Grandeur And Misery: France's Bid for Power in Europe, 1914-1940 (Hodder Arnold Publication)

A central question in European history is how did a great power pre-eminent in 1918 lie defeated by the same enemy less than 20 years later. Until recently the explanation has been sought in fundamental weaknesses that could only leave the French of 1940 hamstrung and demoralized. Recent studies have challenged that view and now, for the first time, the revisionist approach is displayed in a single volume, both summarizing the research of others and drawing on the author's own work in the archives. The book is about as far from ‘dry as dust' diplomatic history as it's possible to get. Its very readable and the author manages to show with the telling anecdote that even a serious subject has its comic side: that, for instance, the French High Command kept forces stationed in the Alps for seven years because no one in the foreign service had thought to pass on news about a secret treaty between Italy and France in 1902; or that after a particularly stressful meeting Andrew Bonar Law, the British prime minister, mouth to Poincaré, the French president, through the closed carriage window of his train ‘and you go to hell', all the while smiling and exuding affability. Such episodes are not the substance of the book, but they oil its progress. France's fall in 1940 was Europe's loss. Germany's rise and hegemony inflicted horrendous suffering and savagery. The transition from victor in 1918 to vanquished in 1940 has usually been seen in terms of a decline and fall, France's defeat the outcome of deep-seated political, social, and economic weaknesses. But that view has been undermined by detailed studies of recent years. In this new account - the only up-to-date one-volume treatment - Adamthwaite offers a long-overdue reassessment of all the central issues, drawing on the secondary work in the field but relying also on his own findings in the archives. Nothing was inevitable about France's eclipse: the victory of 1918, he argues, could have been turned into a real predominance. Despite powerful constraints, leaders had room for manoeuvre. Contingency and chanciness not inevitability characterized French policy. The roles of prime ministers, presidents, foreign ministries, military chiefs are but one part of the story, as this book demonstrates; they operated in a context subject to the ebb and flow of different economic, political, strategic and cultural influences, all contributing to the shaping of policy. The rivalries, lapses, and absurdities inherent in most human conduct also find a place, usually comic in retrospect, often expressive of larger discontents or difficulties. Adamthwaite has brought alive again issues long buried under the weight of orthodox opinion, showing us a France whose fate was less preordained than is customarily supposed. It is for that reason alone a more poignant story than usual. Cover Contents Illustrations, maps and tables Preface Acknowledgements Chronology Presidents and ministers of France, (1914-1940) 1 France and the World 2 Armageddon 3 Peace-making, 1919 4 The Price of Victory 5 A flawed response 6 Predominance, 1919-1924 7 Locarno, 1925 8 Indian summer, 1926-1931 9 Economics, armaments, decision-making 10 Ideology, opinion and foreign policy 11 Challenges, 1932-1936 12 War again, 1936-1939 Epilogue Notes Guide to further reading Index A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z Recent studies have challenged the view of fundamental French weakness in 1940 and , for the first time, the revisionist approach is displayed in a single volume, both summarizing the research of others and drawing on the author's own work in the archives.

This account of France's transition from victor in 1918 to vanquished in 1940 offers a long-overdue reassessment of all the central issues.