Helmholtz, Cohen, and Frege on Progress and Fidelity : Sinning Against Science and Religion

This book examines the views of Hermann Helmholtz, Hermann Cohen and Gottlob Frege in reaction to the epistemic crises induced by rapid changes in 19th century scientific practice. Besides addressing longstanding interpretive puzzles of interest to Frege scholars, the book extracts precepts for rationally responding to paradigm shifts in scientific and religious traditions. Cohen's work in particular is held up as an example of wisely navigating epistemic and hermeneutical crises in science and religion. The book will appeal to philosophers and historians of science or religion, especially to those concerned with the epistemic challenges posed by Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions . Acknowledgements Contents Chapter 1: Introduction References Chapter 2: An Ambiguous Reading of Kant’s Epistemology 2.1 Concepts, Intuitions, and a Cognitive Synthesis 2.1.1 The Three Necessary Features of a Cognitive Synthesis 2.1.2 So What Are Kantian Concepts and Intuitions? 2.1.2.1 Concepts Qua Pure Spontaneous Productions Are Empty Conceptual Forms 2.1.2.2 The Characteristics of a Proper Kantian Concept 2.1.2.3 Blind Intuitions 2.1.2.4 Proper Kantian Intuitions 2.1.2.5 Pure (Non-empirical) Intuitions Summarizing Kant’s C&I Distinction 2.2 Deploying the Distinction Between Concepts and Intuitions 2.2.1 Lockean Enthusiasm and Illicit Appeals to Abstraction 2.2.2 The Rationalist’s Fallacy: Logical Consistency Implies Truth and Existence 2.3 Kant’s Philosophy of Mathematics: The Good, the Bad, and the Notoriously Obscure References Chapter 3: Disambiguating Kant for the Sake of Science 3.1 Helmholtz’s Naturalized Kantianism 3.1.1 The Argument from Analytic Geometry: Euclidean Axioms Are not Necessities of Thought 3.1.2 The Argument from the Science of Perception: Euclidean Axioms Are not Necessities of Intuition 3.1.3 Helmholtz’ Thought Experiments: Euclidean Axioms Are Contingent Truths 3.1.4 Summarizing Helmholtzian Neo-Kantianism 3.2 Cohen’s Contra-Helmholtz Kantianism 3.2.1 The Transcendental Method, Kant’s ‘A Priori’ and the Copernican Turn 3.2.2 Helmholtz Is Wrong: The Euclidean Axioms Are Synthetic A Priori 3.2.3 Summarizing Cohen’s Kant: What Is Retained, Tossed and Modified? References Chapter 4: Disambiguating Frege for the Sake of Charity 4.1 What Frege Meant by ‘Kant Is Right About Geometry’ 4.1.1 Intuitions as Subjective Ideas 4.1.2 Intuition as the Source of Geometric Knowledge 4.2 Frege’s Kantianism vis-à-vis Helmholtz and Cohen 4.3 Deploying the Distinction Between Concepts and Objects 4.3.1 Fregean Concepts and Objects – What Are they? 4.3.2 Frege’s C&O Distinction Deployed 4.3.3 Fallacy of Creative Abstraction 4.3.4 The formalist’s Fallacy: Logical Consistency Implies Existence References Chapter 5: Some Sanctifying Precepts for Science and Religion 5.1 Redeeming the Concept of Scientific Progress 5.1.1 Van Fraassen and Friedman on the Kuhnian Problem 5.1.2 Van Fraassen’s Solution 5.1.3 Friedman’s Solution 5.1.4 Tactical Rules for Reasonably Resolving Epistemic Crises 5.2 Abrahamic Traditions and Accumulating Knowledge 5.2.1 The Crisis Confronting Cohen’s Religious Community 5.2.2 Cohen’s Response to the Crisis 5.2.3 More Rules for Resolving Epistemic Crises 5.3 Test Case – A Christian Community in Crisis 5.3.1 Traditional Methodist Marriage and the Call for Change 5.3.2 Merrick’s Proposal—A Critical Idealist, Midrashic Reading of Wesleyan-Augustinian Marriage 5.4 Conclusion References Conclusion Bibliography