High Command: British Military Leadership in the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars

From 2001, Britain supported the United States in wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. "Victory" in such conflicts is always hard to gauge and domestic political backing for them was never robust. For this, the governments of Tony Blair and Gordon Brown were held responsible, and paid the price, but the role played by the High Command in the Ministry of Defence also bears examination. Critics have noted that the armed services were riven by internal rivalry and their leadership was dysfunctional, but the truth is more complicated. In his book, General Elliott explores the circumstances that led to these wars and how the Ministry of Defence coped with the challenges presented. He reveals how the Service Chiefs were set at odds by the system, almost as rivals in the making, with responsibility diffuse and authority ambiguous. The MoD concentrated on making things work, rather than questioning whether what they were being asked to do was practicable. Often the opinion of a junior tactical commander led the entire strategy of the MoD, not the other way around, as it should have been. While Britain's senior officers, defense ministers and civil servants were undeniably competent and well intentioned, the conundrum remains why success on the battlefield proved so elusive. Cover 1 Half-title 3 Title 5 Copyright 6 Dedication 7 Contents 11 Foreword 15 Maps 16 1. Prologue 19 PART 1: WHAT HAPPENED 29 2. A Case to Answer? 31 3. Jumping to the Conclusion 41 Deciphering the Code 42 Armed Forces are Different 46 Some Wars are Different 47 Warfare in a State of Evolution 48 Soldiers Will Die and They Will Cause Death 50 4. Inside the Ministry of Defence 53 A Walk through the MoD 53 Seeing One of the Chiefs 55 The Motivations of the Actors 56 Other Influences 58 5. The Tribes and The System 61 Defence Politicians 61 Civil Servants in the MoD 64 The First and Second Permanent Secretaries 71 The Military in the MoD 72 Different World Views 79 The Royal Navy 79 The British Army 83 The Royal Air Force 86 Officers are Similar but Different 90 Officers Behaving Badly 92 The Culture of the MoD 95 Did it Matter? 99 6. Setting the Conditions for Success and Failure 103 The Weinberger Doctrine 103 The Powell Doctrine 105 No Useable Doctrine 106 Blair’s Doctrine 107 Problems for the Military 110 What did the Changes Mean for the UK? 111 7. A Long Peace is Shattered 113 The Twin Towers 114 8. War Comes to Afghanistan in 2001 117 Hunting al-Qaida 117 ISAF 118 A Limited Success 119 9. The War on Terror Opens in Iraq in 2003 121 Aftermath of the Invasion 123 Hard Fighting 128 Operation Salamanca/Sinbad and The Deal 134 Out of Step 140 10. Battle Returns to Afghanistan in 2006 147 NATO Expands its Role 147 Unified Command 148 Helmand 150 The Taliban Attack 151 Why Helmand? 154 11. Emerging Criticism and Flawed Strategies 161 A Capable Army 161 Someone Was to Blame 162 Strategy 165 Good Strategy 169 Contradictions in UK Strategies 172 How were these Strategic Inconsistencies Left Unchecked? 179 PART 2: WHY IT HAPPENED 183 12. Making Military Decisions 185 Sorting Out the Levels of Decision-making 185 The Defence Crisis Management Organisation (DCMO) 186 High-level Decision-making in Main Building 188 The Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) 193 Orphaned Commanders 197 13. The Chiefs 203 The Development of the Chiefs of Staff System 203 Selection of a Service Chief 208 Military Chiefs in a Political World 210 Selection of the Chief of the Defence Staff 213 The Chief of the Defence Staff 214 Preparation for the Top Job 218 The Chiefs of the Defence Staff in Action 220 The Chief of the Defence Staff as the War Commander 223 Conclusion 229 Part 3: WHAT NEXT? 231 14. The Aftermath 233 Why Did it Go Wrong? 233 How Things Could Improve 240 Who is to be in Charge and How should Decisions be Taken? 246 Choosing and Training the Chief 250 15. Fit for the Future? 253 Annex 1. Events and Principal UK Defence Personalities 259 Annex 2. Principal UK Field Commanders 263 Annex 3. Summary of Eight Contradictions in UK Strategy 267 Annex 4. List of Titles, Acronyms and Ranks 269 Notes 273 Bibliography 305 Index 309 Explores the circumstances that led to Britain's support of the United States in wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and how the Ministry of Defence coped with challenges including rivalry and diffuse responsibility among the Service Chiefs, lack of clear strategy, and weak domestic political support