Brains make Decisions? 139 Freedom as a Personal Ability 141 Embodied Freedom 144 External Objections 146 The Compatibilist Counter Position 149 Immanent Objections 151 Conclusion 154 References 155 6 Brain World or Life World? Critique of Neuroconstructivism 157 Introduction 157 Bodily Being-​in-​the-​World: The Coextension of Lived Body and Physical Body 160 The Locus of Pain 164 Conclusion: Life-​World and Neuroscience 166 References 168 7 Perception and Reality: Sketch of an Interactive Realism 170 Introduction 170 Perception as Interaction 172 The Objectifying Power of Perception 175 The Implicit Intersubjectivity of Perception 177 Genesis of Intersubjective Perception 180 Subjectivation of Perception in Schizophrenia 182 Summary 184 References 187 C. Psychiatry and Society 192 8 Psychiatry between Psyche and Brain 194 Introduction 194 Reductionist Assumptions and their Verification 197 Psychiatry as Relational Medicine: An Integrative Concept 201 Conclusion 203 References 205 9 Embodiment and Personal Identity in Dementia 209 Introduction 209 Personal Identity 210 Body Memory 213 Dementia and Personal Identity 216 Dementia as a Loss of Reflexivity and Meta-​Perspective 216 Body Memory in Dementia 218 Relational versus Embodied View of the Person in Dementia 222 Conclusion 225 References 226 10 The Cyclical Time of the Body and the Linear Time of Modernity 230 Introduction 230 The Processes of Life and their Cyclical Time 231 The Cyclical Structure of Body Memory 235 Cyclical and Linear Time 238 Individual and Collective Formation of the Linear Order of Time 239 Conflicts between Cyclical and Linear Orders of Time 241 Conclusion 244 References 245 Text References (English papers) 250 Index 252 With the progress of artificial intelligence (AI), the digitalization of the lifeworld, and the reduction of the mind to neuronal processes, the human being appears more and more as a product of data and algorithms. Thus we conceive ourselves "in the image of our machines" and conversely, we elevate our machines and our brains to new subjects. At the same time, demands for an enhancement of human nature culminate in transhumanist visions of taking human evolution to a new stage. Against this self-reification of the human being, the present book defends a humanism of embodiment: our corporeality, vitality, and embodied freedom are the foundations of a self-determined existence, which uses the new technologies only as means instead of submitting to them. The book offers an array of interventions directed against a reductionist naturalism or transhumanism in various areas of science and society. As an alternative, it offers an embodied and enactive account of the human person: we are neither pure minds nor brains, but primarily embodied, living beings in relation with others. This general concept will be applied to issues such as AI, transhumanism and enhancement, virtual reality, neuroscience, embodied freedom, psychiatry, and finally to the accelerating dynamics of current society which lead to an increasing disembodiment of our everyday conduct of life. The book thus applies cutting-edge concepts of embodiment and enactivism to current scientific, technological, and cultural tendencies that will crucially influence our society's development in the twenty-first century.--Publisher's description