Hume's 'a Treatise Of Human Nature': An Introduction (cambridge Introductions To Key Philosophical Texts)

David Hume's A Treatise of Human Nature (1739-40) presents the most important account of skepticism in the history of modern philosophy. In this lucid and thorough introduction to the work, John P. Wright examines the development of Hume's ideas in the Treatise, their relation to eighteenth-century theories of the imagination and passions, and the reception they received when Hume published the Treatise. He explains Hume's arguments concerning the inability of reason to establish the basic beliefs which underlie science and morals, as well as his arguments showing why we are nevertheless psychologically compelled to accept such beliefs. The book will be a valuable guide for those seeking to understand the nature of modern skepticism and its connection with the founding of the human sciences during the Enlightenment. Half-title 3 Series-Title 4 Title 5 Copyright 6 Dedication 7 Contents 9 Preface 10 Acknowledgments 19 Abbreviations 20 WorKs BY Hume 20 Works By Other Writers 21 Chapter 1 The author and the book 23 1. Reflections on the road from London to Bristol 23 2. Stoic reflections, a “new Scene of Thought” and the “Disease of the Learned” 27 3. Formal education and self-education 32 4. Hume’s early writing 33 5. Bristol and the advice of the physician 37 6 Hume’s “retreat” in France and the writing of the treatise 41 7. Hume in london: revision and publication of books 1 and 2 50 8. Return to Scotland: hutcheson’s criticisms and the revision of book 3 54 9. The ‘failure’ of the treatise and the task of a modern reader 58 Chapter 2 First principles 62 1. Hume’s foundational project: contrast with that of descartes 63 2. Hume’s conception of philosophy and its methods 65 3. The association of ideas 69 4. Causes of association: imagination, brain traces, and the mind/body union 73 5. Perceptions and external objects: hume’s indirect realism 80 6. Impressions and ideas 83 i) Impressions 83 ii) Ideas 86 7. Simplicity and complexity 89 8. Ideas as copies of impressions: the copy principle 90 9. Reason: philosophical relations and separations 96 i) Reasoning and philosophical relations 96 ii) The separability principle: conceptual possibility 97 iii) Separation of perceptions themselves and the solid principle 98 10. Conclusion: imagination and hume’s science of human nature 99 Chapter 3 Causation 101 1. “Of knowledge and probability” 104 i) Knowledge and insight 104 ii) Probability 109 iii) Hume’s notion of reasoning in general 111 2. Preliminary examination of the impression of causation 112 3. The causal maxim and Hume’s rejection of indeterminacy in nature 115 4. The inference from the observed to the unobserved 117 i) ‘Experience’ and the nature of Hume’s problem of induction 119 ii) The inference from the observed to the unobserved is not based on reason 122 iii) Custom and association are the cause of the inference: Hume’s critique of Locke 124 iv) Reasoning about causes 128 5. Belief 129 i) The nature of belief 130 ii) The causes of belief: mental mechanisms 131 iii) The effects of belief 134 6. The subjective origin of the idea of necessary connection 136 i) The impression of necessity 137 ii) Hume’s two definitions of cause: defining causation in terms of regularity of objects or the determination of the mind 140 7. Skepticism concerning causation 142 8. The natural supposition of objective necessity 144 i) Projection 144 ii) The natural supposition of inseparability 146 9. Conclusion: hume’s rejection of occasionalism, and the inadequacy of our ideas 148 Chapter 4 Skepticism 151 1. “Of scepticism with regard to reason” 155 2. “Of scepticism with regard to the senses” 158 i) The roots of skepticism with regard to the senses: “a few . . . experiments” 159 ii) We have no legitimate idea of body 162 iii) Constancy and coherence 164 iv) Imagination as the source of belief in body: coherence and the mental inertia principle 165 v) Imagination as the source of belief in body: coherence and the identity substitution principle 168 vi) The primacy of common sense belief: it is not a “natural belief ” as defined by Kemp Smith 172 vii) The “double existence” view of philosophers, or indirect realism 173 viii) Skepticism concerning the modern philosophy 175 ix) Skepticism and the inevitability of belief in the senses 177 3. Material substance and Aristotelian philosophy 178 4. Personal identity 180 i) Understanding Hume’s Problem 180 ii) The Bundle Theory 182 iii) Explanation of the belief in personal identity 184 iv) Second thoughts: the Appendix 185 5. Conclusion: hume’s escape from total skepticism 188 Chapter 5 Determinism 191 1. Liberty and necessity 192 2. The agent and the spectator points of view 195 3. Necessity in physical objects 199 4. Uniformity in human behavior 201 5. Hume’s answer to the objection that there is irregularity in human action 202 6. The inference of the mind and the necessity of voluntary actions 203 7. The theoretical mistake of those who believe in free will 204 8. Necessity and moral responsibility 208 9. Conclusion 210 Chapter 6 Passions, sympathy, and other minds 212 1. The direct passions: desire, aversion, joy, grief, hope, and fear 213 2. Indirect passions: pride, humility, love, and hatred 215 3. The subject of pride and humility 217 4. The mechanism of the indirect passions 218 5. Qualifications 220 6. Virtue and vice as sources of pride and shame 222 7. Sympathy, and the mind as mirror of other minds 225 8. The mechanism of sympathy 226 9. The nature of sympathy 229 10. Conclusion: sympathy, the passions and the problem of other minds 234 Chapter 7 Motivation: reason and calm passions 238 1. Once again, what Hume means by ‘reason’ 239 2. Reason alone does not provide any motivation to the will 240 3. There is no opposition between reason and passion 242 4. Are there unreasonable desires? 