Himalayan Blunder: The Angry Truth About India's Most Crushing Military Disaster

I HAVE HAD occasion to read a number of books and other material on the Indian military debacle of October-November 1962 when the Chinese inflicted a humiliating reverse on our armed forces in NEFA and along the Himalayan border. These contributions have come from various sources, from soldiers, some of whom have participated in the fighting in various capacities, from bureaucrats, military correspondents, journalists and commentators. Brigadier John Dalvi's account not only of the disastrous thirty days conflict but of the policies and attitudes of mind which led to it, as also of the lessons to be drawn from that tragic confrontation gives this book an unusual dimension. The author had the advantage of being a participant in the fighting when on the morning of 20th October 1962 massed Chinese artillery opened up a heavy concentration on the weak Indian garrison in a narrow sector of the Namka Chu valley of Kameng Frontier Division in the North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA). Dalvi was taken prisoner and held in captivity for seven months during which as he writes poignantly, "a wave of bitter shame" for this country overwhelmed him. This book is partly the result of those seven months of brooding and thinking. It is remarkable not only for its sensitive writing but for its thinking in depth. No soldier who passed through that searing experience, however generous his nature, could be impervious to a deep embitterment of spirit and feeling. It is to Dalvi's credit that he does not allow this embitterment to cloud his judgement and thought. He does not, however, spare those whom he believes were the guilty men. But neither his assessment of them nor his conclusions have the enveloping sweep of a flat vindictive indictment. Dalvi had evidently thought deeply over the military dangers inherent in the political policies of our omniscient know-alls in New Delhi long before the confrontation came. There is a dramatic but impressive picture of General Lentaigne, then commandant of the Defence Services Staff College in Wellington, boldly challenging a very senior official of the External Affairs Ministry who had given a talk on Sino-Tibetan relations justifying the policy of China's subjugation of Tibet. Lentaigne warned the complacent speaker -this was early in 1951 -of the military threat to India by the Chinese presence in Tibet. Lentaigne, of course, was ignored, as were some others, by the all-seeing Pooh Bahs of New Delhi. Retribution came eleven years later. It is the great merit of Dalvi's book that while he evidently has sufficient dynamite to blow some political and military reputations sky-high, he refrains from doing so merely for the heck of doing so. None-the-less his book throws new light on certain decisive periods notably on the vague borderland of September-October 1962. His objects and objectives are not so much concerned with the past as with the future. Major mistakes, like minor diseases, are often preventible. If so, why are they not prevented ? This is the question which Dalvi poses and asks. He is deeply concerned that these mistakes, exposed and analysed, should not be repeated, for it is obvious that he realises the basic reason why history repeats itself. History repeats itself because men repeat their mistakes. I confess that I have never read an account of those tragic thirty days that has so stirred me cerebrally or moved me so emotionally. I think it is because Dalvi's writing is an exercise in restraint, in the way he unfolds the evidence not merely to establish his case, but, going further, to suggest ways and means of improving our apparatus for the higher direction of war. What is the use of the past if it has no lessons for the future? Experience, as Oscar Wilde observed, is the name men give to their mistakes. Wise men and wise nations profit by their mistakes. Humility is the beginning of wisdom for progress starts with the thought that perhaps one might oneself be mistaken. I like Dalvi's courage, his conviction, his deep understanding of what he is writing about, his openness of mind. That is why I would do more than recommend this book. I would implore every Indian capable of arriving at an independent decision, to read it. ## FRANK MORAES New Delhi, 25th March, 1969. dedication sustained me in those harrowing days. This book is the fulfilment of my promises to my friends, in all walks of life, to vindicate the reputation of the men I had the honour to command. I hope that I shall have discharged my responsibility to all those who gave their lives in the line of duty and whose sacrifice deserves a permanent, printed memorial. 