Heidegger and the measure of truth : themes from his early philosophy

"Denis McManus presents a new interpretation of Heideggers early vision of our subjectivity and of the world we inhabit. Heideggers fundamental ontology allows us to understand the creature that thinks as also one which acts, moves, even touches the world around it, a creature at home in the same ordinary world in which we too live our lives when outside of the philosophical closet; it also promises to free us from seemingly intractable philosophical problems, such as scepticism about the external world and other minds. But many of the concepts central to that vision are elusive; and some of the most widely accepted interpretations of Heideggers vision harbour within themselves deep and important unclarities, while others foist upon us hopeless species of idealism. Drawing on an examination of Heideggers work throughout the 1920s, Heidegger and the Measure of Truth offers a new way of understanding that vision. Central is the proposal that propositional thought presupposes what might be called a measure, a mastery of which only a recognizably worldly subject can possess. McManus shows how these ideas emerge through Heidegger's engagement with the history of philosophy and theology, and sets out a novel reading of key elements in the fundamental ontology, including Heidegger's concept of Being-in-the-world, his critique of scepticism, his claim to disavow both realism and idealism, and his difficult reflections on the nature of truth, science, authenticity, and philosophy itself. According to this reading, Heideggers central claims identify genuine demands that we must meet if we are to achieve the feat of thinking determinate thoughts about the world around us."--Publisher's description Cover 1 Contents 12 Introduction 16 Part I 24 1 The Concept of ‘Constitution’ 26 1.1 ‘Constitution’ and a phenomenological project 26 1.2 The project illustrated: The objecthood of God and the ‘how’ of Christian faith 32 1.3 Further ‘original havings’ 35 2 ‘Constitution’ and the Categories 43 2.1 Con-formity and the ‘application’ of the categories 43 2.2 Constitution and idealism 50 2.3 ‘Living in the categories’ 52 2.4 Intimations of ‘Being-in-the-world’ and the vanishing of talk of ‘constitution’ 56 2.5 The ‘subject-correlates’ of science and philosophy 60 Part II 64 3 Vorhandenheit 66 3.1 Themes in the discussion of Vorhandenheit 68 3.2 Vorhandenheit and assertion 74 3.3 Vorhandenheit and science 77 3.4 Vorhandenheit and Zuhandenheit 83 4 Dreyfus’s Concept of the ‘Background’ 91 4.1 What is the ‘background’ meant to do for us? 92 4.2 A first ‘regress of rules’ 95 4.3 A second ‘regress of rules’ 104 Part III 116 5 The Measure of Truth 118 5.1 Constitution and measure 120 5.2 ‘Empty intending’ and truth as ‘fulfilment’ 122 5.3 ‘Living in the Hinblick’ 126 5.4 A skeleton for some themes of the fundamental ontology 130 6 The ‘Founding’ of Measurement in Understanding without Fit 150 6.1 Understanding without fit: Manipulating the Zuhanden 153 6.2 The ‘founding’ of measurement 156 6.3 Objections and clarifications 159 6.4 ‘Appropriating’ or ‘being lived by’ one’s measures 169 Part IV 178 7 Being-in-the-World and Truth Revisited 180 7.1 The ‘soul/external world gulf ’ 180 7.2 Finite knowing, ‘presupposing truth’, ‘living in the truth’ and ‘in untruth’ 181 7.3 ‘Empty intending’, ‘logical space’, and the ‘most obvious objection’ 189 7.4 On the ‘real/ideal gulf ’ 191 7.5 Truth’s dependency on Dasein 196 8 Vorhandenheit and Zuhandenheit Revisited 205 8.1 Zuhandenheit revisited 205 8.2 Vorhandenheit and the Theoretical Attitude revisited 208 8.3 Seinsvergessenheit and ‘Vorhandenheit in the broadest sense’ 210 8.4 Vorhandenheit and assertion revisited 213 8.5 Inauthenticity and the ‘double meaning’ of the ‘Theoretical Attitude’ 217 9 Metaphilosophical Issues and Further Questions 223 9.1 ‘Original havings’ and the ‘Being and Time’ project 225 9.2 Recalling the measure 230 9.3 Philosophy’s ‘subject-correlate’ revisited 237 Appendix: Heidegger’s Critique of Husserl 241 Abbreviations 244 Bibliography 247 Index 258 A 258 B 258 C 258 D 258 E 259 F 259 G 259 H 259 I 259 K 259 L 260 M 260 N 260 O 260 P 260 Q 261 R 261 S 261 T 261 U 262 V 262 W 262 Z 262 Denis McManus presents a new interpretation of Heidegger's early vision of our subjectivity and of the world we inhabit. Heidegger's 'fundamental ontology' allows us to understand the creature that thinks as also one which acts, moves, even touches the world around it, a creature at home in the same ordinary world in which we too live our lives when outside of the philosophical closet; it also promises to free us from seemingly intractable philosophical problems, such as scepticism about the external world and other minds. But many of the concepts central to that vision are elusive; and some of the most widely accepted interpretations of Heidegger's vision harbour within themselves deep and important unclarities, while others foist upon us hopeless species of idealism. Drawing on an examination of Heidegger's work throughout the 1920s, Heidegger and the Measure of Truth offers a new way of understanding that vision. Central is the proposal that propositional thought presupposes what might be called a 'measure', a mastery of which only a recognizably 'worldly' subject can possess. McManus shows how these ideas emerge through Heidegger's engagement with the history of philosophy and theology, and sets out a novel reading of key elements in the fundamental ontology, including Heidegger's concept of 'Being-in-the-world', his critique of scepticism, his claim to disavow both realism and idealism, and his difficult reflections on the nature of truth, science, authenticity, and philosophy itself. According to this reading, Heidegger's central claims identify genuine demands that we must meet if we are to achieve the feat of thinking determinate thoughts about the world around us. Book jacket Denis McManus presents a new interpretation of Martin Heidegger's early vision of our subjectivity and of the world we inhabit. Heidegger's'fundamental ontology'allows us to understand the creature that thinks as also one which acts, moves, even touches the world around it, a creature at home in the same ordinary world in which we too live our lives when outside of the philosophical closet; it also promises to free us from seemingly intractable philosophical problems, such as scepticism about the external world and other minds. But many of the concepts central to that vision are elusive; and some of the most widely accepted interpretations of Heidegger's vision harbour within themselves deep and important unclarities, while others foist upon us hopeless species of idealism. Heidegger and the Measure of Truth offers a new way of understanding that vision. Drawing on an examination of Heidegger's work throughout the 1920s, McManus takes as central to that vision the proposals that propositional thought presupposes a mastery of what might be called a'measure', and that mastery of such a'measure'requires a recognizably'worldly'subject. These insights provide the basis for a novel reading of key elements of Heidegger's'fundamental ontology', including his concept of'Being-in-the-world', his critique of scepticism, his claim to disavow both realism and idealism, and his difficult reflections on the nature of truth, science, authenticity and philosophy itself. According to this interpretation, Heidegger's central claims identify genuine demands that we must meet if we are to achieve the feat of thinking determinate thoughts about the world around us. Denis McManus presents a novel account of Martin Heidegger's early vision of our subjectivity and the world we inhabit. He explores key elements of Heidegger's philosophy, and argues that Heidegger's central claims identify genuine demands that must be met if we are to achieve the feat of thinking determinate thoughts about the world around us.