Hope Is Not a Plan: The War in Iraq from Inside the Green Zone (Praeger Security International)

Hope Is Not a Plan takes the reader inside the war in Iraq courtesy of participant-observers brought there to diagnose the insurgency and develop a get-well plan. Focusing on the critical months of late 2004 and early 2005, it looks at a slice of the war not previously examined. This is not the Beltway story, nor the grunt and jarhead story. Rather, the book looks at the process of taking political and military goals and turning them into action. In telling that story, Hope Is Not a Plan helps explain how Iraq got to where it is today. The book compares the reality of what happen in the Green Zone during this period with what history, experience, and doctrine suggest should have happened. Finally, it reflects on what can be learned from the experience. From the outset, the war in Iraq was directed from Washington and executed by troops on the ground. Between Washington and the battlefields was the Green Zone, a four-square-mile enclave that hosted the American Embassy annex, the Iraqi Reconstruction Management Office, the planning, policy, strategy, and communications sections of Headquarters, Multi-national Force-Iraq, and the Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq.

from The Outset, The War In Iraq Was Directed From Washington And Executed By Troops On The Ground. Between Washington And The Battlefields Was The Green Zone, A Four-square-mile Enclave That Hosted The American Embassy Annex, The Iraqi Reconstruction Management Office, The Planning, Policy, Strategy, And Communications Sections Of Headquarters, Multi-national Force-iraq, And The Independent Electoral Commission Of Iraq.

hope Is Not A Plan Takes The Reader Inside The Green Zone Courtesy Of Participant-observers Brought To Iraq To Diagnose The Insurgency And Develop A Get-well Plan. Focusing On The Critical Months Of Late 2004 And Early 2005 --when A New Sovereign Government In Iraq Tried To Build Legitimacy, And The Coalition Force Tried To Find The Best Way To Help It Do So--it Looks At A Slice Of The War Not Previously Examined. This Is Not The Beltway Story, Nor The Grunt And Jarhead Story. Rather, The Book Looks At The Process Of Taking Political And Military Goals And Turning Them Into Action.

in Telling That Story, Hope Is Not A Plan Helps Explain How Iraq Got To Where It Is Today. Organized By Topic Rather Than On A Strict Chronological Basis, It Is Practical, Not Theoretical, Examining Doctrines And Lessons Learned, Not Abstractions Of The Ivory Tower. The Book Describes What Happened In The Green Zone During This Period And Compares That Reality With What History, Experience, And Doctrine Suggests Should Have Happened. Finally, It Reflects On What Can Be Learned From The Experience. Rich In Detail, The Book Is Written To Be Accessible To Anyone Interested In First-hand Information About The Workings Of A Coalition Staff During Wartime--or To Anyone Who Wants To Understand How Things In Iraq Went So Very Wrong.

[t]hese Authors Provide A Sobering Analysis From Their Vantage Point As Military Officers....[t]he Authors Wrote The Book Not Because They Thought That Could Save The Situation In Iraq, But Rather Because They Hoped That Lessons Learned Could Be Applied To Future Post-conflict Situations....[t]he Real Payoff For This Book Is The Systematic Effort To Document The Lack Of Coordination Across Agencies And The Coalition. Of Greatest Concern To The Authors Is The Lack Of An Entity That Can Provide Overall Direction In Situations That Require Military Operations, Political Direction, And Economic Expertise....militaries Know How To Fight And Win Wars. Diplomats Know How To Foster Dialogue. But Who In The United States Has The Proper Training For Post-conflict Reconstruction? The Authors Argue We Better Figure That Out Quickly.

political Science Quarterly

Written entirely by individuals who served between mid-2004 and mid-2005 at Headquarters, Multinational Force--Iraq, in Baghdad's Green Zone, the eight chapters of this volume document the failures of the American occupation of Iraq, summarized by editor Mowle as consisting particularly of "lack of cross-functional strategic planning, insufficient understanding of the situation, and insufficient cross-functional control over command and execution." The text focuses on the period of the existence of the Iraqi Interim Government, from the June 2004 "handover of sovereignty" to the selection of the Iraqi Transitional Government in May 2005 and contains chapters that discuss political failures of planning, occupational authority attempts to develop intelligence, the work of training the Iraqi Security Forces, the role of elections in bringing about a government that occupation forces hoped would be seen as legitimate by Iraqis, and the lack of strategic thinking concerning the opportunities opened up by elections and the new governme 0275994457......Page 1 CONTENTS......Page 8 Foreword......Page 10 Preface......Page 16 Abbreviations......Page 20 1 Introduction: The Green Zone in 2004–05......Page 22 2 Prelude: Strategy, Optimism, and Hard Choices......Page 35 3 Campaign Planning: The Ground Truth......Page 53 4 We Didn’t Know What We Were Getting Into......Page 78 5 Creating the Iraqi Security Forces......Page 91 6 The Primacy of Politics: The First Election......Page 107 7 Strike Two: Bureaucracy Does Its Thing Reprised......Page 128 8 Conclusion: Hoping for a Plan......Page 154 Notes......Page 170 Index......Page 188 About the Editor and Contributors......Page 192 Introduction : the Green Zone in 2004-05 / Thomas S. Mowle Prelude : strategy, optimism, and hard choices / Thomas S. Mowle Campaign planning : the ground truth / Tomislav Z. Ruby We didn't know what we were getting into / Kalev I. Sepp Creating the Iraqi security forces / William C. Thomas The primacy of politics : the first election / Thomas S. Mowle Strike two : Bureaucracy does its thing reprised / Nathan Freier and Donald G. Rose Conclusion : hoping for a plan / Nathan Freier, Tomislav Z. Ruby and Thomas S. Mowle