61, St. Patrick's Town, Sholapur Road, Poona-1 1st March 1969. her with the Motherland. On 4th August 1950, General Lio Po-Chang said, "The Army must launch an attack on Tibet ... to enable the Tibetan peoples to return to the great family of the Chinese Peoples Republic, while consolidating the defence of South-West China". A word about Sino-Tibetan relations in the 20th Century would be useful to clarify the background to our doubts and hesitancy in dealing with the Chinese annexation of Tibet. In 1904, the British Indian Government of Lord Curzon organised a military expedition, under Colonel Younghusband, against Tibet, with the aim of "forestalling any likely collusion between the Dalai Lama and Russian agents". It will be recalled that Czarist Russia was the bogey-man of the early part of the 20th Century. Younghusband successfully reached Lhasa, and the Dalai Lama was forced to agree to terms. The resultant Anglo-Tibetan Treaty of 1904 secured Britain certain trading rights, and a guarantee against concessions to foreign Powers. The British thereafter had a direct influence over the foreign policy of Tibet. This was a thinly-disguised arrangement to create and maintain a buffer zone to protect the northern borders of British India. The Treaty was confirmed by the Anglo-Chinese Treaty of 1906. Lord Curzon urged the British Government to secure de-jure international recognition of Tibet as a sovereign state, but he was overruled by the Home Government as the rather vague concept of Chinese suzerainty was considered to be a harmless fiction. Britain was then at the zenith of her world power and China was weak and dominated by various European Powers. There was little point in making an issue of a trifling matter with a harmless neighbour. Chinese suzerainty over Tibet was always nebulous and nominal. Tibet had been independent for long periods up to the 18th Century. In 1720 Chinese Forces entered Tibet "to forestall a suspected Tibetan-Mongol alliance against China". They occupied Lhasa and two Chinese Ambans, or Residents, were introduced. In 1792, Emperor Chien Lung exacted a formal recognition of Chinese suzerainty and the administration of Tibet was brought more under the control of the Ambans. During the latter half of the 19th Century Chinese control weakened. The Tibetans chose a Dalai Lama without informing China, as they were required to do. The Chinese had little option but to condone the irregularity, as they were too weak to enforce their agreement by force of arms. The Chinese Imperial Government of the Manchus tried to exercise greater control over Tibet and in 1910 they invaded Tibet forcing the Dalai Lama to flee to India. He was deposed by an Imperial decree. After the overthrow of the Manchu Dynasty by the Chinese Revolution of 1911, the authority of China as the suzerain Power was speedily challenged and overthrown. The Dalai Lama was restored to power, returned to Lhasa in 1912, and drove out the Chinese garrisons. The Chinese Government tried to recapture Tibet but were prevented from doing so by the British Government. This time the British Government claimed that any attempt to capture Tibet would be a violation of the Anglo-Chinese Treaty of 1906. While Chinese suzerainty was not disputed, "the British Government could not consent to the forcible assertion of full sovereignty over a state which had established independent treaty relations with the British Government". In 1913 the Tibetans proclaimed their independence. In the same year the British Government held a Tripartite Conference of Tibet, China and Britain, in Simla (India). The Conference concluded its deliberations by April 1914. Briefly, the main provisions which concern our study, were that Tibet was divided into two regions, i.e. Inner and Outer Tibet. China agreed to abstain from all interference in the administration of Outer Tibet, which was to be fully autonomous. A Chinese Resident was to be re-established. China agreed not to convert Tibet into a Chinese Province or send troops to Outer Tibet. Agreement was also reached on the boundary between India and Tibet, from Bhutan eastwards to Burma, which was then under the British Indian Government. This boundary later became known as the McMahon Line, which has figured so largely in the recent Sino-Indian dispute. The question of Chinese "suzerainty" was settled bilaterally between the Governments of Tibet and British India. Mr. Hugh Richardson, CIE, OBE, former Officer-in-Charge of the Indian Mission in Lhasa, has made this authoritative statement in a letter entitled "The Myth of 'Suzerainty'" : "A term that was bandied about in the past and a little today is 'suzerainty'. We hear that somehow or other Tibet has always been under the suzerainty of China and that various Governments, our own and the Indian Government, have recognised that. The facts are quite the opposite. In 1914 by the Simla Convention, the British Government signed a declaration directly with Tibet by which it undertook not to recognise the suzerainty of China over Tibet unless the Chinese gave a substantial quid pro quo by admitting the autonomy of Tibet and fixing a frontier. The quid pro quo was never given and consequently to this day, or rather till we handed over our responsibility in 1947 to the Indian Government, the British Government