Grasping Gallipoli - Terrain, Maps and Failure at the Dardanelles, 1915 (2015)

The failure of the Gallipoli campaign was instantly blamed on a great untruth – that the War Office was unprepared for Dardanelles operations and gave Sir Ian Hamilton little in the way of maps and terrain intelligence. This myth is repeated by current historians. The Dardanelles Commission became a battleground of accusation and counter-accusation. This book, incorporating much previously unpublished material, demonstrates that geographical intelligence preparations had indeed been made by the War Office and the Admiralty for decades. They had collected a huge amount of terrain information, maps and charts covering the topography and defences, and knew a great deal about Greek plans to capture the Gallipoli Peninsula. At least one plan was Anglo-Greek! Much of this material, which is here identified and evaluated, was handed over to Hamilton's Staff. Additional material was obtained in theatre before the landings, T. E. Lawrence playing a part. This book, which is the first to examine the intelligence and mapping side of the Dardanelles campaign, looks closely at its terrain, and describes the production and development of new operations maps, and clarifies whether the intelligence was properly processed and efficiently used. It also examines the use of aerial photos taken by the Royal Naval Air Service during the campaign, and charting, hydrographic and other intelligence work by the Royal Navy. Title -- Acknowledgements -- Contents -- List of Maps -- Glossary -- Foreword -- Introduction: The Issues -- Chapter 1 The Gallipoli Peninsula -- Chapter 2 Genesis of the Gallipoli Campaign -- Chapter 3 Pre-War Geographical Intelligence -- Chapter 4 Terrain Intelligence at the Outbreak of War -- Chapter 5 Intelligence from March 1915 -- Chapter 6 The First Operations Maps -- Chapter 7 Gallipoli from the Air -- Chapter 8 Admiralty Hydrographic Surveys -- Chapter 9 Captured Maps and New Maps -- Chapter 10 Repeating the Mistakes: the Suvla Landings -- Chapter 11 Retrospect -- Appendix I Military Report on Eastern Turkey in Europe, 1905 -- Appendix II NID 838 May, 1908, Turkey, Coast Defences -- Appendix III WO Report on the Defences of Constantinople, 1909 -- Appendix IV Samson's Report on Landing Places at Kaba Tepe, 1910 -- Appendix V Manual of Combined Naval and Military Operations, 1913 -- Appendix VI Dowson's Notes on Mapping from Aeroplane photographs in the Gallipoli Peninsula, 1915 -- Appendix VII Dowson's Report on Visit to Gallipoli, July 1915 -- Bibliography -- Authors' Note -- Copyright The failure of the Gallipoli campaign was instantly blamed on a great untruth - that the War Office was unprepared. This book, incorporating information unavailable elsewhere, shows that in fact the WO and the Admiralty had amassed a huge amount of data. Aerial reconnaissance had played a part - even Lawrence of Arabia had done his bit! The War Office knew all about Greek plans to capture the peninsula and one plan was even Anglo-Greek. The authors examine all the intelligence and how it was used or ignored and in the process, in the words of the late Richard Holmes they 'illuminate a wildly beautiful landscape, which never fails to charm and shock me in equal measure.'