244 5. The non-representative nature of passions and desires 245 6. Calm vs. violent passions 248 7. Strong calm passions and the development of character 250 8. Conclusion: hume’s concept of a calm passion and hutcheson’s “calm desires” 253 Chapter 8 Moral sense, reason, and moral skepticism 257 1. Moral sense in Hutcheson’s philosophy 258 2. Moral judgments are not based on reason 262 3. Mistakes in accompanying beliefs do not make actions moral or immoral 263 4. Against the rationalists: morality is not the discovery of immutable relations 265 5. Matricidal trees and incestuous animals 266 6. Moral value is not discovered a posteriori in objective matters of fact 267 7. The analogy between vice and virtue, and sensible qualities 270 8. Is Hume a moral skeptic? 273 9. The asymmetry between science and morals: facts and values 275 10. Conclusion: "morality . . . regards only human nature & human life” 277 Chapter 9 The foundations of morals 280 1. The controversy which has excited the curiosity of the public 281 2. Hume’s preliminary contrast between natural and artificial virtues 283 3. The origins of the artificial virtue of justice 287 4. Moral obligation to be just: moral judgment and the fixing of moral character 292 5. The revised distinction between natural and artificial virtues 297 6. Refinements of sympathy: arriving at a common moral point of view 300 7. “Virtue in rags” and the judgment of character 302 8. Utility, sympathy, and the fourfold scheme of moral judgment 305 9. Conclusion: hume’s answers to hutcheson and mandeville 308 Bibliography and further reading 311 MODERN EDITIONS OF HUME’S OWN WRITINGS 311 CLASSICAL AND EARLY MODERN BACKGROUND TO HUME’S THOUGHT 312 EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY RESPONSES TO HUME’S TREATISE 315 SELECTED SECONDARY SOURCES 316 JOURNAL ARTICLES AND CONFERENCES ON HUME’S PHILOSOPHY 325 Index 326 0521833760,9780521833769,0521541581,9780521541589 Cambridge University Press "David Hume's Treatise of Human Nature (1739-40) presents the most important account of skepticism in the history of modern philosophy. In this lucid and thorough introduction to the work, John P. Wright examines the development of Hume's ideas in the Treatise, their relation to eighteenth-century theories of the imagination and passions, and the reception they received when Hume published the Treatise. He explains Hume's arguments concerning the inability of reason to establish the basic beliefs which underlie science and morals, as well as his arguments showing why we are nevertheless psychologically compelled to accept such beliefs. The book will be a valuable guide for those seeking to understand the nature of modern skepticism and its connection with the founding of the human sciences during the Enlightenment"--Provided by publisher. "David Hume's Treatise of Human Nature (1739-40) presents the most important account of skepticism in the history of modern philosophy. In this lucid and thorough introduction to the work, John P. Wright examines the development of Hume's ideas in the Treatise, their relation to eighteenth-century theories of the imagination and passions, and the reception they received when Hume published the Treatise. He explains Hume's arguments concerning the inability of reason to establish the basic beliefs which underlie science and morals, as well as his arguments showing why we are nevertheless psychologically compelled to accept such beliefs. The book will be a valuable guide for those seeking to understand the nature of modern skepticism and its connection with the founding of the human sciences during the Enlightenment"-- Résumé de l'éditeur

David Hume's Treatise of Human Nature (1739-40) presents the most important account of skepticism in the history of modern philosophy. In this lucid and thorough introduction to the work, John P. Wright examines the development of Hume's ideas in the Treatise, their relation to eighteenth-century theories of the imagination and passions, and the reception they received when Hume published the Treatise. He explains Hume's arguments concerning the inability of reason to establish the basic beliefs which underlie science and morals, as well as his arguments showing why we are nevertheless psychologically compelled to accept such beliefs. The book will be a valuable guide for those seeking to understand the nature of modern skepticism and its connection with the founding of the human sciences during the Enlightenment.