Greek Scepticism: Anti-Realist Trends in Ancient Thought (McGill-Queens Studies in the History of Ideas) (Volume 14)

Intro Contents Abbreviations Acknowledgments Preface I: Toward a New Interpretation of the Sceptics II: Greek Epistemology before the Rise of Scepticism III: The Rise of Scepticism IV: Early Pyrrhonism V: Scepticism in the Academy VI: Later Pyrrhonism VII: Ancient Scepticism and Modern Epistemology Appendix: Flourishing Dates of Ancient Thinkers Bibliography Index Locorum General Index The Negative Side of Scepticism Standard Criticisms of the Sceptics The Positive Side of Scepticism: Mitigated Scepticism Moral and Religious Scepticism Scepticism as Anti-Realism. Scepticism and IdealismContemporary Anti-Realism Historiography and the Sceptics Xenophanes Heracleitus Epicharmus Parmenides Zeno Empedocles Anaxagoras Summary The Sophists Democritus: Atomism, Idealism, and Equanimity Protagoras: Utility and Anti-Realist Truth Metrodorus and Anaxarchus: Idealism and Equanimity Socrates: Mitigated Scepticism The Megarians Monimus and Cynic Indifference The Cyrenaics: External Objects and Other Minds Plato The Rise of Scepticism The Arguments for Early Pyrrhonism Pyrrhonism as a Practical Philosophy Equanimity and Indifference. AppearancesPyrrhonism and Idealism The Consistency of Early Pyrrhonism Toward Later Pyrrhonism The Arguments for Academic Scepticism Academic Arguments, Probability, and Equal Opposition Academic Equanimity Arcesilaus and Natural Belief The Consistency of Arcesilaus' Outlook Arcesilaus and Sextus Carneades and Plausibility Cicero on the Plausible The Consistency of Carneades' Scepticism Carneades, Arcesilaus, and Pyrrho Philo, Metrodorus, and Cicero The Arguments for Later Pyrrhonism The Problem of the Criterion Practical Affairs The Consistency of Later Pyrrhonism. Pyrrhonean Anti-RealismThe Standard Interpretations Mental States Contemporary Anti-Realism The Sceptical Perspective Alcmaeon Aristotle Athenaeus Cicero Democritus Diogenes Laertius Empedocles Epicharmus Epictetus Euripides Eusebius Gellius Gorgias Heracleitus Hippolytus Lactantius Lucretius Marcus Aurelius Metrodorus Nausiphanes Parmenides Pausanias Philo of Alexandria Philostratus Photius Plato Plutarch Sextus Empiricus Simplicius Suidas Tertullian Theophrastus Xenophanes Xenophon Zeno A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P R S T U V W.

In Greek Scepticism Leo Groarke presents a more sympathetic and accurate account of Greek scepticism and its relevance to modern and contemporary thought. He begins with an account of the development of scepticism in pre-Socratic times and concludes with a discussion of the relationship of scepticism to modern and contemporary epistemology. Groarke argues that the sceptics posed the problems central to both ancient and modern epistemology, and that in fact scepticism is the ancient analogue of anti-realist trends which are thought to be uniquely modern. He also shows that scepticism is not simply negative, but offers a positive philosophy which mitigates the sceptical critique of knowledge. Greek Scepticism undermines our usual account of the development of modern epistemology. Groarke shows that the separation of the mind and the external world that is generally attributed to Descartes is actually an integral part of ancient scepticism. In discussing the major problems that stem from this distinction, ancient scepticism anticipates thinkers such as Berkeley, Kant, and Hume. Groarke maintains, controversially, that the doubts of the ancient sceptics are deeper and epistemologically more significant than those of the philosophers usually discussed today.