did not recognise the suzerainty of China over Tibet. I am aware that certain Ministers of the Crown have made statements that might give you another impression. But whatever a Minister may say in Parliament cannot affect the terms of a mutually signed declaration with another Government". China did not ratify the Simla Agreement on the grounds that they could not accept the proposed boundaries between Inner and Outer Tibet. The British and the Tibetans went ahead and signed a Convention almost identical to that agreed at Simla. Now the Chinese claim that they have never accepted the McMahon Line because they were not signatories to the Simla Convention. After the Simla Convention Tibet remained in effect independent. In 1921 the British Government informed China that they did not feel justified in withholding any longer recognition of the status of Tibet as an autonomous State, under the suzerainty of China, and intended to deal on this basis with Tibet in future. China was too weak to challenge this position. During World War II Tibet opened its own Foreign Affairs Bureau. She did not join China which was directly involved in the war. Tibet claimed neutrality and resisted Chinese pressure for opening up communications through Tibet. If Tibet had been under China, she could not have been neutral or denied facilities to the Central authority. In 1947, a Tibetan trade mission travelled abroad on Tibetan and not Chinese passports. Tibet was thus never a full-fledged Chinese province. Chinese suzerainty was nominal and was challenged by the Tibetans whenever they were strong, or the Central Chinese Government was weak. China never had any direct control over Tibet except by conquest. Except for two short periods of direct Chinese rule, Tibet had been independent for years. British officials who ought to know, have proclaimed Tibet's independence. The last British officer in Lhasa, Mr. H. Richardson has said, "There was not a trace of Chinese authority in Tibet after 1912". Mr. Jayaprakash Narayan, the revered, revolutionary leader of the 1942 freedom movement, cited the historical record in 1959. He said, "China has On the political side, the Chinese took hundreds of young, bright Tibetans, many of the serf class, for higher education and indoctrination, to Mainland China. They returned to occupy key positions in the local administration. I met one of these officials during my imprisonment, and he was more rabidly anti-feudal than the Chinese themselves. These young men were ideal for China's long-term purposes, as their families had suffered for generations at the hands of rapacious landlords and monks. During this period China did not want to agitate the Indo-Tibetan border areas, as they needed time, and India's help. Besides, they were fully occupied by the Korean War between 1950 and 1953; and later in helping the Viet-Minh in the latter's war with the French in Indo-China between 1953 and 1954. China talked of eternal peace and friendship between India and China. The era of "Hindi-Chini bhai bhai" (Brotherliness), cultural delegations, missions and mutual visits was thus born. China's early restraint and outward manifestations of peaceful behaviour paid them handsome dividends. The Indo-Tibetan crisis of 1950 was dismissed. We announced our firm resolve to remove India's woeful poverty and accorded priority to development. The First Five-Year Plan was launched with great elan and hopes. Mild doses of socialism were prescribed in a basically capitalist economy mainly to silence the Communists and the Left Socialists, and to isolate them from the restive masses. Soon after Independence the Congress Socialists had left the parent organisation, and some of the best brains of the Congress severed their long connection with the giant political Party. India had also received a shock by the agrarian revolt in Warangal and Telengana (South India) where the peasantry rose against the Government. This was a dangerous portent for a Government ostensibly wedded to progress by democratic methods. In the prevailing atmosphere of cordiality and peace, China and India signed the Sino-Indian Agreement on Trade and Intercourse between the Tibetan Region of China and India on 29th April 1954. The preamble to this Agreement enunciated the now infamous "Panch Sheel" or Five Principles to govern relations between the two countries. These were: Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty. Mutual non-aggression. Mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs. Equal and mutual benefit. Peaceful co-existence. China was the main beneficiary of this Agreement. India had formally recognised China's complete control over Tibet. We had written off Tibet in return for Chinese guarantees of good behaviour, as embodied in the Five Principles. We sought security by a written treaty, and believed that we were guaranteed against an invasion. We failed to demand any reciprocal benefit, especially in insisting on a final border agreement, which at that time was the only possible