I : the meaning of the first person term

Книга I: The Meaning of the First Person Term I: The Meaning of the First Person Term Книги Психология, философия Автор: Maximilian de Gaynesford Год издания: 2006 Формат: pdf Издат.:Oxford University Press Страниц: 208 Размер: 1,2 ISBN: 0199287821 Язык: Английский0 (голосов: 0) Оценка:I is perhaps the most important and the least understood of our everyday expressions. This is a constant source of philosophical confusion. Max de Gaynesford offers a remedy: he explains what this expression means. He thereby shows the way to an understanding of how we express first-personal thinking. The book thus not only resolves a key issue in philosophy of language, but promises to be of great use to people working on problems in other areas of philosophy. 'i' Is An Essential But Widely Misunderstood Expression. Maximilian De Gaynesford Offers A Philosophical Remedy For The Resulting Confusion. He Explains What This Expression Means, What Its Logical Form And Inferential Role Are, And How It Is Used To Express And Communicate Thoughts. On The Way, He Dissolves Various False Doctrines Supporting The Standard View The 'i' Is Pure Indexical. His Central Claims Are That 'i' Is A Deictic Term, Like The Other Singular Personal Pronouns ('you' And 'he/she'), And That The Key To Understanding Such Terms Lies In Appreciating The Ways Their Reference Depends On Making An Individual Salient. De Gaynesford Addresses Both The Semantic And Epistemological Questions And Shoes How The Interrelate. His Findings About How We Express First-personal Thinking May Be Used To Support Subsequent Investigation Into The Thoughts Thus Expressed. So The Book Not Only Resolves Vital Issues In Philosophy Of Language, But Offers A New Approach To Personal Identity, Self-knowledge, And Other Key Problems In The Philosophy Of Mind.--jacket. Historical Background -- Questions Of Reference -- Questions Of Expression -- Questions Of Logic -- Interim Conclusion -- Logical Character -- Inferential Role -- Referential Function (i) -- Referential Function (ii) -- Expressive Use -- Communicative Role. Maximilian De Gaynesford. Includes Bibliographical References (p. [186]-192) And Index. "'I' is an essential but widely misunderstood expression. Maximilian de Gaynesford offers a philosophical remedy for the resulting confusion. He explains what this expression means, what its logical form and inferential role are, and how it is used to express and communicate thoughts. On the way, he dissolves various false doctrines supporting the standard view the 'I' is pure indexical. His central claims are that 'I' is a deictic term, like the other singular personal pronouns ('you' and 'he/she'), and that the key to understanding such terms lies in appreciating the ways their reference depends on making an individual salient." "De Gaynesford addresses both the semantic and epistemological questions and shoes how the interrelate. His findings about how we express first-personal thinking may be used to support subsequent investigation into the thoughts thus expressed. So the book not only resolves vital issues in philosophy of language, but offers a new approach to personal identity, self-knowledge, and other key problems in the philosophy of mind."--BOOK JACKET I is perhaps the most important and the least understood of our everyday expressions. This is a constant source of philosophical confusion. Max de Gaynesford offers a remedy: he explains what this expression means, its logical form and its inferential role. He thereby shows the way to an understanding of how we express first-personal thinking. He dissolves various myths about how I refers, to the effect that it is a pure indexical. His central claim is that the key to understanding I is that it is the same kind of expression as the other singular personal pronouns, you and he/she: a deictic term, whose reference depends on making an individual salient. He addresses epistemological questions as well as semantic questions, and shows how they interrelate. The book thus not only resolves a key issue in philosophy of language, but promises to be of great use to people working on problems in other areas of philosophy. This text explains what the expression 'I' means, its logical form & its inferential role. It aims to resolve a key issue in philosophy of language thereby shows the way to an understanding of how we express first-personal thinking. It also addresses epistemological questions as well as semantic questions & shows how they interrelate § 1. When we ask about I and the thinking it expresses, we are commonly told that the topic is straightforward: a simple rule gives all that needs to be said, 'I refers to the speaker or writer.