Hitting America's soft underbelly : the potential threat of deliberate biological attacks against the U.S. agricultural and food industry

Over The Past Decade, The United States Has Endeavored To Increase Its Ability To Detect, Prevent, And Respond To Terrorist Threats And Incidents. The Agriculture Sector And The Food Industry In General, However, Have Received Comparatively Little Attention With Respect To Protection Against Terrorist Incidents. This Study Aims To Expand The Current Debate On Domestic Homeland Security By Assessing The Vulnerabilities Of The Agricultural Sector And The Food Chain To A Deliberate Act Of Biological Terrorism. The Author Presents The Current State Of Research On Threats To Agricultural Livestock And Produce, Outlines The Sector's Importance To The U.s. Economy, Examines The Capabilities That Are Needed To Exploit The Vulnerabilities In The Food Industry, And Explores The Likely Outcomes Of A Successful Attack. The Author Addresses The Question Of Why Terrorists Have Yet To Employ Agricultural Assaults As A Method Of Operation And Offers Proposed Recommendations For The U.s. Policymaking Community. Research Methods -- The Importance Of The Agricultural Sector To The U.s. Economy -- Organization Of This Report -- Concentrated And Intensive Contemporary Farming Practices -- Increased Susceptibility Of Livestock To Disease -- Insufficient Farm/food-related Security And Surveillance -- Inefficient Passive Disease-reporting System -- Inappropriate Veterinarian And Diagnostic Training -- A Focus On Aggregate Rather Than Individual Livestock Statistics -- Capability Requirements For Carrying Out An Agroterrorist Attack -- Economic Disruption -- Loss Of Political Support And Confidence In The Government -- Social Instability -- Agroterrorism To Generate Financial Capital And As A Form Of Blackmail -- Biological Assaults Against Agriculture And Terrorists' Modus Operandi. Peter Chalk. Mg-135. Prepared For The Office Of The Secretary Of Defense. Includes Bibliographical References. "Agriculture and the food industry in general are enormously important to the social, economic, and, arguably, political stability of the United States. Although farming directly employs less than 3 percent of the American population, one in eight people works in an occupation that is directly supported by food production. Agriculture's share of produce sold overseas is more than double that of other U.S. industries, which makes the sector a major component in the U.S. balance of trade. Unfortunately, the agriculture and food industries are vulnerable to deliberate (and accidental) disruption. Critical concerns in this area include: " The concentrated and intensive nature of contemporary U.S. farming practices " The increased susceptibility of livestock to disease " A general lack of farm/food-related security and surveillance " An inefficient, passive disease-reporting system that is further hampered by a lack of trust between regulators and producers " Veterinarian training that tends not to emphasize foreign animal diseases (FADs) or large-scale husbandry" A prevailing focus on aggregate, rather than individual, livestock statistics Although vulnerability does not equate to risk, and there are few recorded instances of terrorists actually using disease against agriculture, a realistic potential for disruption exists. Indeed, what makes the vulnerabilities inherent in agriculture so worrying is that the capability requirements for exploiting those weaknesses are not significant and are certainly less considerable than those needed for a human directed bio-attack. Several factors account for this situation. First, there is a large menu of agents from which to choose, with no less than 15 "List A" pathogens identified by the Office International des Epizooties (OIE) as having the potential to severely effect agricultural populations and/or trade."--Abstract from DTIC web site Preface......Page 4 Contents......Page 6 Tables......Page 8 Summary......Page 10 Acknowledgments......Page 16 Acronyms......Page 18 CHAPTER ONE Introduction......Page 20 Research Methods......Page 21 The Importance of the Agricultural Sector to the U.S. Economy......Page 23 Organization of This Report......Page 24 Concentrated and Intensive Contemporary Farming Practices......Page 26 Increased Susceptibility of Livestock to Disease......Page 28 Insufficient Farm/Food-Related Security and Surveillance......Page 29 Inefficient Passive Disease-Reporting System......Page 30 A Focus on Aggregate Rather Than Individual Livestock Statistics......Page 32 Capability Requirements for Carrying Out an Agroterrorist Attack......Page 33 Economic Disruption......Page 38 Loss of Political Support and Confidence in the Government......Page 41 Social Instability......Page 44 Agroterrorism to Generate Financial Capital and as a Form of Blackmail......Page 46 Biological Assaults Against Agriculture and Terrorists’ Modus Operandi......Page 47 CHAPTER FOUR Policy Recommendations......Page 52 Bibliography......Page 62