source of friction. We voluntarily gave up the military, communication and postal rights in Tibet which we had inherited from the British as a result of the Anglo-Tibetan Treaty of 1904, and agreed to withdraw completely, within six months, the military detachments stationed at Yatung and Gyantse; we offered to hand over to China, the postal and telegraph services together with their equipment. Defending the Agreement Mr. Nehru said, "It was recognition of the existing situation there. Historical and practical considerations necessitated the step". This was the only approach of a man who desired peace and who wanted to avoid conflict. He hoped to cement China's friendship and thought that he could solve any differences that may arise, peacefully. Illogically, he did not keep his powder dry and completely ignored the military problems posed by our northern Himalayan Border. The slogan coined was "There will be no war with China in Mr. Nehru's life-time". This was the guide-line for Government, the Civil Service, the Financial experts, the Services, the Press and the Public. It also became the corner-stone of our National Aims and National Policy. This approach dominated our actions during the next eight years and was responsible for Mr. Nehru's anguished cry of having been stabbed in the back. Mr. Nehru introduced Mr. Chou-en Lai to the Afro-Asian world at Bandung in 1955. We continued to champion China's cause in the U.N. and advocated her admission to the world body. The era of Indo-China friendship and brotherhood had begun to gather momentum. This facade of friendship suited China as this gave her more time to build up her economy and military strength. India was then an honoured and influential member of the world community, the moral leader of the newly independent nations, and thus a powerful advocate of China's cause. China sedulously propounded the theory that China and India had never been at war, and had no cause in the future to resort to arms. This period closed with some faint warning murmurs, which might have been heeded, but were not. In August 1954 the Chinese created a border incident at a place called Bara-Hoti on the Uttar Pradesh-Tibet Border, when the ink had hardly dried on Panch Sheel. The Chinese claimed that Bara-Hoti (called Wuje by them) was Chinese territory. In Bandung Mr. Chou-en Lai said, "We have not yet fixed our border line with some countries". We were again warned, but not alerted. Mr. Nehru visited China in 1954 and was given a royal reception, returning charmed and impressed. He thought that China's leaders did not want war. In a lesser being it might have been alleged that he was brainwashed. Let us see what the views of the Army General Staff were, as the Chinese threat was a matter of concern to any live and alert Army. What action did the Army take to assess the potential Chinese threat and what was done to project the General Staff appreciation to the Government? In 1952 General Kulwant Singh, a very able and distinguished field commander, who had exercised high command in Kashmir in 1947-48, headed a committee to study the military threat to our Northern borders, and to assess the requirements in the event of a clash with China in the Himalayan region. He submitted a lengthy and comprehensive report. Unfortunately, like many other reports to Government, it was shelved. All that emerged was the raising of a small Indo-Tibetan Border Force, under the Home Ministry, mainly to establish our administration in a few selected places. Militarily the Force was useless and ineffective. The Kulwant Singh report gave Government an opportunity to consider the purely military aspects, and the counter-measures required to challenge the Chinese in the Himalayas if ever this unpleasant situation arose. Government's orders were clear. It was decided at the highest level, presumably the Cabinet, that no military preparations against China were necessary, and there was little the Army could do in the face of this direct and unequivocal order. It was clear even before the 1954 Agreement, that we would not attempt to challenge the Chinese militarily. So, literally nothing was done about our Northern Defences. We built no roads; we did not strengthen our intelligence arrangements (assuming we had any) and did not even carry out any reconnaissance of likely trouble spots in our own areas. We did not carry out staff studies for the reorganisation of our field formations. We did not study the pattern of weapons and communications equipments that we may require. Army Schools of Instruction were orientated towards open warfare. There was little emphasis on mountain warfare despite the Army's deployment in Kashmir from 1947. Up to 1954 China was not allowed to figure in the thinking at Army HQ, Pakistan then posed the main threat. For historical and religious reasons, Pakistan and India were natural enemies and only statesmanship of the highest order could avert war. The two nations were carved out of the great Indian Peninsula, Partition