Humean libertarianism : outline of a revisionist account of the joint problem of free will, determinism and laws of nature

What does it mean for an agent to be free? Is determinism true? What are laws of nature? This book deals with the interconnections between these questions. Backmann argues for the view that libertarianism can be reconciled with determinism. In order to reach this goal, libertarianism – classically defined as an incompatibilist theory of free will – is defined as the thesis that at the time of decision, the agent must be able to choose between alternative courses of action. Backmann claims that this notion of libertarianism can be reconciled with determinism provided that determinism is understood in a Humean fashion, i.e. backed by a Humean theory of laws of nature. The resulting view – Humean Libertarianism – is an intermediate position between classical compatibilism and incompatibilism. CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Introduction 1 Determinism 1.1 Epistemic Determinism 1.2 Logical Determinism 1.3 Ontological Determinism 1.3.1 Determinism in Quantum Theory 1.3.1.1 Copenhagen-like Theories of Quantum Mechanics 1.3.1.2 Bohmian Hidden Variables Theories 2 Necessity and Laws of Nature 2.1 Necessitarianism 2.1.1 Armstrong, Tooley, and Dretske 2.1.2 Bird 2.2 Broadly Humean Accounts 2.2.1 Orthodox Humeanism 2.2.2 Best Systems 3 Libertarianism 3.1 Noncausalism 3.2 Causalism: Agent Causation 3.3 Causalism: Event Causation 4 Objections against Event-causal Libertarianism 4.1 Objections against Alternativism 4.1.1 The Consequence Argument and the Truth of Determinism 4.1.2 Frankfurt-style Cases 4.1.3 Alternative Possibilities and Modern Science 4.1.3.1 Jordan, Penrose, and Hameroff 4.1.3.2 Kane 4.1.3.3 Balaguer 4.2 Objections against Control and a Humean Solution 4.2.1 The Argument from Luck and Selected Responses 4.2.1.1 Kane 4.2.1.2 Mele 4.2.1.3 Balaguer 4.2.2 Libet’s Experiment 4.2.3 Control in Humean Libertarianism 5 Humean Libertarianism: Fortes, Foibles, and Future Follies References