being based on religious majority. Partition and Independence in 1947 were preceded by mass killings, riots and atrocities that made every decent Pakistani and Indian hang his head in shame. The aftermath of Partition was even worse, when we witnessed the wholesale murders of the Punjab and the reprisals in Bihar and elsewhere. The hatred and revengeful feelings of 1947 have yet to be removed. Time has not healed the scars of mutual distrust and loss of property. Hardly had sanity returned when Pakistan unleashed her tribals against Kashmir in October 1947. The Indian Army rushed to the rescue of the Kashmiris who had belatedly acceded to India under the Instrument of Accession that governed the political relations and future of the erstwhile Indian States. Soon the Regular Pakistan Army was thrown in, and in less than a year after Partition, Pakistan and India were at war. When the tide had turned in India's favour and the military situation could have enabled us to achieve a battlefield decision, Mr. Nehru decided to refer the issue to the U.N. and a cease-fire was accepted on 1st January 1949, leaving one-third of Kashmir under Pakistan's control. The so-called Kashmir deadlock remains unsolved despite interminable talks, U.N. debates and the intervention of U.N. mediators. History will demand an answer to the question as to why a cease-fire was sought by us when the involvement of Pakistan was not even proved. We have saddled ourselves with a problem that has bedevilled relations between India and Pakistan for two decades. Only a computer can assess the cost in terms of money, loss of life, alienation of other countries and the resultant hardships to the Indian people. The manning of the Cease-Fire Line costs money and ties down troops. The recurring border incidents vitiate the atmosphere between the two countries. The Kashmir War was a strange war. The two sides were led by British Commanders-in-Chief, General Boucher of the Indian Army and General Gracey of the Pakistan Army. They had access to each other and were reported to have held talks every evening to discuss the day's events. Partition left many problems in its wake, viz. the demarcation of the boundaries between the two countries; division of assets; the canal waters dispute; religious minorities on the wrong side of the border and many others. Any of these could cause a major military clash. In 1951 the armies of the two countries faced each other across the border in the Punjab, but fortunately wisdom prevailed and war was averted. The confrontation of 1951 taught the Pakistan Government a major lesson. They knew that they had to do something urgently to achieve near military parity with India. As they saw it, they had to free themselves from the constant threat and intimidatory tactics of India. They also foresaw an inevitable clash of arms with India over Kashmir or any of the other outstanding issues. The Kashmir issue was crystallising into a set pattern, with India refusing to budge from her position that there was nothing to discuss. Only victory in war would give Pakistan what she considered her dues and rights. In 1953 Pakistan signed a Mutual-Aid Treaty with the U.S.A., and joined the US-sponsored security pacts of CENTO and SEATO. They traded bases in Pakistan for massive military aid and were fully in the Western camp. This was a dangerous portent for India. On 13th November Mr. Nehru issued a clear warning that India would regard U.S. Military Aid to Pakistan as an unfriendly act. He also denounced the pact in Parliament as endangering peace and tending towards colonialism. In January 1954 he thought, "it will certainly bring world war nearer in the matter of time as also nearer India's frontier". Mr. John Foster Dulles, the U.S. Secretary of State, was not impressed with Nehru's verbal views and proceeded to do what he thought was best for his country. Mr. Dulles was the prime architect of the theory of containing Communism by building a ring of collective security pacts. Pakistan on the southern boundaries of Russia was an invaluable base. It is now known that American U-2 spy aeroplanes have operated from Peshawar airfield in Pakistan. We were satisfied, after indulging in another futile gesture of recording our displeasure. Mr. Eisenhower, the U.S. President, is reported to have offered India similar aid but without strings. Mr. Nehru disdainfully declined the offer. We were a peace-loving country and did not wish to align ourselves with any Power. We also had to give the impression of being self-reliant and independent. 1954 was a critical year for India. American Aid in the form of money, construction of military accommodation, Patton Tanks, F-86 fighter aircraft, radar equipment, medium and heavy artillery guns and the latest family of infantry weapons flowed to rejuvenate Pakistan's World War II type Army. Pakistan was gifted sufficient military hardware to raise a modern, powerful strike force to threaten the security of the Punjab and even Delhi itself. In any case, India could no longer conquer Pakistan, and there would be no more one-sided military confrontations. Politically Kashmir could no longer be solved in the U.N. as the Western Powers would have to side with their new ally, Pakistan. This was a possibility that was not foreseen by us. We did not evaluate the long-term implications of this, and continued to rely on Western impartiality and U.N. fairplay. The exaggerated international respect paid to India and her nonaligned policy gave us the totally erroneous impression that we could count on being free of power-politics. Himalayan Blunder: The Angry Truth About Indias Most Crushing Military Disaster is Brigadier J. P. Dalvis retelling of the Sino-Indian war that took place in 1962 - a war that India lost. Dalvi fought the war as the Commander of the 7th Infantry Brigade in NEFA (North-East Frontier Agency). His account of the war is graphic and telling. He was captured by the Chinese forces and held for seven months. As a participant of the war, he was privy to all that went on at the battlefield as well as behind the scenes. Based on his firsthand experiences, he recounts the events that occurred between September 8, 1962 and October 20, 1962. As early as 1951, China silently and steadily began to work its way onto Indian soil. Even in the face of indisputable evidence, India insisted on maintaining cordial relations with the Chinese. China seemed only too happy to play along. Dalvi narrates the manner in which Indias own political leadership traitorously worked against its cause. In no uncertain terms, he holds three men responsible for Indias defeat - Jawaharlal Nehru, Krishna Menon, and General Brij Mohan Kaul. Issuing orders from Delhi, they seemed to be clueless about the situation on the battlefield. Undoubtedly, when they were rushed into battle, the Indian soldiers - underfed, ill-equipped, and unprepared as they were - never stood a chance against the powerful Chinese army. Regardless of that, the soldiers fought bravely and laid down their lives for their homeland. Dalvi claims that the apathy and the sheer ineptitude of those at the helm of Indias political affairs sacrificed hundreds of valuable lives. Brigadier Dalvis detailed narrative of the massacre of the Indian soldiers, a horror that he witnessed firsthand, is heart-rending. The book was published in 1969. Among all the books based on the subject of the 1962 Sino-Indian war, this book is considered to be one the most striking and authentic versions. Due to its sensitive subject matter and its portrayal of Indias leaders in a harshly negative light, the book was banned by the Indian Government upon its release. The Indian Military Setback Against The Chinese Attack In 1962 Called For An Honest Critique. Quite A Few Books Written By Army Officers Have Tried To Tell Their Version Of The Untold Story. Quite A Few Books Written By Army Officers Have Tried To Tell Their Version Of The Untold Story. Dalvi's Account Of The Sino-indian War Is By Far The Most Remarkable And Authentic. He Was Presenting The Theatre Of War Throughout, Commanding A Brigade And Was Held Captive By The Chinese For Seven Months. In Discussing The Day-to-day Events From 8 September To 20 October 1962, The Author Graphically Tells The Truth Which Only A Participant Could Experience And Know. The Background Of The War Is Drawn From His First-hand Information As A High-ranking Military Commander. The Indian Military Setback Against The Chinese Attack In 1962 Was High Time For An Honest Soul-searching. Quite A Few Books Written By Army Officers Have Tried To Tell Their Version Of The Untold Story. Brig. Dalvi's Account Of The Sino-indian War Is By Far The Most Remarkable And Authentic. He Was Present In The Theatre Of War Throughout, Commanded A Brigade And Was Held Captive By The Chinese For Seven Months. In Discussing The Day-to-day Events From 8 September To 20 October 1962 The Author Graphically Tells The Truth Which Only An Actual Participant Could Experience And Know. The Background Of The War Is Drawn From His First-hand Information As A High-ranking Commander. Cover Title Page Copyright Dedication Acknowledgements Contents Foreword Preface Part I Chapter I Chapter II Chapter III Chapter IV Chapter V Chapter VI Part II Chapter VII Chapter VIII Part III Chapter IX Chapter X Chapter XI Chapter XII Part IV Chapter XIII Chapter XIV Chapter XV Part V Chapter XVI Chapter XVII Chapter XVIII Chapter XIX Chapter XX Chapter XXI Chapter XXII Chapter XXIII Chapter XXIV Chapter XXV Part VI Chapter XXVI Chapter XXVII Epilogue Appendix I Appendix II Sketch I Sketch II Sketch III The Indian military setback against the Chinese attack in 1962 was high time for an honest soul-searching. In discussing the day-to-day events from September 8 to October 20, 1962, the author graphically tells the truth which only an actual participant could experience and know. The background of the war is drawn from his first-hand information as a high ranking military commander. US Army War College Reading List 2012